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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the role of the mishu (staff)
institution in contemporary Chinese politics. The findings of
this research reveal that there are about one million mishu
personnel in the Chinese political arena, who either serve
individual leaders privately or work in general offices to
provide staff support collectively to leadership squads at
various levels. Significantly, the mishu institution
constitutes a separate sub-system that runs vertically from
top to bottom and cuts horizontally across various
bureaucratic hierarchies across the country. Functioning as a
type of "counter-bureaucracy," the mishu provides the
political leadership with a countervailing base of expertise
and an extra channel of information and authority flow,
helping keep political leaders well informed and strengthen
their capacity to closely monitor and supervise the process
of policy implementation by regular bureaucracies. Moreover,
the mishu also works as a major cushioning mechanism in
Chinese politics, absorbing personality conflicts,
reconciling policy disagreements, and softening power
struggles among political principals.
For a deeper understanding of the mishu phenomenon,
comparisons are made with its historical roots in ancient
China and with the practice of the US staff system of today.
This research concludes that in spite of the apparent
structural fragmentation associated with the post-Mao
reforms, the controlling and cushioning roles of the mishu
institution help to maintain, to a remarkable degree, the
integration of the Chinese authority structure, thus
providing a balance to the currently dominant view among
China scholars that in the post-Mao era the Chinese political
leadership has largely lost control over the bureaucracy and
that the Chinese authority structure is on the verge of
disintegration.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Lucian W. Pye
Title: Henry Ford Professor of Political Science
(emeritus)
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Politicians everywhere experience difficulties of varying
degrees in controlling state bureaucracies. Instances abound
of their helplessness before the power and autonomy of a
bureaucracy. For a rather extreme example:
In 1923 Rudolf Hilferding, the famous socialist economist
and a left-wing Social Democrat, became the German Weimar
Republic's sixth finance minister. His own civil servants
were highly suspicious of him and decided that they would run
the ministry without him. Nothing of any significance passed
across his desk. Their action led directly to his nervous
breakdown. After he returned to work the collaboration of his
officials was only guaranteed once he had agreed not to make
any radical policy initiatives. 1
In the United States, President Nixon was once similarly
frustrated over bureaucratic obstinacy. As H.R. Haldeman, his
chief-of-staff, recalled,
... by 1971 Nixon had realized he was virtually powerless to
deal with the bureaucracy in every department of the
government. It was no contest. Nixon could rave and rant.
Civil servants, almost all liberal Democrats, would thumb
their noses at him.2
Even in China where political leaders may appear to be
able to exercise absolute power over the bureaucracy, the
1. Edward C. Page, Political Authority and Bureaucratic
Power: A ComDarativeAnalysis, Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1985, p. 1.
2. Larry Berman, The New American Presidency, Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1987, p, 108.
existing literature contains plenty of evidence to suggest
that the Chinese bureaucracies are quite capable of thwarting
the control from above. Indeed, even Mao Zedong himself
frequently complained about unreliability of the Party
bureaucracy, whose heads, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping,
treated him like a "dead parent" "whose funeral was taking
place," meaning that although he was shown formal deference,
Mao "was never even consulted" on many important decisions. 3
(Mao's frustration over being isolated and kept in the dark
by the bureaucracy will be discussed in greater detail in a
later chapter.)
Deng Xiaoping harbors comparable bitterness over the
various obstacles and sabotages presented by the Chinese
bureaucracy to his reform efforts, as is reflected in his
statement below:
Bureaucracy remains a major widespread problem in the
political life of our Party and state. Its harmful
manifestations include the following: standing high above the
masses; abusing power; divorcing oneself from reality and the
masses; spending a lot of time and effort to put up an
impressive front; indulging in empty talk; sticking to a
rigid way of thinking; being hidebound by convention;
overstaffing administrative organs; being dilatory;
inefficient and irresponsible; failing to keep one's word;
circulating documents endlessly without solving problems;
shifting responsibilities to others; and even assuming the
airs of a mandarin, reprimanding other people at every turn,
vindictively attacking others, suppressing democracy,
deceiving superiors and subordinates, being arbitrary and
despotic, practicing favoritism, offering bribes,
participating in corrupt practices in violation of the law,
and so on. Such things have reached intolerable dimensions
3. Lucian W. Pye, Mao Tse-tuna: The Man in the Leader,
New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1976, p. 57.
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both in our domestic affairs and in our contacts with other
countries.4
Nevertheless, the above familiar image of bureaucratic
obstinacy should not lead to the conclusion that political
leaders are helpless and powerless. As a matter of fact,
politicians have at their disposal a variety of mechanisms to
strengthen their control over bureaucracies, such as
budgetary controls, congressional hearings, and political
appointments in the Western case, and political campaigns,
massive purges, ideological indoctrination, etc., in the case
of China under Mao.
This dissertation examines in detail another control
mechanism -- personal staffs. It is commonplace for political
leaders everywhere to use their personal staffs to help
amplify their power over state bureaucracies. Chinese
political principals are no exception, though the staff role
in this regard has so far been generally neglected in the
existing studies of Chinese politics, resulting in
exaggeration of political leadership's loss of power over
bureaucracies in the post-Mao era. As the findings of this
research will demonstrate, Chinese political leaders depend
heavily upon the assistance of staff personnel in their
service, who play a highly significant role in helping
political leadership at various levels to control
4. "Speech to the Enlarged Meeting of the Political
Bureau," in Selected Works of Dens Xiaopina, Beijing: F6reign
Language Press, 1984, p. 310.
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bureaucracies and thus sustain the integrity of China's
authority structure.
The Chinese staff system is the focus of this research,
and the basic research issues that this dissertation
addresses are as follows.
* What are the structures, functions, and dynamics of the
Chinese staff institution in the leadership-bureaucracy
interaction?
* What are the similarities and differences between the
Chinese staff institution of today and those in the Western
political systems and in ancient China?
* What is the impact of the staff role on the power
allocation between leadership and bureaucracy and on the
integrity of the authority structure in the Chinese
political arena?
The Characteristics of Bureaucracy: Literature Review
In order to understand the inherent tension and
unavoidable struggle between political leadership and the
bureaucracy, it is necessary to appreciate the distinctive
characteristics of the bureaucratic form of organization,
both in concept and in practice, which tend to give it great
actual power and autonomy.
According to the ideal type as first explicated by Max
Weber, bureaucracy is characterized by hierarchy,
impersonality, standardization, and specialization, which in
turn are based on a comprehensive body of written rules,
12
regulations, and laws. The hierarchical structure is intended
to guarantee the unity of command, namely, each official
reports to one and only one superior, thus avoiding any
confusion in the chain of comr.,and. But "hierarchical
subordination ... does not mean that the 'higher' authority
is simply authorized to take over the business of the
'lower.' Indeed, the opposite is the rule." 5 That is because
the scope of competence for each bureaucrat is clearly
defined and strictly delimited by rules and laws.
Impersonality means, above all, that loyalty should go to the
office rather than any individual leader, 6 and that duties
should be performed without regard to particularistic
considerations but according to universalistic, impartial
rules, in order to minimize corruptive conduct like nepotism
and favoritism.7 Impersonality also means that personal
sentiments and passions should be excluded from the process
of decision making and implementation, so as to maximize
predictability and stability of the bureaucratic operation.8
Standardization requires that recurrent and common issues
should be handled consistently and uniformly, without varying
5. Max Weber, wBureaucracy," in H. H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Socioloav, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 197.
6. Ibid. p. 199.
7. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1967, pp. 59-60, 65-66.
8. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," pp. 215-216.
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from case to case. This also serves to enhance predictability
and continuity. Specialization, or a high degree of division
of labor, is meant to facilitate the accumulation of special
expertise and perfection of necessary skills, so as to
improve efficiency.9
In a nutshell, a bureaucrat is expected to use his head
instead of his heart, to be instrumentally rational rather
than morally or socially emotional, to follow rules instead
of using excessive discretion, and to be loyal to the office
instead of individual leaders. Put in another way,
bureaucracy should function like a machine. Max Weber
observed, "that the purely bureaucratic type of
administrative organization ... is, from a purely technical
point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of
efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational
known means of carrying out imperative control over human
beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in
stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its
reliability. "10
Nonetheless, bureaucracies have revealed many serious
weaknesses in practice. Some of the most widely acknowledged
bureaucratic pathologies are as follows.
9. Efficiency generally means maximum output with
minimum input, e.g., time, money, manpower, or raw materials.
10. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization, edited and with an introduction by Talcott
Parsons, New York: The Free Press, 1965, p. 337.
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* Bureaucracy tends to be rigid, conservative, inert, and
inept at adapting to fast changes.11
* Bureaucracy suppresses creativity of subordinates and
stunts personal growth of individuals.1 2
* Bureaucracy is poor and inefficient at handling uncertain,
ambiguous situations and tasks, even though it may be
effective and efficient at pursuing clearly defined goals
and well understood tasks.
* Bureaucracy tends to give priority to administrative
efficiency over democratic participation, being aloof and
irresponsive toward individual citizens.
* Bureaucracy tends to grow excessively regardless of real
needs, hence "Parkinson's Law." 13
For the purpose of .this thesis, however, the above
bureaucratic ailments are not the focus of research. Rather,
the primary concern is with the various problems that
bureaucracies present for political control. From
politicians' point of view, the responsiveness of bureaucrats
to their political considerations and personal wishes is the
11. Peter M. Blau and Marshall W. Meyer, Bureaucracy in
Modern Society, 3rd ed., New York: Random House, 1987, 139-
140.
12. Warren G. Bennis, Changing Oraanizations: Essays on
the Development and Evolution of Human Organization, New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966, p. 6.
13. C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law. and Other
Studies in Administration, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1957.
15
most critical issue, and is nearly always short of
satisfactory.
The universal politician-bureaucrat conflict is
inevitable because politicians and bureaucrats have divergent
perspectives and interests due to several reasons. 1 4
Politicians and bureaucrats have different career paths: the
former come and go in fast succession but the latter stay
much longer. This causes politicians and bureaucrats to have
different time horizons. Politicians want quick results to
win votes or to achieve their ideological ideals, while
bureaucrats tend to care more about standard operating
procedures (SOP) and long-term planning.1 5 Politicians tend
to have a broader vision and a more comprehensive, diffuse
view, whereas bureaucrats like to focus on a narrow, well-
defined vista, due to specialization.1 6  Specialization
14. It is admitted that the following characterization
is conducted on a highly abstract level with a view to
capturing the core features at the risk of
oversimplification.
15. Douglas Yates, Bureaucratic Democracy: The Search
for Democracy and Efficiency in American Government,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 77-78.
In addition, bureaucrats usually enjoy de facto life
employment under the protection of various civil service
regulations and laws, which leave their job security
virtually immune to political interferences. As an American
bureaucrat smugly observes, "We're all like headless nails
down here -- once you get us in, you can't get us out."
(Charles Peters, How Washinaton Really Works, Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1980, p. 46.) This often
works to embolden bureaucrats to turn deaf ears to the policy
preferences of their transient political superiors.
16. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p, 103.
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inclines a bureaucracy to have a sense of a distinct
professional identity, speaking its own language and forming
its separate ethos or culture, which is difficult for
politicians as outsiders to penetrate.1 7  Moreover,
politicians are typically generalists, often amateurs, but
bureaucrats are specialists. This fact makes it difficult for
politicians to be fully informed of bureaucrats' actual
operations and thus for the politicians to make competent
decisions to exercise effective control. This difficulty is
further exacerbated by the bureaucracy's natural tendency to
conceal its professional knowledge and secrets from
outsiders.18
Last but not least, bureaucrats have their private
interests. Out of his self-serving instincts, a bureaucrat
"tends to distort the information he passes upward to his
superiors in the hierarchy," and bureaucrats all have a
tendency "to exaggerate data that reflect favorably on
themselves and to minimize those that reveal their own
shortcomings."1 9 And when implementing policies laid down by
his superior, a bureaucrat are often found to act
aggressively in favor of those policies that advance his own
interests and ignores or drags his feet on those that injure
17. Yates, Bureaucratic Democracy, p. 89.
18. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," p. 233.
19. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 77.
17
or simply fail to advance those interests.2 0 Moreover, it is
far from uncommon for bureaucrats to use any discretionary
power at their disposal to exchange favors and look after
their private needs.
As a result, politicians often find their supposedly
subordinate bureaucracies practically beyond their control.
Max Weber once pessimistically asked, "In view of the growing
indispensability of the state bureaucracy and its
corresponding increase in power, how can there be any
guarantee that any powers will remain which can check and
effectively control the tremendous influences of this
stratum? "21
In the West, politicians have to apply a variety of
measures in order to exercise some control over the
bureaucracy. They retain the power to pass laws and make
regulations governing bureaucratic performance. They resort
to congressional oversight by periodically holding hearings,
where outside specialists and experts are brought in to
counterbalance the expertise of the bureaucracy. They put
themselves in charge of the purse strings, exercising
budgetary control ove: the bureaucracy. And they appoint
people they trust to key posts in the bureaucracy, counting
20. Ibid.
21. Max Weber, Economy and Sociaty: An Outline of
Interpretative Socioloav, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich,
eds., Vol. I, New York: 1968, app. 2, p. 1403.
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on these political appointees to make the bureaucracy heed
their desired policy orientation.
The above control measures, however, all have an
inescapable weakness, in that they can be applied only
intermittently. Thus, they often prove just enough to enable
politicians to exercise "loose control" in order to "preclude
'bull in a china shop' behavior by bureaucracies," according
to Yates.22 In other words, they work more as "fire alarms"
to prevent disasters or flagrant misconduct that enrages
politicians' constituencies than as "police patrols" to
exercise ccnstant and close supervision, to borrow the
metaphor from McCubbins and Schwartz.23 Therefore, with all
those control mechanisms in place but without adequate
22. Yates, Bureaucratic Democracy, p. 162.
23. Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms,"
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1
(February 1984), pp. 165-179.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that from the
perspective of the principal-agent theory, the 'fire alarm"
approach may be more cost-efficient and so more desirable
than the 'police patrol' approach. According to this theory,
because of *information asymmetries," some loss of control is
inevitable once the principal has delegated authority to the
agent, who possesses special expertise or superior
information regarding the task at issue. As a result, the
primary attention on the part of the principal should be
focused on designing an effective incentive structure, as "a
second-best solution," to induce satisfactory outputs,
rather than on chasing the impossible (or too costly) goal of
closely monitoring the whole process. See John W. Pratt and
Richard J. Zechhauser, 'Principals and Agents: An Overview,"
in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zechhauser, eds., Princinals
and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1985, pp. 2-5.
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personal staff assistance, politicians can still find
themselves no match for the power of the bureaucracy.2 4
The Control Function of Staffs
The preceding literature review provides ample testimony
to the difficulty that political leaders encounter in their
efforts to control the state bureaucracy. Nevertheless,
evidence suggests that there exists an important and often
effective measure for politicians to achieve constant control
over a bureaucracy, namely, a large and competent personal
staff, which can operate as a de facto "counter-
bureaucracy." 25 Overlapping extensively with the functions of
the regular bureaucracy, such a counter-bureaucracy is
capable of continuously .providing the politician with a
countervailing base of expertise, an independent source of
information, and an extra channel of authority flow. Since
staff people are typically hired (or selected) and fired (or
dismissed) at the pleasure of the leaders themselves and they
24. This fact is well reflected in the general agreement
concerning the ineffectiveness of legislative oversight in
American politics: "Most [scholars] conclude that legislative
oversight has been sporadic, atomized, erratic, trivial,
ineffective, or some combination of these." (Morris S. Ogul ,
Congress Oversees the Bureaucracv: Studies in Legislative
Sunervision, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976, p. 193)
25. For that matter, the White House staff is often
referred to as a "counter-bureaucracy" in American politics.
It is noteworthy that the importance and saliency of
staff role varies from country to country. The United States
and China are among the countries where staffs play a crucial
part in bureaucratic control, whereas in other countries like
Japan where bureaucratic tradition is strong, the staff role
in this regard is relatively limited.
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work directly for their leaders, staff members can be counted
upon to be personally loyal, responsive, and reliable to a
much greater extent than regular bureaucrats. This control
function of a staff is analyzed by Anthony Downs, who writes:
The control advantages of a staff result from its quasi-
redundancy relative to the line.2 6 An official served by a
large staff really has two line organizations working for
him: the line hierarchy and the staff hierarchy....Because
the staff organization parallels the line but works through
technically specialized vertical channels, the top-level
official can use each organization as a means of by-passing
and checking up on the other. The staff thus increases his
control over the line because it acts as an external monitor
and its functions partly overlap those of the line.2 7
In actual practice, having adequate staff assistance or
not may mean the difference between being a true master or a
mere figurehead. The correlation between power and the amount
of personal staff assistance is illustrated by a comparison
between Japanese and Italian politicians. Without adequate
26. Here, the "line" refers to the leaders of a
subordinate bureaucracy. Western organization theory contains
a line-staff dichotomy. The concept of "staff" in this
dichotomy refers basically to the same personnel as the
concept being used in this research, namely, those who work
directly for leaders and who are theoretically entitled only
to provide advice and assistance upward to the leadership but
not to issue orders and commands downward directly to
subordinate departments in their own right. The "line" refers
to the leadership personnel, who bear operational
responsibility for a bureaucracy and have formal authority to
make decisions and issue orders directly to the subordinates.
It should be pointed out that the line-staff dichotomy
and the leadership-staff-bureaucracy triangle nexus do not
correspond exactly, in that the concept of "bureaucracy" in
the latter denotes both the line and the staff of a
subordinate organization.
27. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 154.
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staff assistance, Japanese political leaders find themselves
heavily dependent upon the bureaucracy. Ezra Vogel explains:
Even the prime minister's office has only a limited research
capacity,...Lacking the staff to make independent analysis,
the prime minister's office must ally with the ministries
rather than work around them.... Indeed, the prime minister is
not expected to formulate policy statements of his own.
Rather, he works closely with the bureaucracy and enunciates
what various ministries advise him to.28
In sharp contrast, supported by large, competent staffs,
Italian politicians enjoy enough independence to be able to
reduce career bureaucrats virtually to a state of irrelevance
in the process of policy formation. Italian ministers, or
political appointees, recruit their personal staffers from
outside -- mostly from among university professors and
experts in public corporations -- and they bring their large
entourages of personal assistants with them "from ministry to
ministry." 2 9 Consequently, Italian politicians can afford
even to cut their contact with the career bureaucrats down to
the minimum necessity for discharging their work. In one
somewhat extreme case, "a director general of the Ministry of
the Treasury confessed that for years he had not been able to
see the minister on whom he depended."30 Italian politicians
are able to rely exclusively on their staffs for "drawing up
of bills to submit to the approval of Parliament" 31 and thus
28. Vogel, Ezra F., Japan as Number One: Lessons for
America, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979, p.
61.
29. Sabino Cassese, "The Higher Civil Service in Italy,"
in Ezra N. Suleiman, ed., Bureaucrats and Policy Making: A
Comparative Overview, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984, p.44.
30. Ibid.
31. Thid.
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they can monopolize policy initiatives over the
bureaucracy.32
The correlation between substantial staff support and
power of control may also be demonstrated by a single country
at different historical times, as in the case of American
politics. During the first decades of the United States'
history when "(t)he Congress refused to make even the minimal
appropriation to provide secretarial assistance [to the
Presidency]," many of the incumbents of this apparently
exalted office came to the conclusion that their job was
actually "a situation of dignified slavery" or "a glorified
clerkship." 3 3 Their responsibility was full of ceremonial
trivia but had little real power, while power resided largely
with department secretaries and the Congress.3 4 Later, only
32. Quansheng Zhao has also noticed the correlation
between staff support and power in comparing the Japanese
Diet and the U.S. Congress. Zhao writes: 'The [Japanese]
government provides only two or three congressional aides for
Diet members, so that Diet members have to rely heavily on
... bureaucracy in drafting legislation. In contrast, members
of the U.S. Congress have enough funds from the government to
hire both administrative and legislative aides. The average
number of aides a senator has, for example, is about twenty-
five or more, and it may reach seventy-five. Many legislative
aides have higher academic degrees, often Ph.D.s, in their
fields and write drafts for legislation without outside
help....Instead of relying on the bureaucracy as Japanese
politicians do, American politicians rely on congressional
staff.' Japanese Policvmakina: Informal Mechanisms and the
Making of China Policy, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993, pp. 200-
201.
33. Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents: The Secret
History of the Chief Executives and Their Ton Aides, New
York: Times Books, 1979, pp. 11-12.
34. George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne,
Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, p. 8.
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with a greatly enlarged and strengthened white House staff
did the balance of power begin to tip in favor of the
Presidency. A large staff directly at the disposal of the
President provided him with three advantages: "First, it gave
the president more discretion and allowed him to take more
personal credit for policy developed by his administration.
Second, it gave the presidency a capacity to formulate policy
distinct from and independent of the departments and
agencies. Third, it accelerated the shift of power from the
departments and agencies to the white House."3 5
It is well known to historians that Chinese emperors
relied heavily on their personal staffs, called "inner
court," to help control the state bureaucracy. The entire
Chinese dynastic history was featured by recurrent power
struggles "between the so-called inner court (neitina), the
emperor's faction, and the outer court (waicha ) , the
bureaucracy's faction."3 6 Although at times "strong
bureaucrats might isolate the emperors and administer the
realm independently,"37 many emperors were able to assert
their will "to rule as well as .to reign" and to exercise
35. Ibid. p. 183.
36. Beatrice S. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: The
Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ina China. 1723-1820, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991, p. 4.
37. Ibid. p. 4.
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effective control over the bureaucracy with the help of "a
strengthened inner court."38 For example,
Thus strengthened within his inner court, Yongzheng [emperor]
was able to reach out for power over matters previously not
directly susceptible to his will. As many areas of government
as possible were to be drawn into the inner court, where the
monarch and his close assisting ministers, rather than the
outer-court bureaucrats, would hold sway."3 9
Moreover, at the regional levels, centrally-appointed
scholar-officials let their entourages of personal aides,
called mufu (tent government), play a very large role in
helping control their local subordinates, called "clerks"
(.i), who tended to amass tremendous actual power and become
hard to control due to their deep-rooted connections with
local populace and their familiarity with technical matters
of government such as legal procedures, taxation, and
bookkeeping.40
As is evident from the above examples, sufficient staff
support is crucial for attempting effective control over the
bureaucracy, hence the pithy saying: "Staffing is power." 41
Therefore, any assessment of the power allocation between
38. Ibid. p. 24.
39. Ibid. p. 17.
40. The best study of the mufu system in English
literature is probably Kenneth E. Folsom's book, Friends
Guests, and Colleaauas: The Mu-Fu System in the Late Ch'ina
Period, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.
41. Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond,
Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American
Lawmakina, New York: The Free Press, 1977, p. 1.
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leadership and bureaucracy cannot be accurate without
bringing the staff role into the calculus equation.
The Chinese Case
Nevertheless, the role of personal staffs has so far
been generally neglected by students of contemporary Chinese
politics, whose attention has been attracted either to the
few larger-than-life individual elites, like Mao Zedong, Zhou
Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun, or to the
gigantic, all-encompassing bureaucratic structure. 4 2 The
existing literature contains a plethora of biographies and
monographs about those top leaders and a large number of
articles and books about Chinese bureaucracies. In sharp
contrast, however, extended treatments of Chinese staffs are
virtually nonexistent. 4 3 As a result, the widely held
42. In this research, the concept of Chinese bureaucracy
refers to both functional and regional organs. The former
refer to functional ministries, agencies, and departments;
the latter, regional governments and Party committees at
levels of provinces, prefectures, municipalities, counties,
etc.
43. In fairness, scholars are not unaware of the
potential importance of leaders' staffs. For instance, Michel
Oksenberg observes that "Secretaries, playing major
information and communication roles, are crucial figures in
the Chinese system." ("Methods of Communication within the
Chinese Bureaucracy," China Quarterly, No. 57 (January-March
1974), p. 19.] Oksenberg and his co-author, Kenneth
Lieberthal notice that various staff offices play crucial
roles in linking the top leadership with the far-flung
bureaucracy but they also admit that these roles are "as yet
not well understood."(Policv Makina in China, p. 42) And A.
Doak Barnett provided very accurate description of many of
the routine functions of a staff office in his cadraes
Bureaucracy. and Political Power in Communist China, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1967.
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assumption, implicit or explicit, about the Chinese political
system is that there are only a very small number of all-
powerful but "understaffed"44 leaders presiding over a far-
flung, mammoth bureaucracy, thus leading to all kinds of
control problems.45
Without bringing the staff role into the calculus
equation, the dominant view about the Chinese leadership-
bureaucracy nexus is that it has undergone, since the
founding of the Communist regime, a process of transformation
Insufficient research on the staff role in Chinese
politics results primarily from unavailability of the
relevant information. As Oksenberg explained back in 1971,
"Documents obtained during the Cultural Revolution reveal two
other important aspects of Mao's closest policy making
associates. As the active heads of large bureaucracies, they
had their own personal staffs of advisors, secretaries, and
so on. How Politburo officials organized and used their
staffs, how the staffs attempted to influence the men they
served, and what the personal relations were among and within
the staffs of the top leaders, are major questions for an
understanding of Chinese politics, but the available
information does not allow them to be answered." ("Policy
Making under Mao, 1949-68: An Overview," in John M.H.
Lindbeck, ed., China: Manaaement of a Revolutionary Society,
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971, p. 95.)
44. Oksenberg observes, at the conference on "The
Structure of Authority and Bureaucratic Behavior in China,"
Tucson, Arizona, June 19-23, 1988, that "the top leadership
in China is relatively understaffed." See Nina P. Halpern,
"Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese
Bureaucracy," in Lieberthal and Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy, p.
131.
45. China's enormous Party and state bureaucracies
number around thirty million bureaucrats, according to the
PRC official statistics. See Yan Huai, Zhonaauo dalu zhenazhi
tizhi aiantan (Understanding the Political System of
Contemporary China), Somerset, NJ: Papers of the Center for
Modern China, 1991, p. 23. The author used to be director of
the Research Institute of Organization and Personnel of the
CCPCC Organization Department.
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from the "totalitarianism"46 of the Mao era to the current
state of "fragmented authoritarianism, "47 with political
leadership becoming ever weaker and the bureaucracy ever more
powerful. The two contrasting models, "totalitarianism" and
"fragmented authoritarianism,"' are also called "command
model" and "bargaining model" -- "the 'command model,'
emphasizing the existence of a relatively unified and
effective chain of command reaching from the top leadership
down to the ministries and local units, and the 'bargaining
model,' emphasizing the fragmentation of authority and the
exchange nature of interactions between superiors and
subordinate units." 48
46. "Totalitarianism" used in this research differs from
its conventional sense. The term conventionally refers to
state's total control over society, but it here means
political leadership's total control over the bureaucracy.
This "totalitarian" view is well reflected by Roderick
MacFarquhar in his two volumes of Origins of the Cultural
Revolution, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974 and
1983. It is also more or less reflected by Harry Harding in
his Oraanizina China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976,
California: Stanford University Press, 1981.
47. The "fragmented authoritarianism" model is suggested
primarily by Lieberthal, Oksenberg, and Lampton, and it is
explicated in these two books: Kenneth G. Lieberthal and
Michel Oksenberg, PolicyMakinga in China: Leaders.
Structures. and Processes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1988; and Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David
M. Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy. Politics. and Decision Making
in Post-Mao China, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1992.
48. Nina P. Halpern, "Information Flows and Policy
Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy," in Lieberthal and
Lampton, eds. ibid. p, 126.
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Scholars seem to agree that the "totalitarianism" or
"command" model fits the leadership-bureaucracy relationship
for the first fifteen years or so of the Chinese Communist
regime under Mao, the charismatic and all-powerful paramount
leader. At this stage, generally speaking, power was highly
concentrated in the hands of the leadership, so that "the top
political leaders have sufficient power to elicit compliance
from lower levels on almost any issues at any time."4 9 In
spite of Mao's repeated complaints, which might reflect his
excessively exacting expectations, Chinese leaders' control
over the bureaucracy was absolute by ordinary standards, to
the extent that "the problem of excessive control seemed far
greater than that of inadequate discipline." 50
Nonetheless, even during this "totalitarian" stage, some
scholars suggest, political leadership already began to show
signs of losing ground to the bureaucracy. It is true that
Chinese political leadership was capable of bringing to bear
intensified and overwhelming coercive power, which no
bureaucrats could possibly resist. Political leaders launched
mass movements, rectification campaigns, massive purges,
ideological broadsides, and other draconian measures, to
pummel the bureaucracy into submission. But, for lack of
"infrastructural power," some scholars suggest, such flexing
49. Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policv Making in China, p.
135.
50. Harding, Organizing China, p. 350.
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of "despotic power" could not be sustained. 51 As a result,
the bureaucracy could always wait and find a new opportunity
to reassert its interests and actual power, if only in a
subtle, disguised manner. Therefore, it is suggested that
Chinese leadership's domination over the bureaucracy was
better characterized, not by "totalitarianism," but by
"sporadic totalitarianism." This perspective can be found in
Yia-ling Liu's interpretation about the recurrent political
games between the higher authorities and the local cadres in
the development of private economy at Wen Zhou.
No one [of the local cadres] seemed able to resist the
radical policy imposed by the work team [which represented
the will of the higher authorities]. However, each time,
after the campaign subsided and the work team left, the old
practice of private business gradually crept in again. Sooner
or later, this privatization process became strong enough to
provoke another attack from the state. This cyclical process
shows that the strong despotic power of the state exercised
during a political campaign can indeed suppress social
resistance to imposed radical socio-economic changes. But the
state's weak organizational capacity prevents it from
resisting compromise after the campaigns.5 2
It is also suggested that the Chinese leadership's felt
necessity to assert overwhelming power sporadically and
selectively arises from, or is intended to compensate for,
its lack of organizational capacity to process the upward
51. Yia-ling Liu, "Reform From Below: The Private
Economy and Local Politics in the Rural Industrialization of
Wen Zhou," China Ouarterlyv, No. 130 (June 1992), p. 315.
52. Ibid. p. 316. A very similar view can be found in
Vivienne Shue's book The Reach of the State: Sketches of the
Chinese Body Politic, Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1988, pp. 67-68.
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information flow from the bureaucracy on a continuous basis
and in an effective manner. As David Lampton puts it, the
Chinese political system is characterized by "the very
limited capacity of central authorities to oversee how policy
is being implemented or to assess the full range of its
effects in a timely manner." That is because "the Center has
limited capacity to verify lower-level reports
independently."53 By imposing a conformity mentality through
intermittent application of coercion, Chinese leaders hoped
to achieve "greater fidelity [of the bureaucracy] to the
goals of the leaders even in the absence of informational and
other resources adequate to assure the desired level of
compliance. "53
Moreover, it is argued that the apparently totalitarian
control by the leadership is also eroded by other two
factors: the cellular or "honeycomb" structure and patron-
client ties. Chinese regional bureaucracies are, according to
some scholars, highly self-sufficient and have a natural
tendency to become "independent kingdoms" (duli wangguo).54
As a result, the central leadership's control over them is
53. Kenneth G. Lieberthal, "Introduction: The
'Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model and Its Limitations," in
Lieberthal and Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy, p. 6.
54. David M. Lampton, "The Implementation Problem in
Post-Mao China," in D. M. Lampton, ed., Poligy
Implementation In Post-Mao China, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987, p. 19.
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quite limited and can be in fact more token than real. 5 5 As
Lieberthal and Oksenberg state:
According to this 'cellular' perspective, there is a great
concentration of power in the hands of provincial level
officials and leaders of lower level units (danywi). China is
thus a cellular economy and polity, with the territorial
components of the system surprisingly self-sufficient and
capable of thwarting and subverting Beijing demands. Far from
being an efficient system controlled from the top, then, this
view considers the Chinese chain of command inefficient,
largely ineffective, and -- to the extent it works --
laboriously slow.56
Scholars have also noticed that the Chinese leadership-
bureaucracy relationship is riddled with the holes of
personalistic, particularistic, and factional ties.
Therefore, instead of being able to effectively exercise
policy initiative on an aggregate level, Chinese leadership
tends to be bogged down in the quagmire of dyadic, patron-
client relationship of exchanges with individual bureaucrats
at lower levels. 57
55. The most representative of this view is Audrey
Donnithorne's article, "China's Cellular Economy: Some
Economic Trends since the Cultural Revolution," China
Ouarterlv, No. 52 (October-December 1972), pp. 605-619. It is
also reflected in the following works: Andrew G. Walder,
Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese
Industri, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986;
Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State; and Victor Nee,
"Between Center and Locality: State Militia, and Village," in
Victor Nee and David Mozingo, eds., State andSocietvy in
Contemporary_ China, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983,
pp. 223-243.
56. Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China,
pp. 135-136.
57. This view is reflected by the following authors:
Jean Oi, "Communism and Clientelism: Rural Politics in
China," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1985), pp.
238-266; and Victor Nee, "Peasant Entrepreneurship and the
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With Mao passing from the political scene, Chinese
leaders seem to have lost dominance over the bureaucracy
faster and more visibly: "The fragmentation ... grew
increasingly pronounced under the reforms beginning in the
late 1970s,..." 58 The current state of the leadership-
bureaucracy relationship is captured by the "fragmented
authoritarianism" model. According to this model, the
leadership has been paralyzed by the fragmentation of the
authority structure to the extent that the Chinese political
process has in effect turned into something like "protracted
guerrilla warfare,"59 "the bargaining treadmill," or "the
rural country fair or market, a setting characterized by
protracted haggling, posturing, conditional outcomes,
frequent failure to reach agreement, and issues that rise and
fall on the agenda, but are rarely fully resolved or
discarded." 60 Thus, the Chinese political process is better
perceived, not any longer as a "command system," where
leaders dominate the bureaucracy, but as a "bargaining
system," where the leadership and the bureaucracy are
Politics of Regulation in China," in Victor Nee and David
Stark, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism:
China and Eastern Europe, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1989, pp. 169-207.
58. Lieberthal, "Introduction," p. 8.
59. David M. Lampton, "A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining,
Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China," in Lieberthal
and Lampton, eds., Bureaucracv, p. 37.
60. David M. Lampton, "Chinese Politics: The Bargaining
Treadmill, "Issues and Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1987), p. 12.
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mutually dependent and have to achieve consensus through a
"disjointed," "protracted," and "incremental" bargaining
process, in order to get anything done.
The above transformation process from "totalitarianism"
to "fragmented authoritarianism" is most succinctly
formulated by Lieberthal and Oksenberg in an evolutionary
pattern, which they believe applies to all communist regimes.
This evolutionary pattern consists of these stages: "initial
centralization; erosion of control; response by the leaders;
response by the agencies; and emergence of a mature system."
A more detailed discussion of the pattern goes as follows:
When a communist party first seizes state power by
force, the political leaders "seek to establish a highly
unified, centralized strdtcture of authority...[and] attempt
to eliminate bureaucratic opposition and independence and
establish mechanisms for sustaining their command." 61
This is soon followed by the stage of "corrosion of
control." This arises because, in order to destroy any
autonomous societal forces and put the whole society under
its grip, the political leadership has to greatly enlarge the
state bureaucracy, and this inevitably leads to proliferation
of agencies, increased division of labor, and resultant
"departmentalism."62 Furthermore, each bureaucratic unit is
61. Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Makina in China,
pp. 403-404.
62. "Departmentalism" means pursuing separate
bureaucratic missions and interests at the expense of
overarching national goals and political leadership's
comprehensive view.
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put in charge of a certain amount of resources and thus comes
to acquire a proprietary attitude toward them. In the absence
of markets for allocating resources, bureaucracies enjoy de
facto monopoly over those resources. On the strength of this
monopoly, bureaucracies are -in a position to cultivate
networks of patron-client ties and mutual obligations to
promote and protect their separate interests. Also, this
monopolistic position gives rise to the fact that, "Formally
subordinate units enjoy enhanced ability to bargain with
their 'superiors,'" "rather than to simply accept the chain-
of-command of formal organization charts." 63
Then, "(t)he willful leaders at the apex find these
trends vexing and frustrating, and they therefore embark upon
periodic efforts to make the bureaucracy more responsive to
them."64 These efforts include restructuring bureaucracies to
prevent "departmentalism," using the Party, the army, and
the government to supervise and monitor.each other, "sending
down" (xiafana, in Chinese) bureaucrats into the countryside
for manual labor and ideological re-education, heavy doses of
ideological indoctrination, political campaigns, and massive
purges of bureaucrats. 65
63. Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Makina in China, p.
406.
64. Ibid. p. 409.
65. id.
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Nevertheless, the bureaucracy is always able to come up
with one move or another to "counter these efforts and reduce
their vulnerability to the vagaries of the top leaders,....66
It seeks to maximize its self-sufficiency by hiding critical
information, by hoarding excessive slack resources, by
exercising feigned compliance, and by cultivating patrons at
higher levels. "Over time, in short, they [bureaucrats] learn
to blunt the weapon of control of the top leaders.o67
Between moves and countermoves of the political
leadership and the bureaucracy, a "mature Soviet type system"
emerges, which "is a bureaucratically dominant but fragmented
system with a protracted, disjointed policy process
characterized by bargaining and consensus building."68
Moreover, China scholars have noticed that the process
of leadership losing power to the bureaucracy is also
accelerated in recent years by Deng Xiaoping's reforms. The
reforms have made the leaders more reluctant to use those
Maoist coercive measures, increased the "extra-budgetary"
resources available to bureaucracies, and reduced "the
resources available to central leaders to discipline
bureaucracies so as to achieve major regime goals." 6 9
66. bid.
67. Ibid.
68. I . p. 410.
69. Ibid. p. 411. The impact of redistribution of
resources on the balance of power between the Center and
localities during the years of reforms is also elaborated by
Jean C. Oi in her "Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations
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Besides, reforms inevitably involve issues of technical
complexity,. multiple trade-offs, complicated
interrelatedness, and enduring uncertainties, the handling of
which surpasses the competence of political leaders. All
these contribute to flattening the hierarchical structure and
tipping the balance of power in the favor of the bureaucracy.
The above review of the major works on the problem of
bureaucratic control in China reveals that almost no
attention has been given to the role of the staffs at the
politicians' command, though those researches have unveiled
many key elements of truth about China's leadership-
bureaucracy relationship and its metamorphosis over time. As
a result of this overlooking, there is a tendency in the
existing literature to underestimate the power and capacity
of political leadership and exaggerate the fragmentation of
the Chinese authority structure in the post-Mao era.
Nonetheless, as will be a basic argument of this thesis,
the staff system constitutes a crucial organizational tool
for Chinese political leaders to use in controlling the
bureaucracies. As will be demonstrated by this research,
Chinese political principals do have large numbers of staff
personnel in their service, who work to strengthen their
control over bureaucracies. There are, significantly, around
one million staff personnel in the Chinese political
of Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics, Vol.
45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 99-126.
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system.70 This multitude of staff members are responsible for
providing extensive political support and assistance to
leaders. They are responsible for processing all incoming
information, collecting, classifying, verifying, clarifying,
condensing, and synthesizing. They are supposed to handle all
outgoing documents, drafting, editing, censoring, and
coordinating. They are required to constantly and closely
monitor and supervise subordinate bureaucratic departments
and units in their policy implementation. They are known to
frequently go out on inspecting and investigating tours, to
keep their leaders informed about the conditions and new
developments at lower levels, as well as to ensure that the
leaders' authority is unequivocally felt and properly obeyed.
The findings of this research regarding the staff role will
demonstrate that the Chinese political leadership is in fact
much more powerful and effective than is suggested by the
existing literature, thus forcing us to rethink the power
70. Xu Ruixin et al, Zhonaauo Xiandai Mishu Gonazuo
Jichu (The Essentials of Contemporary Chinese Mishu
Profession), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989, p. 178.
The number of about one million mishus can be calculated from
the fact that: in addition to the Center and the provinces,
"...there are totally over 300 prefectures or municipalities,
over 2,000 counties or cities, more than sixty-eight thousand
townships, and over ten thousand large or medium-sized
enterprises, as well as numerous popular organizations and
colleges and universities. Each of them usually contains both
Party and administrative leadership squads, and each
leadership squad has its own general office and mishu
personnel." [Xi Zhongxun, OPreface" to The Work Reaulations
for General Offices, in Linadao tonazhi tan mishu aonazuo
(The Remarks by Leadina Comrades on Mishu Work), Beijing:
Xiandai chubanshe, 1989, p. 20.1
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distribution between leadership and bureaucracy in Chinese
politics.
Working Definitions
Before going any further, clear working definitions of
"leadership," "staff," and "bureaucracy" are in order, since
the concepts being used in this research are somewhat
different from their ideal-typical definitions or
conventional connotations. There does not exist in the
Chinese system a clear bifurcation between elective
politicians and career civil servants c. between political
appointees and permanent bureaucrats, as is the case with the
Western systems. Every one of the thirty million or so
Chinese cadres can be regarded as a political appointee, in
the sense that his appointment, promotion, or demotion is
controlled or determined by the Communist Party. Therefore,
the distinction between "political leaders" and "bureaucrats"
in this research is not based on different career paths but
instead on different positions being occupied by the actors
at issue in the organizational structure. Put in another way,
a Chinese cadre can be either a leader or a bureaucrat
depending on different perspectives.
For example, a provincial governor is a bureaucrat from
the perspective of the Central leadership squad, but he is a
leader as a member of the provincial leadership squad, from
the perspective of the provincial bureaucratic departments.
The closest example of this relative definition of a
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politician/bureaucrat identity in the American case is a
department secretary in the executive branch. From the point
of view of career civil servants, a department secretary is a
politician, since he is appointed by the President to
represent his policy orientation. But from the perspective of
the President and the White House staff, a department
secretary has become a bureaucrat. As soon as he has become
head of the department, he has "married the natives," to use
a somewhat derogatory metaphor of the White House staff to
describe department secretaries. 71 And the Miles Law takes
over, which dictates that "Where you stand depends on where
you sit." 72 The tension between a comprehensive view and a
specialized perspective and between overall organizational
goals and parochial interests will arise immediately. Thus,
"the secretary becomes the mouthpiece for the sentiments of
the department in contacts with the president and the white
House staff."73 As is the case with all Chinese cadres, an
American department secretary is either a politician or a
bureaucrat, depending on different perspectives.
71. Frank Kessler, The Dilemmas of Presidential
Leadershin: Of Caretakers and Kinas, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1982, p. 93.
72. James W. Fesler and Donald F. Kettl, The Politics of
the Administrative Process, New Jersey: Chatham House
Publishers, Inc., 1991, p. 61.
73. Kessler, The Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership, p.
93.
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It is significant to note that the Miles Law is also
applicable to Chinese politics, where its colloquial
equivalent is: &where you squat is where you shit." 74 This
phenomenon is also called "reverse cooptation," a process in
which a broad-visioned "statesman" is "captured" by the
bureaucracy or bureaucracies he is put in charge of, thus
becoming a Nzealot" or "advocate" for the narrow
institutional interests of those bureaucracies. 7 5 As Shirk
explains:
Chinese governmental institutions are structured to encourage
expressions of departmental points of view. Of course,
ministers and ministry officials are appointed by the CCP and
cannot stray too far from the preferences of the party, but
the party expects ministers to articulate the interests of
their particular sector.... Officials in China and the Soviet
Union feel no need to disguise their commitments to
departmental objectives....Everyone in China, including party
people, takes for granted that bureaucrats articulate
departmental interests and perspectives. 7 6
The following chart illustrates the three organizational
positions that correspond to the three concepts,
74. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Loaic of Economic
Reform in China, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1993, p. 99.
75. David Bachman, Bureaucracy. Economy. and LeadershiD
in China: The Institutional Oriains of the Great Leap
Forward, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 37,
44.
76. Shirk, The Political Logic, pp. 98, 100-101. It is
noteworthy that when factionalism flares up, concerns for
institutional interests are often overridden by power
considerations which are determined more by personal loyalty
than by organizational allegiance. See Lucian W. Pye, JJ4
Dynamics of Chinese Politics, Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn,
and Hain, 1981.
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aleadership," "staff," and abureaucracy," that are used in
this research with regard to the Chinese political system.
Table 1.1: The typical structure of leadership-staff-
bureaucracy relationship in the Chinese political system
leadership sauad
staff (mishu sauad)
I I I I I I I I I I
B* B B B B B B B B B
* A subordinate bureaucratic organ, e.g., ministry,
department, agency, or a lower-level government.
Every Chinese administrative organization is run by a
leadership squad (linadao banzi), which is composed of a
handful of leaders. For example, the leadership squad for a
provincial Party committee consists of about 18 leaders; that
for a prefecture Party committee, 11; that for a county Party
committee, 9.77 And every leadership squad is served and
assisted by its staff, which is called migsh squad (mishu
hanzi in Chinese). The mishu squad consists of both personal
mishu (secretary-aides), who work directly for individual
leaders, and organizational mishu, who work in the staff
office 78 and serve the leadership squad collectively. Such a
staff office, or 9general office," is typically quite
77. Yan Huai, Understanding the Political System of
Contemporary China, p. 9.
78. Such a staff office is usually called "general
office" (banaonashi/banaonatina in Chinese).
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sizable. For example, a provincial general office consists of
about 250 staff members, and the Central General Office,
probably over 1,000. A general office is literally a counter-
bureaucracy, composed of subunits that correspond to and
overlap with virtually all of.the subordinate bureaucratic
departments or units under the leadership squad.
The mishu, literally meaning "secret booko but generally
translated as "secretary," is a broad category of staff
personnel, which include aides, assistants, advisors,
secretaries, translators, office clerks, servants,
housekeepers, and bodyguards. Both personal and
organizational mishus are responsible for providing two basic
categories of services and assistance to the leaders: 1)
policy/administration and 2) logistics/private livelihood.
The former includes processing information, conducting policy
research, offering policy advice, ghost-writing official
documents, and monitoring and supervising policy
implementation; the latter refers to looking after the
private livelihood of leaders in terms of food, housing,
transport, security, medical care, recreation, down to
funeral services. Although the mishu institution can be
regarded roughly as the Chinese equivalent to the staff
systems in other countries, it possesses so many distinctive
features as to warrant the frequent use of its
transliteration when referring to Chinese staff personnel in
this thesis, in order to avoid the habitual connotations that
are associated with the Western staff systems.
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Those subordinate bureaucratic bodies in the chart refer
to functional bureaucracies (e.g., ministries, agencies, or
departments) or regional bureaucracies (e.g., lower-level
governments). The subordinate functional bureaucracies number
about 10 in. the Party system, and several dozens in the
government system; the subordinate regional bureaucracies
number anywhere from five to over thirty.
Take the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
(hereafter, CCPCC) for example. Its leadership squad refers
to the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the various key
Central leadership small groups, which together consist of
about 40 top leaders. Its staff refers to those top leaders'
personal mishus and their collective mishus working in the
Central Committee General Office. Its subordinate
bureaucracies refer to the twenty or so Central departments
or units, including Organization Department, Propaganda
Department, Department of United Front Work, Department of
International Liaison, the Xinhua News Agency, the People's
Daily, the Central Party School, as well as thirty
provincial-level Party committees. The same tripartite
structure is discernible in all Chinese political
organizations at all levels.
Unique Features of the Chinese Mishu (Staff) System
It is only one half of the story to point out that the
staff role has so far been overlooked in the studies of
Chinese politics and that staffs are in effect used
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extensively, as in many other systems and in Chinese history,
to amplify political leadership's control over the
bureaucracy. The other half, which is even more interesting
and significant from the perspective of comparative politics,
is that the Chinese mi.bu. system also performs a highly
unique function: it serves as a cushion to absorb conflicts
and clashes among political leaders and to soften the impact
of arbitrary political interventions upon the bureaucratic
administration, so as to maintain the cohesion, stability,
and continuity of the Chinese political process.
In China it is generally expected or even taken for
granted that personality conflicts, policy disagreements, and
factional power struggles will happen among political
leaders.7 9 But it is also generally expected that their
mishus should play a major role in softening such conflicts
and clashes. A PRC political observer explains:
within the Chinese Communist Party there are a legion of
political factions and interest groups. It is a delicate
matter to conduct communications and negotiations among them.
whenever a difficulty occurs, mishus play an indispensable
role in passing words back and forth among them and
reconciling their differences. 80
79. This fact is admitted by a key Central mishu, Xu
Ruixin in his The Essentials, p. 139. The author is head of
Mishu Bureau of the CCPCC General Office and deputy director
of the same General Office.
80. Luo Ning, *Chumo yu hongse gongqiang lide renwu"
('The Shadowy Figures behind the Blood-Red Wall"), Mindu
Zhongluo (Democratic China), No. 11 (1992), p. 42.
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Indeed, a large part of interpersonal relationships and
communications among political principals are in effect
conducted and mediated by their miahus. Leaders meet face to
face only at certain intervals, say, once a week, a month, a
year, or even less frequently, at formal meetings or
conferences, but their mishus are constantly in touch with
all the leaders and with each other. 81 During the intervals
between formal meetings, leaders are not supposed to contact
each other in private too frequently. A primary reason for
this arrangement is that factionalism is regarded as an
absolute taboo. Any two leaders directly contacting each
other with any conspicuous frequency in private will surely
arouse suspicion of factional foul play and thus draw fire
from their colleagues. Consequently, political leaders have
to rely heavily upon their mishus to communicate with each
other in their work and even in their personal
communications.
In order to cushion conflicts and facilitate smooth
communications between leaders, mishi personnel are required
and trained to be even-handed and impartial. They are all
expected to be superbly skilled at handling various subtle
power relationships and master the art of "walking a
81. Because of their young age and juniority and the
stringent selection process and psychological conditioning
they are subjected to, miashu personnel are generally believed
to be less prone to self-seeking factional activities than
leaders. This point will become clear as our analysis unfolds
in the following chapters.
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tightrope" among clashing leaders. 82 It is taboo for them to
be openly close to some leaders and distant from the
others. 83 It is recorded that even personal mishus of
rivaling top leaders have quietly contacted each other or
their masters' enemies in efforts to patch up the differences
and conflicts between their masters, as has been the case
with the mishus of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun.
(These practices will be discussed in detail in Chapter
Four.) Suffice it to say here that Chinese personal mishus
perform a crucial part in cushioning clashes among political
leaders, thus helping maintain a workable degree of unity and
rapport within the political leadership -- under usual
circumstances.84
Moreover, Chinese political leaders' mishius bear, in a
major way, the responsibility of ensuring the coherence and
continuity of bureaucratic administration. It is something
very peculiar about the Chinese political leadership that, on
the one hand, it has to resort to various means to secure
absolute domination over the bureaucracy, but on the other
hand, it needs to protect, so to speak, the bureaucracy from
82. Luo Ning, *The Shadowy Figures,' p. 131.
83. Hou Rui, Zenvan dana banaonashi ure (How t Work
as Director of a General Office), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe,
1990, p. 68.
84. It should be pointed out here that when factional
infighting heats up and gets out of hand among political
principals, as during the Cultural Revolution, staffs'
cushioning effect is limited.
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itself -- from its arbitrariness, inconsistency, and
whimsical zigs and zags. In the West, it is typically not a
major concern for the political party in power to guarantee
the long-term consistency and continuity of the bureaucratic
administration. Quite to the. contrary, "change" is an
appealing, vote-catching campaign slogan, since change is so
difficult. Stability and continuity are ensured by laws,85 by
the autonomous institution of civil service, and by a legion
of powerful status quo-oriented interest groups.
Consequently, when a western political party is in power, its
primary concern is how to maximize its control over the
bureaucracy and bend the bureaucratic administration as far
as possible in its favor -- until the party itself is, sooner
or later, voted out.
In China, political leaders need to worry about
maintaining stability and continuity of the bureaucratic
administration, since change is so easy. As Lucian Pye points
out, "The history of Chinese politics is one of sudden zigs
and zags in announced policies. It is not just that new
leaders bring new policies, but the individual leaders have
no strong obligations to be consistent. Chinese leaders will
85. For example, many programs and budgetary obligations
can be turned by laws into "uncontrollables" for a new
administration, thus guaranteeing their continuity. See Page,
Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power, p. 73.
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routinely introduce new policies that totally reverse
previous commitments,..."86
In addition, the practice of rule by man makes the
consistency of bureaucratic administration particularly
vulnerable. Whatever a powerful leader utters orally can be a
new policy for change in the bureaucracy. what he says now,
however, may contradict what he said on an earlier occasion,
which he may have totally forgotten. And what one leader says
on one occasion may conflict with what another leader says on
another occasion. In the absence of the supremacy of written
laws 87  and an autonomous civil service, the job of
coordination to prevent disastrous changes is largely
fulfilled by leaders' mishus. Mishus are responsible for
preserving the institutional memory, which includes all of
the leaders' past speeches, comments, opinions, and
instructions. And all new decisions and policies are required
to be researched, drafted, edited, and censored by mishu
personnel, in order to bring some measure of consistency and
coordination to them and to facilitate the stability and
continuity of the bureaucratic administration.
86. Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadrea China's
Political Cultures, Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies,
The University of Michigan, 1988, p. 82.
87. As Lieberthal points out, *The legal system [in
China] does not function in a fashion that enables it to
adjudicate key issues and establish stable precedents. Law
and regulation combined do not pose effective bars to the
adoption of policies that redistribute power and violate'past
commitments." ("Introduction," p. 21.)
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What is also interesting is the fact that there exists a
distinctive division of personae roles between Chinese
leaders and their mishus, which also helps fulfill the
cushioning/smoothening function in the leadership-staff-
bureaucracy nexus. In terms of styles, "leaders are expected
to have their distinctive and quite individualistic
styles,"8 8 but their mishus typically have a humble, modest,
unassuming, and self-effacing personality. 8 9 Leaders are
expected to be bold, firm, pushy, demanding, and even
ruthless (in the case of chief leaders) toward the
bureaucracy, thus to be awed, feared, and promptly obeyed. In
China, this intimidating quality around political authority
is functionally indispensable for maintaining social and
political order, for pushing forward with daring programs,
and for the proper functioning of the bureaucracy in general.
However, their mishus are expected to be easy-going, soft,
flexible, and conciliatory, and it is their job to smooth out
any erratic disruptions left behind by the leaders. By
contrast, in a democracy, under the pressures of elective
politics, politicians generally prefer to make themselves
appear popular, likable, consistent, and reasonable, while
letting their aides play the role of being tough, aggressive,
pushy, and changeable and thus do the "dirty work." (This
88. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre, p. 153.
89. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, pp. 131-32.
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contrast between the Chinese and the American cases will be
examined in Chapter Seven.)
What is also special about the Chinese mishu institution
is that it is organized as a separate sub-system running
vertically from the top down to the bottom of the Chinese
political system and cutting across various bureaucratic
hierarchies horizontally. Mishu offices at lower levels have
the obligation to report to, and accept guidance from, those
at higher levels and to coordinate with those at the same
levels. In contrast, in the American political arena, a staff
is typically accountable only for its own boss, and so is
inclined, if anything, to compete and fight with the staffs
of other politicians or institutions, as for example between
the White House staff and the Congressional staff. As a
result, American staffs typically function as a major source
of innovations, changes, and conflicts and tensions, whereas
Chinese mishu$s serve as a principal force toward
rapprochement, integration, stability and continuity.
Finally, there are two other features that also add to
the peculiarity of the Chinese mishu institution. First, in
addition to its political functions, the Chinese mishu systenm
is also responsible for taking care of the private life of
political leaders with regard to housing, food, recreation,
transport, health care, security, down to funeral services,
whereas these matters lie basically outside of the public
arena in the Western systems. In providing these services,
Chinese mishus tend to form highly intimate and lasting
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personal ties and mutual attachment with political
principals, knowing all their personal secrets, winning their
personal liking and trust, and becoming their favorites and
confidants. Second, the Chinese mishu institution is a
primary de facto "cadre school," where one can best learn all
the political secrets, tricks, and skills necessary for being
a successful politician in China.9 0  As a result, a
significant portion of Chinese leaders, including a good many
top leaders, have come from a background of once working as
mishus. The mishu institution is arguably the single most
important avenue for upward mobility in the Chinese
officialdom.
Central Arguments
The mishu system plays a dual role in Chinese politics
-- amplifying political control over bureaucracies and
smoothening the political process. Accordingly, there are two
central arguments to be developed in this thesis.
First, like its counterparts in many other systems, the
Chinese mishu institution provides Chinese political leaders
with necessary organizational capacity to constantly and
closely monitor and supervise the bureaucracy.
This argument is intended to be an antidote to the
present tendency often to overstate the fragmentation of the
90. Jiang Zhifeng, WanaDai chu iina de Zhonananhai
nianiu (The Last Card of the Game of Zhonananhai), San
Francisco, CA: Minzhu Zhongguo Shulin Publishing House, 1990,
pp. 144-145.
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Chinese authority structure and the degree to which Chinese
political leadership has lost power to the bureaucracy.
Although it is generally true that the Chinese authority
structure is now more fragmented than it was under Mao and
that the leadership-bureaucracy relationship has undergone a
transformation from a command system toward a bargaining
system, this evolutionary model should not be reified as
being an objective, unalterable law. It is important to
realize that Chinese leaders are not powerless and helpless
for it still possesses some powerful organizational tools to
assert and perpetuate their authority and control over the
bureaucracy. A key tool is the mishu system. If staffs have
successfully helped politicians gain and maintain control and
policy initiative over the bureaucracy in some Western
systems, e.g., the United States and Italy, there is no
logical reason to preclude such a possibility in the Chinese
case.
Second, unlike its counterparts in other systems, the
Chinese mishu institution functions as a principal
cushioning/integrating mechanism for the Chinese political
system and plays a major role in providing, under normal
circumstances, a workable degree of unity and coordination
among leaders and a measure of consistency, stability, and
continuity for bureaucratic administration.
In short, the Chinese mishu institution performs two
roles for the working of the Chinese political system:
controlling role and cushioning/lubricating role.
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Empirical Data
Since the role of the Chinese mishu system has generally
been neglected, there is little material to draw upon in the
existing Western literature, and so empirical data have had
to be collected by and large from primary sources in Chinese.
The major information sources and brief evaluations of them
are as follows.
(1) The memoir literature. The past decade has witnessed
an outpouring of autobiographies and memoirs by the former
mishus for the deceased top leaders including Mao Zedong,
Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Ye Jianying, Chen Boda, and
Jiang Qing. There is also a spate of biographies of these top
rulers. 9 1 This memoir literature provides a wealth of new
information about the inner workings of the Chinese
leadership-bureaucracy interaction at the top level and they
91. The memoir literature includes: Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou
Enlai he tade mishumen (Zhou Enlai and His Mishus), Beijing:
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1992; Dong Bian et al.,
eds., Mao Zedona he tade mishu Tian Jiaying (Mao Zedona and
His Mishu Tian Jiavina), Beijing: the Central Documents
Publishing House, 1989; Li Yinqiao, Zouxia shentan de Mao
Zedona (The Mao Zedona off the Altar), Shanxi: Zhongwai
wenhua chuban gongsi, 1989; Ye Yonglie, Chen Boda ai ren (A
Bioaradhv of Chen Boda), Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe,
1990; Fan Shuo, Ye Jianvina zai 1976 (Ye Jianyina during
1976), Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1990;
and Zhang Yunsheng, Maoiiawan iishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyi lu
(The Eyewitness Accounts of Maoiiawan: The Memoirs of Lin
Biao's Mishu), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988. Moreover, a
very useful English book, which drew heavily on this source
of information, is: Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emnerors:
China in the Era of Mao and Deng, Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, Publishers, 1992.
54
are particularly revealing about how top leaders' mishus
operated, formally and informally, in the Mao era.
(2) The mishu xue literature. Mishu xue (the study of
secretarial/staff work) contains articles and monographs by
Chinese leaders and their mishu$ concerning the mishu role in
Chinese politics as well as training manuals and textbooks
for current and prospective mishu personnel. It was a near-
taboo to discuss openly the important role of mishus in China
under Mao, but in recent years, serious efforts have been
made by the Chinese to publicly rationalize and strengthen
this role. Over ten professional journals have been
established with regard to the mishu role in Chinese
politics. 92 Training programs have been set up at over one
hundred and fifty institutions of higher learning.
Professional conferences and symposia have been convened
regularly for exchanging experiences and improving mishu
work. 93 Top leaders and their key mishus have published many
articles and books regarding the mishu role.94 These sources
92. Wang Qiangong et al., Shivona mishu aonazuo shouce
(A Practical Handbook for Mishu Work), Beijing: Guangming
ribao chubanshe, 1987, p. 400.
93. Zheng Xinghan, Danazhena iiauan mishu aonazuo aaishu
(An Outline of Mishu Work in Party and State Organs),
Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 62.
94. Particularly useful are the following two books: The
Remarks by Leadina Comrades on Mishu Work; and Xu Ruixin et
al., The Essentials; and Dana zhena iiauan mishu aonazuo
conashu (A Series of Books on Mishu Work in Party and State
Ora•ns), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, which consists of
fourteen volumes altogether and are all authored by mishus in
the general offices of Beijing, Hebei, Heilongjiang,
Liaoning, Shanxi, and Tianjin.
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provide not only a considerable amount of factual data about
Chinese misjhus in action but also information about the
normative thinking behind the formal structures and functions
of the Chinese mishu system.
Harry Harding has expressed in personal correspondence
his concern about the need to distinguish between
prescription and description, official doctrine and actual
fact, and myth and reality in treating the information from
this Chinese source. He advises against falling into the same
trap as did such early China scholars as John Lewis and Franz
Schurmann, whose works, as was pointed out by Harding in his
influential article, "were less an analysis of Chinese
political practice than an exegesis of the formal doctrine of
the Chinese Communist Party..95 Harding's prudent advice will
be properly heeded in this research. Nonetheless, it is worth
pointing out that the literature on mishu theory and practice
is a new breed of Chinese organization theory. It differs, in
two significant aspects, from the doctrinal writings of the
top leaders on which those early researches were based.
In this series the following are particularly useful:
Hou Rui, How to Work as Director of a General Office; Hou
Rui, Huivi zhuzi vu fuwu (Oraanizina and Servicing of
Conferences); Qi Peiwen et al., Zen.ana danahao linadaoren
mishu (How to Be a Good Personal Mishu for a Leader); Wang
Fangzhi et al, Weniian shoufa vu chuli (Receiving.
Dispatchina. and Processing of Documents); and Wang Zhande et
al., Gonawen zhuanxie vu hegao (Drafting and Editing of
Official Documents).
95. Harry Harding, "The Study of Chinese Politics:
Toward a Third Generation of Scholarship," World Politice,
Vol. 36 (January 1984), p. 288.
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First, the literature on mishu work is more like practical
advice than authoritative injunctions. It involves more
consensus-building discourse appealing to the common sense
(conditioned by the popular cultural ethos) than the official
doctrine that simply imposes leadership's will in a
monological and high-handed manner. Second, while the works
of the earlier Communist leaders advocated a revolutionary
break with the Chinese tradition, the new mishu literature
consciously seeks roots in traditional Chinese political
thinking. For instance, almost all the textbooks and training
manuals for Chinese mishus begin with a chapter or two on the
history of the Chinese mishu system, which trace the
institution back for thousands of years, dynasty by dynasty.
In this regard, this new breed of Chinese organization theory
is more consistent with enduring and deep-seated elements of
Chinese political culture, and deserves to be taken more
seriously.
(3) Chinese literature published outside mainland China.
Chinese political observers and exiles in Hong Kong, Taiwan,
United States and elsewhere have noticed the role of mishus
in Chinese politics and touched upon it in their
publications. 96 Information from this source is particularly
96. One of such books that is especially useful is Jiang
Zhifeng, The Last Card of the Game of Zhonanananhai. The author
used to be a personal mishu to a Chinese Central leader.
Journal articles that are particularly useful are Shi
Liuzi, 'Zhonggong 'mishu bang' qunxiang" ('A Group Portrait
of the Chinese Communist Secret Secretaries"), Minzhu
Zhongauo (Democratic China), No. 11 (1992), pp. 24-28; Sima
Mai, "Yuyong xiucai de beiju: Mao Zedong de zhengzhi mishu
Tian Jiaying" ('The Tragedy of the Imperial Scholar: Mao
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useful for examining the mishu role for the current top
leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, and
Jiang Zemin.
(4) Interviews. Interviews have been made with some
important Chinese mishus at the Central and regional levels
as well as Chinese officials who are studying, visiting, or
in exile in the United States at the time of writing, and
with people who have first-hand knowledge about the mishu
role in Chinese politics. The accounts by the interviewees
have proved very useful for revealing an considerable amount
of important new information, for corroborating and fleshing
out the data collected from the other sources, and for
testing the intuitions so as to decide whether to give up,
adjust, or follow them through in the research.
Notes on the Methodology
Two basic research techniques have been employed for
this research: comparative approach and interpretative
approach.
COMPARATIVE APPROACH. Comparisons have been made
with the staff role in other political systems, so as to
avoid the parochialism that frequently characterize in-depth
area studies. The comparisons also help to drive the
analytical points home more vividly, and to shed new light on
some larger theoretic issues, such as the problems of
Zedong's Political Secretary Tian Jiaying*), idam. pp. 29-33;
and Luo Ning, "The Shadowy Figures."
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political control over the bureaucracy, the impact of
structural and cultural factors on political behavior, and
alternative paths for political development.
Special attention has been placed particularly on
comparison with the American staff system. This comparison is
significant and interesting in that for all the vast
differences between China and America in terms of political
structure and culture, political leaders of both countries
are very much alike with regard to depending heavily upon
their staffs to control bureaucracies. Of all the
democracies, the United States is perhaps the most similar to
China in this aspect, paralleled or followed closely by
Italy. In other democracies, where the bureaucratic tradition
is strong as in Japan, -Britain, and Germany, political
leaders have smaller staffs and the staff role is thus more
limited.
Furthermore, despite the fact that American and Chinese
political leaders have a similar tendency to use their
personal staffs extensively, staffs in the two systems behave
very differently in that American staffs tend to function as
a major source for innovations, changes, tensions and
conflicts in interactions with the bureaucracy and other
institutional rivals, whereas Chinese staffs are a principal
force for harmony, reconciliation, continuity, and stability.
Therefore, the comparison between the two staff systems
presents an ideal case for analyzing the influences of
political structure and political culture on the behavior
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patterns of staff personnel as well as of political
principals in dealing with the bureaucracy and other
political actors.
INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH. This is essentially a
qualitative study aiming at understanding the motives and
meanings behind the manifest behavior patterns of different
political actors in the leadership-staff-bureaucracy nexus.
In interpreting actions, special efforts have been made
to avoid the pitfall of reification, namely, treating the
Chinese political system as if it were a biological organism,
in which each part -- leadership, mishu, and the bureaucracy
-- automatically performs its pre-determined function for the
benefit of the whole. Although analysis is made with regard
to the mishu role for the functioning of the Chinese
political system as a whole, a holistic approach will be
consciously avoided by efforts to anchor the methodological
ontology in individual actors' rationality and their
perceptions of self interests. Accordingly, although parts of
the analysis are conducted on a "systemic" level, the typical
research questions to be addressed in this thesis are
individual-oriented and run as follows.
* Why do political leaders prefer to trust and empower their
staffs over regular bureaucrats?
* Why do staffs perceive it in their best interest to try to
maintain and enlarge their bosses' power over the
bureaucracy?
* What self-interested considerations incline Chinese leaders
to play the role of being bold, demanding, awe-inspiring,
and even ruthless, while leaving their mishus playing the
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role of being reconciliatory, personable, and
accommodating?
What self-interested considerations incline American
leaders to save for themselves the role of being nice,
popular, reasonable, and consistent, while letting their
staffs play the role of being tough, pushy, .aggressive, and
innovative?
The Organization of the Study
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this
introduction, the second chapter examines the personal
benefits that the mishu institution brings to individual
actors -- leaders, bureaucrats, and mishus themselves --
treating them as individuals with self-interested motives and
self-serving strategies. From the point of view of individual
leaders, the mishu institution characterized by personal
intimacy, diffusiveness of role, flexibility of oral
communication, and sensitivity to individuals' needs and
wishes, offers a welcome antithesis to the rigidities and
inconveniences of bureaucracy characterized by impersonality,
proceduralization, primacy of written rules, and specificity
of role. It is argued that leaders find most convenient and
reliable agents and servants in their mishus; bureaucrats
benefit from mis•hu•s' help in learning leaders' true
intentions and feelings behind the usual vagueness and
generality of written documents as well as in manipulating
leaders' perceptions and decisions; and mishus are in the
best position to learn political secrets and skills necessary
for becoming successful leaders in their own right in due
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course and to please leaders and curry favor with them,
particularly in terms of career promotions.
The third and fourth chapters analyze the roles of the
mishu institution for the functioning of the Chinese
political system as a whole. Two basic roles are identified:
1) amplifying political leadership's control over
bureaucracies; and 2) smoothening the political process by
cushioning conflicts, facilitating coordination, and
sustaining continuity and consistency. The control role, as
is studied in Chapter Three, is primarily embodied in the
following two aspects: 1) enhancing leadership's information
and decision capacity; and 2) strengthening leadership's
monitoring and supervision capacity. In other words, the two
aspects can also be understood as 1) improving leaders'
ability to respond effectively to what bureaucracies
communicate upward willingly, and 2) expanding leaders'
capability to find out what bureaucracies want to hide and to
push them to do what they are reluctant to do.
The smoothening/facilitating function is examined, in
Chapter Four, with regard to the following aspects: 1)
wdrking out properly and subtly hierarchical relationships
among leaders to diminish friction-generating or conflict-
provoking ambiguities; 2) mediating communication among
leaders and between leading and led so as to deflect direct
confrontations and absorb conflicts and clashes; 3) drafting,
editing, and censoring all official documents so as to
guarantee their consistency and continuity; and 4) organizing
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all conferences and meetings to minimize the disruptive
impact of the uncertain and the unexpected and lubricate
intra-elite interactions.
The fifth chapter tries to sort out the formal
structures and functions of the Chinese mishu system.
Moreover, efforts are made to clarify the confusion about the
relationship between the mishu offices and some other key
organs (e.g., leadership squad, leadership small group, and
research center) and actors (e.g., personal mishus). In
addition, this chapter contains two in-depth case studies of
the Central leadership's mishu squads, that is, the Central
Committee General Office and the State Council General
Office.
The sixth chapter compares the contemporary mishu system
with its historical roots, focusing primarily on the grand
council institution at the center and the mufu (tent
government) system in provinces in the Qing dynasty. This
longitudinal comparison aims at revealing significant
continuities and changes in terms of the controlling and
cushioning roles as well as at explaining the underlying
causes in terms of overall structural arrangement and
individuals' career pattern.
The seventh chapter is a horizontal comparison between
the Chinese mishu institution and the American staff system,
with an emphasis on examining the causes behind the
contrasting behavior patterns of American and Chinese staff
personnel. The causal factors to be analyzed include
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different structures of the political game (open competition
vs. power monopoly), different career paths ("in-and-outers"
vs. groomed successors), different political cultures (low
esteem vs. veneration toward politicians), and ditferent
levels of technological development (preoccupation with new
techniques vs. preoccupation with human relations).
Finally, in the conclusion or the eighth chapter, a
balance sheet will be offered with regard to the strengths
and weaknesses of the Chinese mishu system. On the basis of
this analysis, speculations will be made about the impact of
the mishu role on the political development of the Chinese
system. An attempt will be made to provide answers to this
fundamental question: How can a balance between the vitality
and the stability of the Chinese political process be
maintained? Too much domination of political leadership can
cause erratic, reckless, and disastrous changes; too much
power in the bureaucracy can lead to fragmentation and
stagnation. Can Chinese mishus' controlling and smoothening
roles serve to provide a healthy balance between the two
extremes, thus presenting an viable alternative path for
political and economic development?
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Chapter Two
PERSONAL BENEFITS
This chapter analyzes the various personal benefits that the
mishu institution brings to individual actors -- leaders,
mishus, and bureaucrats, for it is the underlying assumption
for this entire research that it is individual actors'
perceptions of self interests that motivate and sustain, in
the final analysis, the mishu institution in the Chinese
political arena. (This is arguably the case with all stable
organizations.) By starting off with this individual-oriented
analysis, it is hoped that an overly holistic view,' as might
be suggested by the following three chapters focusing on the
structures and functions regarding the system as a whole, can
be avoided.
Personal Benefits for Leaders
The mishu institution is particularly advantageous for
Chinese leaders personally, in that it provides a welcome
antithesis to the various inconveniences and rigidities that
are inherent in the bureaucratic form of organization. The
basic rationale behind the mishu institution is opposite to
1. A major criticism often directed at the structural-
functionalism is that it tends to treat a social system as if
it were a biological organism with each component performing,
more or less involuntarily, a predetermined function for the
benefit of the whole. Such a holistic approach tends to focus
on the controlling effect of the whole on the parts to the
extent that the importance of individuals' self-interested
calculations, maneuvers, and manipulations is shortchanged.
the one behind bureaucracy. The latter emphasizes
impersonality, primacy of written rules, standard operating
procedures, specialization, and well-defined and strictly
delimited scopes of competencies, so as to guarantee
predictability and stability of the organizational operation.
These features can make a bureaucracy behave in a stable and
predictable way to be sure,2 but they also make it not very
responsive to the personal wishes and needs of individual
leaders. In contrast, the mishu institution places premium on
personal trust, mutual understanding, oral communication,
versatility, and diffusion of role, in order to accommodate
personal needs of leaders. These features make the mishu
institution particularly responsive to miscellaneous, and
even whimsical, desires and wishes of political leaders.
Mishus are the most convenient personal agents and servants
for Chinese leaders. There are a huge variety of mishus to
look after virtually every need of Chinese leaders, such as:
"political mishu," "policy mishu," "literature mishu, "
"personnel mishu," "news mishu, " "confidential mishu, "
"letter-writing mishu," "foreign affairs mishu," "security
mishu," "administrative mishu," "personal life mishu, "
2. It should be noted that these ideal-typical features
of bureaucracy may not fully materialize in practice and that
even though they may facilitate intra-organizational
regularity and coordination, they can hardly prevent inter-
organizational conflict and fragmentation.
"translation mishu, " etc. 3  There are also other more
technical mishu types, which are responsible for typing and
printing, encoding and decoding, and binding and filing
dossiers. Moreover, there are some mishu types which do not
necessarily contain "mis.hu " in their titles, such as
"confidential vuan (worker), typing vuan, stenographing yuan,
library vuAn, management vuan, etc."4 There are also ad hoc
types of mishu, such as "liaison .uan" whom Mao Zedong used
in the last days of his life to pass on his instructions to
the Politburo.
Nevertheless, for all the nominal classifications, a
mishu is ideally a generalist so that he is readily
interchangeable with other mishus and universally capable,
being thus better able to satisfy the irregular needs of a
leader. 5 The diffusiveness of a mishu's role is revealed by
3. Chen Hongbin et al., Jianmina wenmi aonazuo shouce (A
Concise Handbook of Mishu Profession), Shenyang: Liaoning
jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987, p. 61.
4. Ibid. p. 57.
5. Diffusiveness of role seems to be a universal
phenomenon with personal staffs, as in contrast with the
fixed and well defined scopes of competence in a bureaucracy.
For example, when asked by a fellow White House assistant
about drawing up an organizational chart of the inner circle
of the Johnson White House staff, top presidential aide Bill
Moyers replied: "Such an exercise is a gross misuse of a good
man's time; nothing useful can come from it since the White
House staff reflects the personal needs of the President
rather than a structural design....There is no pattern to it
that can be fitted to a chart." 5 (George C. Edwards III and
Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadershir: Politics and
Policy Making, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, p. 201.)
The same Moyers also told U.S. News & World Renort: "The
[White House] staff is like a basketball team. No one has a
rigid position, and each man is able to handle the ball when
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Zhang Yufeng, who was Mao Zedong's personal life-cum-
confidential mishu during his last years: "In fact each of us
[Mao's personal mishus] held multiple positions, as mishu,
nurse, servant, and had to learn many other skills." 6 As a
rule, the routine work of almost all types of mishus involves
trivial chores as an inevitable component of serving their
leaders. Xi Zhongxun, formerly chief miahu of the State
Council, asserts that a mishu "must not only fulfill
important duties (da shi) well but also carry out trivial
odd jobs (xian shi) satisfactorily: the two aspects should be
combined and mutually complementing, without emphasizing one
at the expense of the other."7 So, ideally a mishu is
supposed to combine all the roles -- as administrative
it is in our part of the court and move it toward the goal."
(Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents: The Secret History of
the Chief Executives and Their Ton Aides, New York: Times
Books, 1979, p. 295.) Nevertheless, The role of a Chinese
mishu is even more diffused, including many responsibilities
that are highly intimate and personal and thus usually lie
outside of the public arena in the Western systems.
6. Zhang Yufeng, "A Few Anecdotes About Mao Zedong and
Zhao Enlai in Their Late Years," in Hua Lin, ed., Mao Zedona
he tade zhanvou men (Mao Zedona and His Comrades-in-Arms),
Beijing: Hualing chubanshe, 1990, p. 130. Diffusiveness of
role is also true of Mao's bodyguards, who have additional
duties of going shopping for him and giving him a daily
massage before bedtime.[ Iid. 133; Wang Hebin, Zivun xuan
zhuren: wo suo iiechu de Mao Zedona (The Master of the Purple
Cloud Compound: Mao Zedona I knew), Beijing: the CCP Central
Party School Publishing House, 1991, p. 39.] The author used
to be Mao's health care and administrative mishu.
7. Xi Zhongxun, "Wei zuohao mishu gongzuo shuo ji ju
hua" ("Some Remarks on How to Carry Out Mishu Work Well") in
Linadao tonazhi tan mishu aonazuo (The Remarks bv Leading
Comrades on Mishu Work), Beijing: Xiandai chubanshe, 1989, p.
18.
assistant, political adviser, ghost-writer, bodyguard,
housekeeper, and menial servant when waiting on his leader.
It should be pointed out, however, that diffusiveness of role
is more pronounced with personal mishus than organizational
mishus; in other words, division of labor is more developed
among the latter, who work in general offices.
Being generalists with multiple skills and flexible
responsibilities, mishus are supposed to be capable of
providing any services that leaders desire. Thus, leaders can
reap the following benefits:
When a leader wants to do something, all he needs to do is
just move his lips, and his mishujwill get it done to his
satisfaction. When a leader wants to articulate something,
all he needs to do is utter a point or two, and his mishu
will expand them into a full-length article, ready to be
delivered by the leader or published in his name. When a
leader hits upon a vague, immature idea, all he needs to do
is convey it to his mishu, who will research, investigate,
try it out, and come up with concrete options for the leader
to choose from. When a leader has a family quarrel, all he
needs to do is tell his mishu, and he will go contact the
appropriate unit or mediate privately to get it settled. When
a leader wants something that is hard to come by, his mishu
will make one phone call or two and obtain it for him."
The personal benefits and conveniences that mishus
provide to Chinese leaders are also well reflected in their
roles as personal servants, housekeepers and bodyguards. As
the servant, a mishu is responsible for looking after his
leader's private life in terms of housing, food, transport,
recreation, and medical care. Chinese mishus are required to
8. Jiang Zhifeng, wanacai chu iina de zhonananhai aiaoiu
(The Last Card of the Game of Zhongnanhai), San Francisco,
CA: Minzhu Zhongguo Shulin Publishing House, 1990, p. 144.
take painstaking care to fully satisfy their leaders' needs
in these regards. With regard to housing, a mis hu's
responsibilities include 1) seeing to it that there is no
source of noise, pollution, or danger in the vicinity of
where his leader lives; 2) making sure that supply of
electricity, gas, heating, and water is adequate; and 3)
keeping his house well maintained. It is also his job to take
care of his leader's rent for housing and utilities, figuring
out how much should be reimbursed by the state and how much
paid out of the leader's own pocket and then making a
detailed and easily understandable report to the leader on a
regular basis.9 In respect to food, a mishu is responsible for
purchasing food on a daily basis, for seeing to it that the
most palatable menu is provided according to his leader's
budget, habit, and taste, for budgeting carefully and keeping
clear track of all the expenses, and for ensuring that "food
is sanitary, nutritional, and safe." 10 If his leader has a
high enough rank to be provided by the state with a cook and
other maids, the mishu is entrusted with supervising them.i'
In terms of transport, the mishu is in charge of the
chauffeur if his leader is equipped with a personal car; or
else he is responsible for contacting the vehicle management
9. Qi Peiwen et al., Zenvana danahao linadaoren mishu
(How to Be a Good Personal Mishu for a Leader), Beijing:
Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 155.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
office of the unit whenever the leader needs a car. Whenever
the leader makes a trip, the mishu should accompany him and
is responsible for purchasing air fare and train and boat
tickets and arranging accommodations and proper reception at
each stop. 12 When it comes to medical care, a mishu is
supposed to monitor his leader's health condition closely,
"know thoroughly, with the help of physicians and nurses, his
health problems, and report promptly to the medical
department any changes of those known symptoms." 13
Furthermore, "Extra precautions should be taken if the leader
is an aged person in poor health and when he goes out on a
trip. It is his job to remind the leader to take right
medicines at right times."14 Moreover, "Wherever they go, the
mishu should get to know well where the local hospital is and
how to get there fast in case of an emergence. "'I
A mishu also acts as the chief bodyguard for his leader.
As such, he must guarantee absolute safety and security of
his leader's residence "...around the clock, in any weather,
and all the year round to protect it from any disasters,
natural or man-made, including fire, burglary, murder,
revengeful acts, etc." 16 In order to do that, he is supposed
to do the following.
12. Ibid. p. 156.
13. Ibid. pp. 156-57.
14. Ibid. p. 157.
15. Ibid.
"1) Total familiarization with the key information. A
mishu should be familiarized with the surrounding geography
[of his leader's residence], the locations of the nearest
anti-aircraft shelter, other safety facilities, buildings,
traffic condition, and dangerous spots in the neighborhood.
He should also learn from the local police the whereabouts of
the evil persons and the preventive measures that have been
taken against them."17
"2) Regular safety check-ups. A mishu should conduct a
safety checkup of the leader's residence thoroughly...before
every important activity, and before and after a storm. A
check-up must determine whether the telephone, door bell,
fire hydrant, faucets, fire extinguishers, electricity fuse
panel, various switches, etc. are in order; whether there are
explosives, inflammables, or other dangerous materials in the
vicinity;..."18
"3) Tight security at the entrance. A mishu should
"select reliable guards, and scrutinize and register each
entering car and visitor carefully."'9
It should be pointed out that a personal mishu's duty
toward his leader's private life is far from being confined
to the above aspects. "In addition to housing, food,
transport, and medical care, a mishu should take care of
baths, haircuts, decoration of the rooms and yard, receiving
and entertaining relatives and friends, and any major
activities in his family. In a word, a personal mishu is
responsible for managing and arranging for his leader all
aspects of his life, even though they are not directly
related with his work. "20
16. Ibid. pp. 158-59.
17. Ibid. pp. 159-60.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. 157.
One of the reasons why mishus are indispensable for
political leaders in taking care of their private needs is
that it is often inappropriate or politically costly for a
leader to personally look after his own private interests,
such as asking for additional perquisites, obtaining
commodities that are hard to come by, and helping his
children with their career advancement. It is then his mishu
who is expected to go and contact the persons or units
concerned and get the leader's needs and wishes taken care of
properly.
Perhaps, the ultimate benefit that a mishu provides for
a leader is the fact that he is the person who is the most
sensitive to his personal needs and wishes. Mishus are
trained to be great mind-readers of their leaders. In order
to best understand or even anticipate a leader's needs and
wishes, a mishu is expected to thoroughly study his leader's
personality. A leading training manual for mishu personnel
states that, "No matter whether you work as a mishu for a
particular leader or serve several simultaneously, you should
know thoroughly your leader's style, personality, habits,
pattern of life, way of thinking, language idiosyncrasies,
hobbies, and even his whole work history. Only in this way
can you provide optimum service, making it easier to be in
harmony and step with your leader."21 A mishu is also urged to
21. Xu Ruixin et al., Zhonaauo xiandai mishu aonazuo
jichu (The Essentials of Contemporary Chinese Mishu
Profession), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989, p. 137.
ube thoroughly familiar with his leader's "health condition,
education level,...family situation, and social
connections."22 All this is intended to sensitize a mishu to
his leader's various needs even before they are explicitly
expressed or even felt. "A mishu should know," exhorts an
experienced miahu, "how to figure out his leader's needs from
his words and acts, so as to be able to provide various
services in advance. For instance, when a leader is
contemplating a policy issue, his thoughts will be betrayed
in his verbal utterances and bodily movements, as, for
example, in some cases he may be seen looking up and down for
something, fidgeting. When his mishu sees-these telltale
signs, he should set himself immediately into action to
figure out what is on his leader's mind, what he is
meditating at the moment, what he needs, and what he himself
as a mishu should do accordingly." In a word, "a mishu should
think of his leader's needs before the leader thinks of them;
and he should have already considered them thoroughly,
concretely, and comprehensively when his leaders just begins
to think of them."23
As a result of their training and socialization, Chinese
mishus usually have incredible ability to understand the ways
their leaders' minds work. For instance, Premier Zhou Enlai
22. Wang Qiangong et al., Shivona mishu aonazuo shouce
(A Practical Handbook for Mishu Work), Beijing: Guangming
ribao chubanshe, 1987, p. 97.
23. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
p. 11.
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only needed to "utter half a sentence" to his mishus every
time he assigned a job, and his experienced mishus "could
understand him intuitively and thoroughly (xinlina shenhui)
... and fulfill his assignments satisfactorily."24
Moreover,.in order to be responsive to a leader's needs
and desires, a personal mishu is urged to cultivate the same
interests and hobbies as his leader has, be they "listening
to music, going to theater, playing chess, admiring
paintings, watching sports, theorizing, summarizing, writing,
making speeches, going down to investigate, chatting, etc."25
Another important benefit that mishu institution brings to
Chinese leaders is compensation for leaders' ignorance and
incompetence. It is not uncommon for Chinese leaders to have
obtained their leadership positions primarily because of
political loyalties, personal connections, or military
heroism during the war years prior to 1949. As a result, many
of them are not adequately educated or even barely literate.
24. Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou Enlai he tade mishu men (Zhou
Enlai and His Mishus), Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi
chubanshe, 1992, pp. 95-97.
25. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 137. In this
regard, Chinese mishus bear strong resemblance to courtiers
of an absolute ruler. As Tullock observes, "When we read
accounts of life at the courts of absolute rulers, we are
often astounded at the extent to which all turns on the
desires and the whims of the ruler. The courtier not only
follows the least indication of the ruler's will; he also
spends a great deal of time trying to discern the ruler's
unexpressed desires so that he may respond also to these.
There is tremendous interest in everything connected with the
personal life of the ruler." (Gordon Tullock, The Politics of
Bureaucracy, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965, p.
67.)
Not many of them are professionally competent, when it comes
to tasks that involve technical complexity and require
special training and expertise.26 In many cases, for example,
Chinese leaders' exorbitant dependence on their mishus in
handling information and documents results from their' own
incompetence. As Oksenberg observes, "Time is not the only
consideration here, however; some leading officials do not
read swiftly, and depend on their frequently more educated
secretaries for guidance."27 As a rule, the higher a leader's
rank, the greater choice he has in selecting his personal
mishu and so the more capable and talented his mishu tends to
be. As a result, even if a high-ranking leader himself is
poorly educated or inept, he still enjoys the advantage of
having high quality mishas working for him to make up for any
inadequacy in himself.
Moreover, another related advantage is that mishus work
to ensure that their masters' power and influence will not
diminish as they age and get physically and mentally weaker.
Although the Chinese traditional respect for age open the way
to the phenomenon of a gerontocracy, it is also in large part
the energizing force of their mishus which sustains and
propels the continuing political involvement of the
septuagenarians and octogenarians.
26. The problem was particularly serious during the Mao
era, and it has been somewhat alleviated during Deng's
reforms of recent years.
27. Michel Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication within
the Chinese Bureaucracy," China Ouarterly, No. 57 (January-
March 1974), p. 19.
What is more, mishu personnel also provide Chinese
leaders with the benefit of personal reliability and loyalty.
Chinese political leaders have far greater control over their
mishus than over regular bureaucrats in terms of selection,
reward and punishment. Personnel decisions over bureaucratic
subordinates are usually subject to consensus of the
leadership squad and the approval of the higher authorities,
but it is all up to an individual leader to select or dismiss
his personal mishu. For instance, if a leader wants to remove
a bureaucrat from a certain post, he has to present a
reasonable explanation to his colleagues in the same
leadership squad or to superior leaders. In case of his
personal mishu, he can fire him any time; all he needs to say
is: "I can't get along with this person." No further
rationalization is necessary.28
Chinese leaders enjoy virtually total freedom in
selecting their mishus, personal mishus in particular. Of
course, leaders' freedom in this regard is more limited with
organizational mishus of general offices, and so the
following discussion is mainly applicable to the selection of
personal mishus. The selection process is usually conducted
28. It was the same case with the emperor-eunuch
relationship. If an emperor wanted to sentence a minister to
death, he had to give a rational reason for the action, but
if he wanted to behead a eunuch servant, a fit of rage was a
good enough ground. This was a major reason why Chinese
emperors generally felt that their eunuch servants were more
reliable than bureaucratic officials, and thus they tended to
rely on the former more than the latter.
in the following three ways. First, leaders personally hand-
pick their own personal mishus, based largely on their
intuition. This usually happens by accident: a chance
encounter may impress a leader with someone's potential for
loyalty and his useful talent. Then the leader instructs the
department concerned (usually the general office or the
organization department) to thoroughly investigate the
background of the candidate to make sure that nothing
seriously contradicts his instinctive reaction. Our research
reveals that a good many personal mishus have actually been
selected in this manner. Second, candidates are recommended
by the leader's current mishus, his trusted friends, or his
old subordinates. Third, a leader will specify his
requirements and then entrusts the appropriate department,
e.g. the general office or the organization department, with
searching for a suitable candidate, who will serve the leader
on probat'ion. If he passes the personal test of the leader,
he stays on; otherwise, he is sent back, shame-faced.2 9
In selecting a mishu, a leaders looks particularly for
the following characteristics, which are believed to be
correlated with the quality of reliability.
29. As a new development worth mentionilig in recent
years, some high-ranking Chinese leaders have appointed each
other's offspring as their personal mishus, as a way of
exchanging favors and strengthening mutual ties. These
arrangements also enable leaders' children to jump directly
to top positions of the bureaucracy upon leaving the personal
service of other leaders' without having to rise grade-by-
grade through the normal channels. (Jiang Zhifeng, The Las
Card, p. 145.)
UNASSUMING PERSONALITY. A leader prefers to have as his
mishu someone who has a pleasant, easy-going, and self-
effacing personality.30  A mishu's submissive personality
should enable him to bear with hot-tempered and even
unwarranted tongue-lashings by his leader.31
YOUNG AGE. Mishus are generally very young. When Tian
Jiaying first became one of Mao Zedong's major mishus, he was
only twenty six years old.32 when Wang Ruilin first became
Deng Xiaoping's mishu, he was only twenty years of age.33
Premier Zhou once had over twenty mishus in his personal
mishu office, and "all of us," observes one of his former
mishus, "were in their twenties or thirties."34 In recent
years, the age qualification for mishus has been explicitly
stipulated: "All mishus at the Central and provincial levels
should be mostly young and middle-aged people with only a few
old comrades; and all mishus at city, prefecture, county, and
30. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, pp. 131-32.
31. Ibid. pp. 131, 141.
32. Peng Yaxin, "Tian Jiaying xiaozhuan" ("A Short
Biography of Tian Jiaying") in Dong Bian et al., eds., Mao
Zedona he tade mishu Tian Jiavina (Mao Zedona and His Mishu
Tian Jiavina), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989,
p. 316. The editor is the widow of Mao's mishu, Tian Jiaying.
The other contributors include Yang Shangkun and Hu Qiaomu,
who were both at one time Mao's miabhs.
33. Deng Rong (alias Mao Mao), "Zai Jiangxi de rizi li
("Those Days in Jiangxi"), Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 22
August 1984, p. 4. The author is Deng Xiaoping's daughter.
34. Qian Jiadong, "Haishi rang women tan zhongli ba"
("Let Us Continue to Talk about the Premier") in Cheng Hua,
ed., Zhou Enlai and His Mishus, p. 261. The author used to be
Zhou Enlai's foreign affairs mishu.
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township levels should be mostly young people, with a few
middle-aged persons. "3 5
Using young people makes the domination-submission
relationship between leaders and mishus more in tone with
Chinese traditional respect for old age, thus helping deflect
any potential power rivalry between leaders and mishus.
Chinese are very sensitive to the effect of age differences,
as is explained by a Chinese expert on Chinese psychology in
his book Psychology in Using People.3 6 "It is regarded as
normal and taken for granted for an older person to reprimand
a younger one. The reprimander will feel no uneasiness, the
one being scolded can take it easy, and the onlookers will
find nothing to disapprove of." However, "if a younger person
reproaches an older one, things will become complicated. If
his criticisms are many, he will probably be regarded as
'unfair' and 'extreme'; if his words are harsh, he will
probably be regarded as 'arrogant' and 'disrespectful toward
senior comrades.' In such a situation, not only the older
person will find it hard to take in but also the onlookers
will not tolerate the younger person."37
35. Zheng Xinghan et al., Dana zhena iiauan mishu
aonazuo aaishu (An Outline of the Mishu Work in Party and
State Oraans), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, pp. 141-42.
36. Gu Baohua, Yongren zhonga de xinli xue (The
Psycholoav in Using People), Beijing: Dizhen chubanshe, 1989,
pp. 237-238.
37. Ibid. pp. 49-50.
Letting young people with little seniority into the
inner circle of power can also have the advantage of making
them work with an extraordinary sense of gratitude,
responsibility, and enthusiasm.
LOW RANKS. Another precaution taken to make mishus
reliable and less menacing to political leaders is to appoint
as mishus people with glaringly low ranks which are far from
commensurate with their powers and responsibilities. At the
provincial level, mishus hold no more than the ranks of
"section staffer (ke vuan)," "section chief (ae zhana)," or,
in rare cases, "deputy head of division (u chujii)." 3" At the
Central level, mishus' ranks range from "deputy head of
division," "head of division (chuii)," "deputy director of
bureau (fu iujii)," to "director of bureau (jla.ji)"; in rare
cases, directors of personal mishu offices for key national
leaders can hold the rank of up to minister.39 For example,
"Deng Xiaoping's personal mishu, Wang Ruilin, has a rank of
minister; Chen Yun's personal mi.shu, Xu Yongyao, that of
deputy minister; those of Yang Shangkun, Jiang Zemin, and Li
Peng, that of bureau head; and those of most heads of Central
commissions or departments, that of division head. ",4
New mishus typically have very low ranks so that they
can be made grateful for each promotion that their leaders
38. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 113.
39. Jiang Zhifeng, The Last Card, p. 143.
40. Shi Liuzi, "Zhonggong 'mishu bang' qunxiang" ("A Group
Portrait of the Chinese Communist Secret Secretaries"), Minzhu
Zhonaguo (Democratic China), No. 11 (1992), p. 25.
hand out afterward. The advantages in using young and low-
ranking people as mishus will be made more clear when we
comes to the historical comparison in Chapter Six.
PERSONAL LOYALTY. Of all the qualifications for being
a mishu, by far the most important one is personal loyalty.
This means that the critical test of a candidate for a
position of mishu has to revolve around judgments about his
potential for loyalty. For example, Ye Qun, Lin Biao's wife
and chief mishu, stipulated ten criteria for selecting a
mishu for Lin Biao. Three of them reflected concerns for
loyalty. First, he must come from an army unit that had
fought under Lin's command; second, he had to have right
family background, with no connections with ranking
officials, particularly, in Beijing; and third, he must not
have a "big mouth or loose tongue."41
The best way to ensure faithfulness is, of course, to
have one's family member work as one's mishu, as is a widely
accepted practice in Chinese politics, at top level in
particular. For example, the following is a partial list of
Politburo members whose wives have worked as their mishus.
41. zhang Yunsheng, Maoiiawan iishi: Lin Blao mishu
huivi lu (The Eyewitness Accounts of Maoiiawan: The Memoirs
of Lin Biao's Mishu), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988, p. 3.
Table 2.1: A partial list of Politburo members whose wives
have worked as their mishus42
leader wife/mishu
Mao Zedong Jiang Qing
Zhao Enlai Deng Yingchao
Lin Biao Ye Qun
Liu Shaoqi Wang Guangmei
Chen Yun Yu Ruomu
Kang Sheng Cao Yi'ou
Chen Yi Zhang Qian
He Long Xue Ming
Chen Boda Li Shuyan
Peng Zhen Zhang Jieqing
Ren Bishi Chen Congying
Huang Yongsheng Xiang Huifang
Qiu Huizuo Hu Min
Moreover, Deng Xiaoping is now having his daughter, Deng Rong
(alias Su Rong or Mao Mao), work as his political/personal
life mishu. 4 This practice was copied by local leaders in the
Mao era, as was the case, for example, with Han Xianchu, the
42. Sources: Shi Liuzi, "A group portrait"; Luo Ning,
"Chumo yu hongse gongqiang lide renwu" ("The Shadow Figures
behind the Blood-Red Wall"), Minzhu Zhonaauo (Democratic
China), No. 11 (1992), pp. 40-41; (Who's Who in China:
Current Leaders), compiled by the Editorial Board of Who's
Who in China, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1989.
43. He Pin and Gao Xin, "'Zong shejishi' de xiao erduo:
Deng Rong chongdang Deng Xiaoping de zhengzhi lianluo yuan"
("The Little Ears of the 'General Architect': Deng Rong as
Deng Xiaoping's Political Liaison Officer"), Zhonaauo shibao
zhoukan (China Times Weekly), American edition, No. 23
(1992), p. 15.
former commander of the Fuzhou Military Region, whose wife,
Liu Zhi, worked as his chief mishu. This used to be a common
practice among army generals, until recent years.44
After a rigorous screening by leaders, those who become
mishus tend to be highly reliable, particularly, in terms of
keeping secrets for their leaders. For instance, Lin Biao's
mishu, Zhang Yunsheng, had been so tight-lipped about the
nature of his work, not telling his wife a thing, that when
he wrote his memoirs, after more than a decade's silence,
about his experience as Lin's mishu, she thought he had
acquired a new hobby of fiction-writing.45
Since their personal mishus are the most reliable and
the least menacing persons in the Chinese political arenas,
leaders feel safe to confide to them their innermost thoughts
and secret plans, counting on them to reveal to no one else.
Mao's Russian interpreter/mishu Shi Zhe recalls: "The
Chairman frequently talked with me in private about what he
was contemplating in terms of his analyses and plans. He was
casual and offhand. He would never reveal what he had told me
at the meetings of the Secretariat until the situation and
developments had borne out his predictions. At first, I was
puzzled, but I later came to realize that the Chairman liked
to tell his immature thoughts to me because I would never
44. Luo Ning, "The Shadow Figures," p. 41.
45. Zhang Yunsheng, The Eyewitness Accounts, p. 21.
leak them out and I had no obligation to carry them out."4 6
Chinese leaders may also be willing to take criticisms
from their trusted mishus, whose young age and juniority
prevent them from constituting challenges to the authority
and dignity of the leaders. For example, "Mao would listen to
suggestions only from persons too junior to be political
rivals.....Mao maintained a fairly comfortable relationship
with his secretaries and bodyguards and often talked things
over with them. He did not bridle when they asked sharp
questions or voiced doubts that he would never have tolerated
from equals."47
In addition, after stringent selection, mighus generally
are people who possess the quality of being hardworking,
diligent, and conscientious in performing their duties for
their leaders. Mishus are expected to work diligently and
conscientiously for their leaders. They "do not observe day
and night, Sundays, or holidays." 48 In some cases, they work
so hard as to ruin their health. Mao's mishu Tian Jiaying
once kept working intensely for days in order to fulfill his
task until out of exhaustion he vomited blood.49 Moreover, for
46. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi iuren shenbian (Beina Close to
the Historical Giants), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,
1991. p. 238.
47. Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors: China in
the Era of Mao and Dena, Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1992, p. 147.
48. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 112.
49. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong and his mishu Tian
Jiaying," ("Mao Zedong he tade mishu Tian Jiaying"), in Dong
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all occasional reports of their venal behavior,"c mishu
personnel are on the whole the least corrupt elements of the
Chinese political system. The general morality stems partly
from the effects of strict selection and psychological
conditioning (to be discussed later) and partly from self-
jt interested considerations. Being young and on the fast track
for upward mobility, mishus are usually willing to defer
immediate gratification for the sake of future profits;
grabbing short-term benefits (e.g., taking briberies) at the
risk of compromising their career advancement is not in their
best interest, after all.5 1
Bian et al., eds., Mao Zedona and His Mishu Tian Jiavina, p.
21. The author is a former mishu of Mao.
50. One example of mishus taking advantage of their
privileged positidns to promote their private interests in
violation of the law is Li Shanyou, a deputy chief mishu of
the provincial government of Hainan, who "has had low
morality and lived a dissolute life, having a long-time
mistress, visiting prostitutes, arousing public indignation,
and taking briberies by abusing his powers." Li was recently
arrested and indicted of the above crimes. (People's Daily,
overseas edition, December 25, 1993, p. 1.)
51. Mishus' mentality in this regard is explained by an
important mishu in the State Council General Office.
According to him, the work of the State Council GO mishus is
very heavy and stressful, and they receive fewer fringe
benefits than ordinary people with comparable ranks, because
they are supposed to set the example for others to emulate.
The State Council GO mishus are motivated, ;ccording to the
interviewee, by two factors: 1) a strong sense of
responsibility and importance of their work; and 2) valuable
experience and skills to be learned and virtually guaranteed
promotions upon leaving their posts.
Personal Benefits for Mishus
The Chinese proverb "The moon shines clearest on the
pavilion nearest the water (iin shui loudai xian de yue)"
refers to the fact that he who is physically close to a
center of power will benefit first and most. This fits a
mishu's situation perfectly in that physical proximity to
political leaders automatically brings 'them respectability,
power, and influence. Depending on the prestige and authority
of their leaders, mishus are generally treated as honored
figures in themselves, demanding special attention and
treatment wherever they go from all they deal with. For
example, Wang Ruilin, director of Deng's personal mishu
office, is regarded as "the number one person 'connected with
heaven.' 2"" "All VIPs of the CCP who want to see Deng Xiaoping
have to pass through Director Wang. All that Deng Xiabping is
exposed to and says has to go through Director Wang as
well. "" As a result, Wang Ruilin is considered by political
insiders in Beijing as "the real boss" of the country, and
even Yang Shangkun, then PRC president and Deng's close
personal friend for sixty years, "comes after him."54
It is political commonplace in China that there are
three kinds of people one can ill afford to offend: a leader,
52. "Deng Xiaoping mishu: tongtian yihao renwu" ("Deng's
Mishu: the Number One Person Connected with Heaven"), Jilicj
ribao (The Economy Daily), Hong Kong, April 2, 1992.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
his spouse and children, and his mishu. Mao's mishu, Zhang
Yufeng, was a case in point. "During the time when she worked
for Mao Zedong, some people would stop at nothing to please
her and ingratiate themselves with her. Even her mother-in-
law would receive special favors when she was hospitalized.
The head of the hospital would make a point of personally
presiding over all joint diagnosis sessions on her case by
experts. "55
Being physically close to political leaders, mishus are
generally treated as political leaders' alter egos, thus
being held in high regard. Even political leaders themselves
tend to be deferential toward mishus of other leaders. For
example, Ye Qun, Lin Biao's wife and a Politburo members
herself, was overheard by her mishu to use an extremely
supplicating tone when talking with a mishu of Chen Boda:
"Mishu Wang, I am begging you for a favor.... I am not being
polite, but I am literally begging you.... "56 Chen Boda, in
his turn, acted in an even more humble manner when talking
with mi.shus of Jiang Qing. When the mishus, who were very
young in age, asked Chen, a member of the Politburo standing
committee, for "guidance and criticisms," Chen insisted that
they treat him as their equals: "We should look after each
55. Ruan Jihong, "Mao Zedong he tade jiyao mishu Zhang
Yufeng" ("Mao Zedong and His Confidential Mishu Zhang
Yufeng") in Zhang Yufeng et al., eds., Mao Zedona Yishi
(Anecdotes About Mao Zedona), Changsha: Hunan wenyi
chubanshe, 1989, p. 40.
56. Zhang Yunsheng, The Eyewitness Accounts, p. 82.
other...help and inspire each other.... Please put in some
words in my favor to Comrade Jiang Qing. I am bothering you
two for this favor." 57 On occasion Premier Zhou Enlai would
ask politely Mao's personal mishu, Tian Jiaying, for policy
guidance.58 Deng Xiaoping treated respectfully the same mishu
by helping him with a promotion. 59 Moreover, leaders' children
usually are taught to act respectfully toward their parents'
mishus. When mishus go down to lower level bureaucracies on
inspection tours, the bureaucrats there will go to
extraordinary lengths to please them. The mishus receive much
more attention and favorable treatment than their actual
ranks deserve. For example, when Chen Yun's mish3u Xu Yongyao
made his inspection tour of Shenzhen and some other Special
Econoric Zones, he was received "with an extraordinary
fanfare," which was usually reserved for a vice-premier, even
though Xu only held the formal rank of deputy ministership.6 0
By the same token, if the mishu of a provincial leader comes
down to a prefecture-level leadership squad on an inspection
tour, at least one of the chief leaders will receive and
57. Lin Qingshan, Jiana Oing chen fu lu (The Rise and
Fall of Jianag Oina), Beijing: Zhongguo xinwen chubanshe,
1988, pp. 414-415.
58. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong and His Mishu Tian
Jiaying," p. 66.
59. Ibid., p. 83.
60. He Pin, "Fengsheng hedi gao gaige" ("Waging Reforms
with a Fear of Dangers Lurking Everywhere"), Zhonaauo zhi
chun (China Spring), No. 110 (1992), p. 27; Shi Liuzi, "A
Group Portrait," p. 28.
constantly accompany him during his visit and he is
entertained with endless feasts and delights.61
The memoirs of almost all the former mishus for
political leaders tells of how the news of being chosen for
the position threw them into a state of great exciterment and
gave them wildly pumping hearts and agonizing worries about
their competence for the job of such apparently staggering
importance. The new mishu's colleagues and immediate
superiors would instantly shower them with congratulations,
flattery, and envy.
Mishu is such an enviable title and will automatically
bring so much respectability and status to its bearer that
about ten million people proudly and enthusiastically claim
the title in the Chinese political arena.62 Anyone who
provides some service directly to a political leader,
important or trivial, will insist on being labeled or counted
in as a "mishu." For example, state-assigned housekeepers for
Chinese leaders are gladly entitled their "personal life
mishus (shenahuo mishu)"; senior bodyguards, their "security
mishus (iinawei mishu)"; ghost-writers or speech-writers,
their "writing mishus" (wenzi mishu); foreign language
interpreters, their "translation mishus (fanvyi mishu)";
document keepers, their "confidential mishus (iivao mishu)";
61. Personal interviews.
62. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of Mishu Work, p.
90.
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advisers, their "political mishus (zhenazhi mishu)"; so on
and so forth.
The nature of their job enables mishus to form close
personal relationship with political leaders and thus win
their personal liking. A .mishu is expected to be loaded with
a rich supply of amusing anecdotes about literature, geology,
sciences, Chinese history, world history and the like, so as
to be a delightful and informative companion to his leader.62
Our research reveals that it is a very common practice for
Chinese leaders to have a relaxed chat with their mishus from
time to time, in order to cheer themselves up or just to kill
time, and to use them as guides when visiting historical
sites or other tourist attractions.64 For example, one of
Mao's greatest pastimes was to chat with his knowledgeable
mighu Tian Jiaying almost every evening, with topics ranging
from poetry, philosophy, Chinese classics, history, to
calligraphy.,
Strong emotional attachment tends, to develop between a
leader and his mishu. Mishus and their leaders are, for that
matter, encouraged "to be emotionally attached to each other"
63. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
pp. 226-228.
64. Ibid.
65. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong and His Mishu Tian
Jiaying," pp. 2-3; Salisbury, The New Emperors, p. 194.
and to "trust each other like friends."66 Indeed, a mishu and
his leader tend to treat each other as family members. For
instance, a security mishu, who had served Mao for over
fifteen years, recalls: "Mao Zedong always showed fatherly
care for me in every detail of my life from my dating to my
marriage and to the birth of my child. I gradually came to
regard myself as a member of Mao's family."6 7 When he was
transferred to another position and was saying good-bye to
Mao, he was choked with tears. Mao seems to have had similar
emotional feelings for him. Mao broke into tears and hugged
him passionately, saying: "My home is your home and you
should come to visit me once a year as long as I live. After
I die you should come to visit my grave once a year and I
will be pleased."6 8 Jiang Qing once told her mishu: "I treat
you more warmly than I treat my own daughter.... Sometimes I
scold you and slap your face, but they are signs of motherly
love. "69
Nevertheless, intense emotional attachments can backfire
badly and turn into hatred, when intra-elite strife gets out
66. Wu Shaozu, "Shouzhang mishu gongzuo zongheng tan"
("Extensive Observations on the Work of a Leader's Mishu"),
in The Remarks by Leading Comrades on Mishu Work, p. 116.
67. Li Yinqiao, Zou xia shenatan de Mao Zedona (The Mao
Zedong off the Altar), Shanxi: Zhongwai wenhua chubanshe,
1989, p. 265.
68. Ibid.
69. Lin Qingshan, The Rise and Fall of Jiana Oina, p.
415.
of hand, as during the Cultural Revolution. As an important
one-time mishu Wu Shaozu explains:
...a hostile relationship occurred [between some leaders and
their mishus) during the Cultural Revolution, causing some
mishus to sell out their leaders in exchange for honors or
their own survival and some leaders to frame and persecute
their mishus. This was a very saddening situation."7
A well-known example was Mao's once most trusted mishu
Tian Jiaying, who was driven to commit suicide after he lost
Mao's trust." Another case of love-hate relationship happened
between Mao and Li Rui, who was once Mao's close mishu but
later was persecuted and imprisoned by him. The same fate
happened to Jiang Qing's confidential mishu Yan, her one-time
favorite, who was thrown into jail after incurring her ire.-
Nevertheless, these extreme cases take place only when
normality of political life is seriously disrupted.
Under normal circumstances, however, the mutual trust
and attachment between mishus and leaders enables mishus to
enjoy the benefit of receiving frequent promotions. It is
tacitly understood, according to our interviewees, between
mishus and leaders that mishus should be promoted by one to
three ranks by the time they leave the service of their
leaders. Indeed, the post of mishu is the fast track for
70. Wu Shaozu, "Extensive Observations," p. 117.
71. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong and His MishU Tian
Jiaying," pp. 69-80.
72. Lin Qingshan, The Rise and Fall of Jiana Oina,
p.420.
upward social mobility in Chinese society. That is largely
because:
In choosing his successor or promoting someone, a leader will
think of his own mishu before anyone else. Because his mishu
is obedient to him, and will remain so after being promoted,
power will actually remain with the leader who would not feel
so at ease if another person were chosen. Consequently, the
shortcut into Chinese officialdom is to become a mishu.
Indeed, children of high officials flock to the posts of
mishu.73  I
The post of mishu is also a de facto cadre school, where
one can best learn all the political secret, tricks and
skills necessary for becoming a successful politician in the
Chinese political arena. As a mishu, "one can learn the
structure, systems, operations, networks, survival
strategies, and struggle philosophy (of Chinese
officialdom) ."74 Therefore, "Those who have been mishus make
skillful and cunning officials, thus enjoying widespread
goodwill, security and endurance, and frequent promotions.
Those who have never been mishus tend to find themselves a
square peg in a round hole, with their paths of promotion
bumpy, their backing shaky, and their life expectancy in
officialdom short." 75 Wu Shaozu explains:
"The post of mishu is an invaluable opportunity for learning
[politics]. A mishu is usually young, but he is able to take
part in important activities undeserved by his low rank and
thus learn a lot of valuable knowledge that cannot be learned
normally....From April 1972 to June 1975, I worked as a mishu
73. Jiang Zhifeng, The Last Card, pp. 144-145.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
for Wang the Elder [Wang Zhen]. I feel that I was spending
the time in a university on society. I had been a natural
science major with juct some meager experience in mass work,
but had been completex ignorant about politics. My political
talent was mostly formed during those three years....I
learned many things from him [Wang Zhen] which have benefited
me ever since." 76
It is well-known to Western China watchers that China
boasts a so-called "crown princes faction (taizi dang),"
which refers. to the fact that a significant number of:
political leaders' children have become ranking officials by
dint of their family ties. Little known to the West, however,
is the fact that there also exists in China a so-called
"mishu faction (mishu dana or mishu bang),"7n which refers to
the fact that political leaders' mishus have risen to power
in droves. It is claimed that "nine out of ten new leaders at
various levels in China have had work experience as mishus. "78
While this may be an exaggeration, a considerable number of
ranking officials, even quite a few top leaders, have indeed
been mishus of one type or another in their past. Take Mao
Zedong's wu da mishu (five major mishus) for example;79  at
least three of them rose to the highest level of Chinese
political authority: Chen Boda became a member of the
76. Wu Shaozu, "Extensive Observations," pp. 112, 117.
77. Personal interviews; also see Shi Liuzi, "A Group
Portrait," pp. 24-28.
78. Ibid.
79. They were Chen Boda, Hu Qiaomu, Ye Zilong, Jiang
Qing, and Tian Jiaying. Kao Zhi, "Jiang Qing wo zhineng guan
bange" ("I Can Only Control Half of Jiang Qing"), in Quan
Yanchi, ed., Linaxiu lei (The Leader's Tears), Beijing:
Qiushi chubanshe, 1989, p. 94. The author was Mao's
confidential mishu.
Politburo standing committee; Hu Qiaomu, a Politburo member;
and Jiang Qing, a Politburo member.80 Mao's other mishus who
rose to political prominence include: Zhou Xiaozhou, the
first secretary of a provincial Party committee; Qi Benyu, a
member of the Cultural Revolution Small Group, which was the
de facto Secretariat of the Central Committee at the time;
Xie Juezai, President of the National Supreme People's Court;
and Yan Mingfu, member of the Central Secretariat and head of
Central Department for United Front Work.81
Table 2.2 provides a partial list of other top leaders'
mishus and the highest positions they have achieved.
80. Although she was Mao's wife personally, her official
position for a long time was his administrative-cum-
confidential mishu.
81. Shi Liuzi, "A Group Portrait," p.26.
96
Table 2.2: A partial list of other Politburo members' mijhus
and their subsequent highest positions8"
leader mishu
Chen Yun Wang Heshou
Deng Xiaoping
Hu Yaobang
Ke Qingshi
Lin Biao
Liu Shaoqi
Peng Zhen
Wang Jiaxiang
Wang Zhen
Liu Huaqing
Liu Fuzhi83
Wang Ruilin
Zheng Bijian
Zhang Chunqiao
Ye Qun
Deng Liqun
Ding Guangen
Tao Zhu
Wu Shaozu
highest positions
2rd secretary of
CCDI*
minister of
heavy industry
vice-chairman of
CMC**
procurator-general
of Supreme
People's
deputy head of the
General Political
Department of
PLA***
president of the
China Academy of
Social Sciences
member of Politburo
standing committee
member of Politburo
member of CCPCC
Secretariat
head of Dept. of
Propaganda of
CCPCC
member of Politburo
member of Politburo
standing committee
minister of
SCPCS****
82. sources: Sheng Ping, Zhonaauo Gongchandang renmino
da cidian (Who's Who in the Chinese Communist Party),
Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991; Zhonaauo
renmina da cidian: xiandai dana zhena linadao renwu iuan
(Who's Who in China: Current Leaders), compiled by the
Editorial Board of Who's Who in China, Beijing: Foreign
Language Press, 1989; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian
(Beina Close to the Historical Giants), Beijing: Zhongyang
wenxian chubanshe, 1991, p. 245; Zhang Zuowei, "Kua shiji
jiebanren: qunxiang" ("The Cross-Century Successors: Their
Profiles"), Tansuo (The Ouest), Vol. 6, No. 102 (1992), p.
12; and Shi Liuzi, "A Group Portrait," , pp. 25-26.
83. He also used to be Zhu De's mighu.
Table 2.2: (continued)
leader mishu highest positions
Zhao Ziyang Tian Jiyun member of Politburo
standing committee;
vice premier
Zhou Enlai Song Ping member of Politburo
standing committee
Zhu De Huang Hua state councilor
foreign minister
* Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
** Central Military Commission
*** The People's Liberation Army
**** State Commission for Physical Culture and Sports
The mishu position as the directorship of the CCPCC
General Office has been a .particularly powerful catapult to
top leadership positions. Yang Shangkun, former state
president of PRC and the one-time permanent vice-chairman of
the Central Military Affairs Commission, was its first
director after the founding the Communist regime in 1949. "He
often described himself as actually the mishu for the Central
leaders."84 Chronologically after Yang Shangkun, the occupants
of that position, and their subsequent highest posts, were:
Wang Dongxing, vice-chairman of the CCPCC; Yao Yilin, a
member of the Politburo standing committee; Hu Qili, a member
of the Politburo standing committee; Qiao Shi, a member of
the Politburo standing committee and Chairman of the National
People's Congress; Wang Zhaoguo, a member of the CCPCC
Secretariat; and Wen Jiabao, a member of the CCPCC
Secretariat.85 The pattern is the same furtner down the line,
84. Wang Qiangong et al., A Practical Handbook, p. 91.
so that the directorship of the general office in any danwei
(work unit) is a relatively sure elevator to a higher rank,
and as such a much coveted and sought-after position.
In emphasizing the mishu position as an important social
elevator, Chinese authors on mishu work like to flaunt the
fact that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping both once worked as
mishus. Deng Yingchao, Zhou Enlai's wife, observed: "Comrades
Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Qu Qiubai, among the late
revolutionary leaders of the first generation, and Comrade
Deng Xiaoping, of the current leadership, have not only made
numerous important instructions on how mishu work should be
carried out, but they have also worked as mishus themselves,
being the founders of our Party's mishu work style and
setting examples for us."8 6 Mao has been hailed as "the very
first mishu in the history of the Chinese Communist Party,"
since he was the mishu for the first National Congress of the
CCP in 1921, and later worked as the mishu for the CCP
Central Committee in 1923, a position which was equivalent in
power to chief mishu (mishu zhana) of later time. - Deng
served as chief mishu for the CCPCC for a long time."
85. Zhonahua renmin aonaheauo dana zhena iun gun
linadaoren minalu (Who's Who in the Party. Army, Government.
Popular Organizations of the People's Republic of China),
Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1990; Peoole's Daily,
overseas edition, October 1992, p. 1.
86. Deng Yingchao, "Mishu renyuan bixu zhongcheng dang
de shiye" ("Mishu Personnel Must Be Loyal to the Party's
Cause"), in The Remarks by Leadino Comrades on Mishu Work, p.
6.
87. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, pp. 72-73.
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From the perspective of comparative politics, what is
significant is the fact that in a society of rule of law,
lawyers tend to be the dominant element in politics, whereas
in China, where the principle of rule of man still prevails,
mishus are the single most important social group in turning
out political elites. For example, in American Congress,
"just under half of House members are lawyers and about three
fifths of senators are lawyers."- In the current Politburo of
China, at least eleven or a half of its 22 full and alternate
members come from a mishu background. 9 0 The skills and
personality traits of mishu personnel are especially favored
by the peculiarities of Chinese politics.
Personal Benefits for Bureaucrats
Bureaucrats benefit from the mishu institution by
learning the true intentions, opinions, preferences, and
feelings of leaders through their mishus. In China, where
politics is still largely colored by the principle of rule of
man, it is not very easy to get the above information, and
yet such information is of critical importance. The
88. Ibid. pp. 74, 76.
89. Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Conaress,
the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, Homewood, Illinois: The
Dorsey Press, 1984, p. 38.
90. They are: Chen Xitong, Ding Guangen, Hu Jintao, Jiang
Chunyun, Li Lanqing, Liu Huaqing, Qian Qichen, Qiao Shi, Tan
Shaowen, Tian Jiyun, Wang Hanbin, Wei Jianxing, Wen Jiabao, Xie
Fei, and Zou Jiahua, according to the biographical data provided
in People's Daily, overseas edition, October 20, 1992, pp. 2-3.
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difficulty arises from the fact that in the Chinese political
process, written documents are typically too vague and too
general to be good indication of leaders' real intentions, as
will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.
Chinese leaders have a tendency to be deliberately vague and
ambiguous in their written statements, leaving the
subordinate bureaucrats to muddle through while claiming
credits for achievements and successes but not being held
accountable for any policy failures.
Besides, the Chinese document circulation system has a
peculiar feature which facilitates leaders' practice of
equivocation, that is, "circling" (auanvue). Under this
system, all that a leader needs to do about a draft document
in circulation among the members of the leadership squad is
to circle his name on the readers' list to indicate that he
has read the document; he has no obligation to make any
comments, pro or con. It is by no means uncommon that even
such circles are in fact drawn, not by leaders themselves,
but by their mishus. A mere circle often leaves his
colleagues and bureaucrats to guess about his true
intentions. Mao is a case in point, as Salisbury's field
interviews reveal: "...not since 1949 had Mao signed any
memorandum from Liu [Shaoqi]. P:pers came back marked with a
small circle to indicate that Mao had read them but there was
never any mark of approval or disapproval. Since the founding
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of the People's Republic, Liu had to guess with every
document whether Mao was for or against it.""
The gap between the vague wording, equivocation, or
generality and leaders' true intentions is largely left to be
filled by the informal oral communication by the mishus
between leaders and bureaucrats.9" Mishus are in the best
position to fill this role, since they are physically the
closest to leaders and enjoy access to their innermost
thoughts and virtually all their secrets. "For all their low
ranks," explains Wu Shaozu, an important former mishu,
"mishus know a great deal -- as much as their leaders
do,..."" One of our interviewees, who used to be a personal
mishu for a minister, even claimed:
A mishu may even know more than his leader, since he is the
one who reads and sifts all incoming documents. A large part
of those documents never get through to the leader. It is
little wonder that he knows a lot that his boss doesn't know.
91. Salisbury, The New Emperors, p. 270.
92. It is significant to note that in the American
political process, deliberate ambiguity also occurs in many
policy documents, as for example, "...many laws are the
product of compromises in ideas and language. Often the
crucial agreements are achieved through deliberate ambiguity,
and the conflicting forces then merely shift the field of
battle from the legislative halls to the administrators'
offices. (Bernard Rosen, Holding Government Bureaucracy
Accountable, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, p. 4) In
such a case, however, interpretation of the "intent" of the
law at issue is open to many actors, such as administrators,
the court, interests groups, issue specialists, and the White
House staff. Political openness precludes any single set of
actors from monopolizing "the most authoritative"
interpretation, as mishus do in the Chinese political process
which is still shrouded in secrecy or semi-secrecy.
93. Wu Shaozu, "Extensive Observations," p. 114.
102
But there is very little that his leader knows he doesn't
know.
Chinese mishus are said to enjoy easy access to three
types of vital secrets of or about Chinese political leaders:
1) "the decisions reached by leadership cores that have not
yet been put in practice, and leaders' thoughts, intentions,
and opinions concerning how various issues should be
handled;" 2) "the secret documents of the Central and local
governments and the top secrets of the state about economy,
scientific researches, military defense, technologies etc.;"
and 3) "leaders' whereabouts and their itineraries, and the
situations of their family members. "'"
Take Mao for example, "Mao had few secrets from his
closest associates, his bodyguards and his secretaries. With
them he was open and remarkably frank." • Mao Zedong once told
his long-time security mishu that, "There are no secrets
about me or my family that I can hide from you even if I can
hide them from heaven or earch." 96  The same was true of
Mao's once most trusted mishu Tian Jiaying: "Tian told a
94. Chen Hongbin et al., The Concise Handbook, pp. 64-
65. The importance of these secrets is such that "whenever
ministers and governors meet, they like to exchange these
types of secrets -- not just out of curiosity but because of
the fact that it is of critical consequence for political
survival to learn the secrets as early as possible and
anticipate possible new developments." Jiang Zhifeng, The
Last Card, pp. iv-v.
95. Salisbury, The New Emperors, p. 170.
96. Quan Yanchi, Zouxia shenatan de Mao Zedona (The Mao
Zedona off the Altar), Beijing: Zhongwai wenhua chuban
gongsi, p. 1.
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friend that he and Mao were genuine confidants. He told Mao
everything he knew or thought, and he believed Mao did the
same with him."'
Mishus know almost all of their leaders' true thoughts
and intentions also because they have the responsibility of
being the censors for their public statements. For instance,
three of Mao's top mishus, Tian Jiaying, Hu Qiaomu, and Chen
Boda, were primarily responsible for compiling and editing
Mao's collected works. They published only revised versions,
making no note of what had been changed, which they kept to
themselves." Besides, since the early 1950s Mao's mishus took
pictures for record of all of Mao's letters, public or
private, "with only a few exceptions," in order to keep track
of the development of his thoughts.99
As a consequence, mish.s are often the most
authoritative interpreters of leaders' thoughts and
intentions, and bureaucrats have to go to them, hat in hand,
to fish for such interpretations. That was why Premier Zhou
Enlai had to ask Mao's mishus from time to time about Mao's
opinions on a particular policy.)" Indeed, even Zhou's wife
Deng Yingchao had often to turn to his mishus to learn what
97. Salisbury, The New Emperors, p. 193.
98. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong and His Mishu Tian
Jiaying," p. 13.
99. Ibid. p. 11.
100. T L. p. 66.
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Zhou was up to. ' " A Chinese mishu explains: "Working
constantly in the presence of his leader, a personal mishu is
regarded by the broad masses and cadres as the representative
and spokesman for his leader. Accordingly, his words and
acts, as a rule, are watched closely and his opinions are
taken seriously. " '' Mishus' interpretation of leaders'
thoughts and intentions becomes all the more important when
leaders get old and even senile. During his last years when
Mao was "somewhat not in his right mind," according to Ji
Dengkui, a former Politburo member and Mao's prot4ge, it was
the job of his confidential mishu Zhang Yufeng and his
interpretation mishus Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang to
translate his grunts and slurs into coherent statements. -
Today, Deng Xiaoping's chief mishu Wang Ruilin and his
political mishu Deng Rong (his daughter) are apparently
performing the same role with him.
In some cases, mishus are the only channel for
bureaucrats to get access to critical information about
leaders, such as the information about leaders' health
condition, feelings, and preferences. Mao's confidential
mishu Zhang Yufeng has recently revealed that his mishus were
the only persons who knew the true condition of Mao's health
101. Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou Enlai and His Mishus, p.463.
102. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
p. 198.
103. Hai Lude et al., eds., Shenahuo zhonade Mao Zedona
(Mao Zedona in Real Life), Beijing: Hualing chubanshe, 1989,
p. 299; Salisbury, The New Emperors, pp. 341, 345.
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and no other people, not even Politburo members, were allowed
to know this topmost secret. " Today, Deng Xiaoping's mishus
keep absolute secret about the true condition of his health,
and Wang Ruilin, director of his personal mishu office, lets
only the seven members of the Politburo standing committee in
on this information."i5
As for learning and handling leaders' personal feelings
and preferences, Chinese bureaucrats rely heavily upon mishus
for guidance. Yang Shangkun, who was director of the Central
General Office for over twenty years, was a good example in
this regard:
There was hardly a secret Yang did not know and no one of
consequence in the Party with whom he was not on familiar
terms. Yang Shangkun ... usually could advise others on when
and how best to approach the chairman [Mao] and on which
topics could be brought up and which were to be avoided....He
was the insider's insider.1 06
Mao's personal mishus were also able to provide
bureaucrats with tips as to "which way Mao's wind was
blowing" -- whether he was in a "good news" pattern or a "bad
news" mood.ic7 Without realizing a leader's emotional state, a
104. Zhang Yufeng, "A Few Anecdotes," p. 129.
105. Zhong Xingzhi, "Fan Deng anchao yin lan you qi" (A
New Anti-Deng Undercurrent Is Surging Secretly"), Zhonaauo
Shibao Zhoukan (China Times Weekly), No. 83 (August 1-7,
1993), p. 16.
106. Salisbury, The New Emperors, pp. 201-202.
107. Ibid. p. 171.
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bureaucrat runs the danger of stroking his hair the wrong way
and thus incur serious consequences for his political fate.
As a caveat, the practice of letting mishus interpret
leaders' "true intentions" is not without problems or even
dangers. There have been occasional complaints about mishus
deliberately distorting or falsifying "imperial decrees,"
namely, leaders' oral instructions. " A well-known example is
Mao's chief mishu Tian Jiaying, who deliberately omitted some
key points in editing Mao's talk regarding the issue of the
historical play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office on the eve of
the Cultural Revolution. (This incident will be discussed in
Chapter Four.)
Of course, deliberate distortion and subtle manipulation
easily shade into each other. Thus, Chinese bureaucrats
benefit not only from mishus' tips about leaders' intentions
and feelings but also from mishus' assistance in manipulating
individual leaders' perceptions and decisions to advance
their separate interests. Chinese leaders are particularly
susceptible to persuasion and manipulation of their mishus.
Thus, mishus' help is critical for getting a leader's support
or bringing his mind around to a bureaucrat's point of view.
Again, take Mao for example. Mao often appeared iron-willed,
menacing, and uncompromising to his colleagues and
bureaucrats, and yet he was open and receptive to the
108. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 138.
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opinions and suggestions of the mishu personnel around him.
His long-time security mishu Li Yinqiao recalls:
It was my feeling that Mao Zedong sometimes had an over-
receptive ear for words from the people immediately around
him, if they were repeated over and over.... Comrade Shi Zhe
the [Russian] interpreter once told Mao that Gao Gang"0 9 was a
good cadre with unusual talent. After hearing the remark
several times, Mao himself began to praise Gao."O
Thus, bureaucrats can benefit a great deal if they have
mishus incessantly insinuate their points of view to the
leaders. That was why Liu Shaoqi cultivated an ally in Mao's
trusted mishu Tian Jiaying and had Tian present Liu's policy
views to Mao in his behalf. In the wake of the "Great Leap"
fiasco, Tian "repeatedly suggested to Mao...that Chen Yun be
restored to taking charge of the economy."'!"  At Liu Shaoqi's
request, Tian suggested to Mao that Chen Yun's policy to
"assign production quotas to individual households" be
adopted. '
It is now no secret that the Gang of Four's "Criticize
Lin Biao and Confucius" campaign, which was in fact aimed at
attacking Zhou Enlai, was successfully launched only with the
109. A key Party leader, Gao was purged in the 1950s in
the so called Gao-Rao incident under the charge of attempting
to split the Party and conspiring with the Soviet Union.
110. Quan Yanchi, The Mao Zedona off the Altar, pp. 141-
142.
111. Peng Yaxin, "A Short Biography of Tian Jiaying," p.
324.
112. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong and His Mishu Tian
Jiaying," pp. 67-68.
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help of Mao's two interpreter-mishus, Wang Hairong and Nancy
Tang:
Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang had begun to feed Mao hints about
Zhou Enlai. They reminded Mao that Zhou had not been
enthusiastic about the Cultural Revolution. Wang Hairong trod
very cautiously. "I have an idea -- I don't know whether it
is right or not," she said. "In the Cultural Revolution when
the rebels built a fire, Zhou was always there to put it
out." Mao was not eager to launch a new campaign. "Sunset is
very beautiful," he observed. "But dusk is approaching. The
time for me to report to Marx is nearing by the day." But
Wang Hairong persisted, and Mao finally agreed that Zhou was
indeed a modern Confucius, always searching for the golden
mean. "It is time to criticize him," he said.-
The Gang's campaign to "Criticize Deng and Fight the
Rightist Wind," which brought Deng Xiaoping down for a second
time, got off the ground after Mao's liaison mishu, Mao
Yuanxin,! 4 talked the Chairman into authorizing it:
On an early November day in 1975 Mao Yuanxin had a talk with
his uncle. Mao was coughing. A cold wind was blowing. The
nephew said: "The wind outside isn't as strong as another
wind."
"What do you mean?" Mao asked.
"I mean the wind of some people to negate the Cultural
Revolution."
"Tell me more," Mao said.
"There are a number of questions here -- whether the
Cultural Revolution was seventy percent good and thirty
percent bad or the reverse. How to assess the campaign
against Lin Biao and Confucius and whether to continue to
criticize Liu Shaoqi."
With a surgeon's skill the nephew touched the most
sensitive nerves of Mao's ideological being. Deng Xiaoping
was at the root of the problem. Deng, he said, hardly ever
mentioned the Cultural Revolution or Mao. He never criticized
113. Salisbury, The New EmDerors, p. 343.
114. Mao Yuanxin was Mao's nephew, son of his brother
Mao Zemin.
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Liu Shaoqi. He lauded Zhou Enlai. All he talked about was
production. Mao's face darkened. His breath came quicker.-:
Mao's case was by no means an exception. Evidence
strongly indicates that it is a widespread practice for
bureaucrats to try anything, including giving substantial
gifts or bribery, to cultivate friendships with mishus in
order to benefit from their help in getting leaders'
attention and support. The critical importance of mishus'
help is illustrated in the mishus' role in setting the agenda
for a conference or meeting. It is usually the chief leader's
mishu or director of the general office who is responsible
for setting the agenda for any conference or meeting. It is
largely up to him to decide what issues are to be included
and what not, and when to raise them, with how much emphasis
or casualness. One of our interviewees explains why personal
connections with mishus are crucial in this regard:
If you have an urgent problem that needs immediate attention
of the leaders, you have to first ask for help of the mishu
[or director of the general office]. Otherwise he can easily
block or kill your issue, by raising it at an inappropriate
time or in an inappropriate manner, or simply by putting it
off. It's so difficult for all the leaders concerned to meet
and sit down together at the same conference that skipping
one such opportunity often means that your issue will be
shelved for a long, long time, if not indefinitely. A mishu's
cooperation or lack of it makes all the difference.
Moreover, mishus' help in letting leaders grant public
appearances is also very important for bureaucrats, since
they often play a critical part in deciding and arranging
115. Salisbury, The New Emperors, pp. 343-344. Also see
Fan Shuo, Ye Jianvina zai 1976 (Ye Jianvina in 1976),
Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1990, pp.
57-63.
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such appearances. An important leader's mere appearance at an
activity organized by a bureaucracy can bring enormous
benefits to the host unit. This is because:
It is a common practice that with the presence of one leader
or another, an. activity will be automatically regarded as a
success; but without the presence of a leader, it will be
regarded as a failure or an insignificant event. When judging
the importance of an activity, people will first see which
important leaders have come, hence the frenzied struggle to
invite leaders to various activities regardless of whether it
is necessary or not.116
Summary
The mishu institution is different in nature from
bureaucracy in that embodying the traditional leader-follower
relationship, the former is based on intense personal
attachment, oral communication, diffusiveness of role, and
fluidity of responsibilities, whereas the latter is based on
the principles of impersonality, primacy of written rules,
specialization, proceduralization, and fixed and well-defined
scopes of jurisdictions. The mishu institution proves
personally beneficial to all the parties in the Chinese
political arena. Leaders have reliable and versatile
agents/servants to take care of their private interests and
personal needs. Mishus are able to directly please leaders
and win their personal liking and trust. As a result, they
are rewarded with quick and frequent promotions by the
116. Yi Chengjie et al., Zhenawu iieaia vu linadao
huodona anDai (Receivina of Official Visitors and Arrangina
of Leaders' Activities), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p.
58.
111
leaders, in addition to enjoying great respectability and
wielding tremendous de facto power. Moreover, mishus also
profit by enjoying opportunities to learn all the political
secrets, tricks, and skills for becoming successful leaders
in the Chinese political arena. The misbu institution offers
bureaucrats with several crucial benefits. Mishus' oral
communication and assistance enable bureaucrats to find out
leaders' otherwise vague and elusive intentions and feelings,
to get critical political information about leaders as
persons, and to privately manipulate leaders' perceptions,
decisions, and activities for the sake of promoting their
separate interests.
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Chapter Three
THE CONTROL ROLE
The previous chapter examined the personal benefits that the
mishu institution work to bring to individual actors. when it
comes to the functioning of the Chinese political system as a
whole, the Chinese mishu institution performs two basic
roles, namely, amplifying political leadership's control over
the bureaucracy and cushioning conflicts and clashes among
political leaders and between leaders and bureaucracies. This
chapter focuses on the analysis of the control role while
leaving the examination of the cushioning/coordinating role
to the next chapter.
For analytical purposes, the mishu system's control role
can be regarded as consisting of two aspects: 1) enhancing
leadership's information and decision capacity; and 2)
strengthening leadership's monitoring and supervision
capacity, though the two aspects are inseparably intertwined
in practice. Put in another way, the two aspects can also be
understood as: 1) improving leaders' ability to respond
effectively to what bureaucracies communicate upward
willingly, and 2) expanding leaders' capability to find out
what bureaucrats want to hide and to push them to do what
they are reluctant to do. This chapter comprises two parts to
examine these two aspects separately.
Part I. Amplifying the Information and Decision Capacity
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Sifting and Condensing Information
With decision-making power highly concentrated in
themselves, Chinese political leaders make an extraordinarily
wide scope of decisions for the bureaucracies under their
charge, ranging from policy goals, personnel, budgets,
political and moral education, down to family planning and
birth control. As a result, leadership squads always find
themselves drowned "in a Niagara Falls of issues." i In order
to exercise effective leadership, a staggering amount of
information from below has to be processed on a continuous
basis. As a result, communication overload has been a chronic
burning issue for Chinese leaders. Chinese political leaders
rely heavily upon their mishus' assistance to reduce to
manageable proportions the information torrents, which
constantly gush upward from bureaucracies.2
1i. David M. Lampton, "A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining,
Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China," in Kenneth G.
Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy. Politics.
and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, California: University
of California Press, 1992, p. 52.
2. Chinese leaders have, in theory, adopted the practice
of so-called management-by-exception in order to alleviate
the problem of overload. This means that the subordinate
bureaucracies are encouraged to work out solutions to as many
problems as possible among themselves instead of passing the
buck upward. Once a decision is made by consensus among the
bureaucracies on an issue, it will be automatically approved
by the presiding leadership squad. Only when consensus cannot
be reached should the issue be passed upward to the
leadership squad. This practice is, in theory, meant to
reduce the leadership squad's overload, to make the best use
of the expertise of the bureaucrats, and to cultivate a sense
of participation among subordinates and enhance their
commitment to the decision thus made. In practice, however,
this arrangement rarely works as intended. The bureaucrats
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To be able to handle, with tolerable effectiveness,
large amounts of information passed upward from
bureaucracies, Chinese political principals let virtually all
incoming information first pass through their mishus ,
personal and/or organizational, so that it is "sifted,
classified, abstracted, analyzed, evaluated, verified, and
refined."3  For example, all letters and visits for a leader
have to be first processed by his personal mishu, regardless
of what they are about -- suggestions, criticisms, petitions,
pleas, accusations, reporting on someone, exposing evil-
doings, and the like. The mishu is required to decide whether
they should be passed on to his leader, be forwarded to the
subordinate departments concerned, be handled by himself, or
just be ignored.4
The same is true of all incoming official documents. A
mishu is supposed to "read carefully and repeatedly every
are still inclined to refer decisions, big and small, to the
leadership instead of trying to settle them among themselves.
After all, intervention from leadership is usually more
effective and beneficial than the deal worked out by
bureaucratic co-equals through laborious bargaining and
haggling. This point is explained by Susan L. Shirk in "The
Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of
Economic Reform," in Lieberthal and Lampton, eds.,
Bureaucracy, pp. 71-73.
3. Wang Zhaoguo, "Chonafen fahui bangonating de canmou.
zhushou zuovona" ("Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices in Providing Advice and Assistance"), in Linadao
Tonazhi Tan Mishu Gonazuo (The Remarks by Leadino Comrades on
Mishu Work), Beijing: Xiandai chubanshe, 1989, p.74.
4. Zheng Xinghan et al., Danazhena iiauan mishu conazuo
aaishu (An Outline of the Mishu Work in the Party and State
Organs), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 79.
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incoming document" so as to "sift through (shaixuan)" them
and "filter out unimportant ones."5 He is also responsible for
establishing the priority of urgency on each document for
getting his leader's attention, by determining "which ones
the leader should read immediately, and which ones he should
read later; which information reported from below the leader
should learn in detail, and which he should only learn
generally; which suggestions submitted from below the leader
should respond to, and which ones he need not;... "6 For
example, Mao's former confidential mishu, Kao Zhi, recalls
that, "One of my important jobs was to sift through all the
documents, telegrams, and materials sent in from all the
ministries, provinces, cities, and prefectures, and decide
which of them should be'passed on to the Chairman and which
should not."7
The mishu also has to abstract (zhaivao) and refine
those documents that are to be read by his leader in order to
make them concise and easily understandable. If t'hey are too
long, he must condense them; if they are poorly organized,
they must rewrite and polish them.8 If a mishu fails to do so
5. Ibid. p. 40.
6. Ibid, p. 201.
7. Kao Zhi, "Jiang Qing wo zhineng guan bange" ("I Can
Only Control Half of Jiang Qing") in Quan Yanchi, ed.,
Linaxiu lei (The leader's Tears), Beijing: Qiushi chubanshe,
1989, p. 94.
8. Qi Peiwen et al., Zenvana danghao lingdaoren mishu
(How to Be a Good Personal Mishu for a Leader), Beijing:
Dangan chubanshe, 1990, pp. 170-171.
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but just passes a document on to his leader as it is, he will
be reprimanded. For instance, Zhou Enlai's personal mishus
each received about thirty documents every day from the
ministries under their respective scopes of responsibility.9
These documents were as a rule "rather long" and Zhou's
mishus had to read them carefully and write an abstract of no
more than a few hundred words for each of them.10
It is also a common practice for high-ranking Chinese
leaders to let their mishus do all the reading and then
report orally to them the gist of the documents. Lin Biao was
a typical example. One of his mishus' job was to read each
day all the documents that came from various bureaucracies to
Lin's office and to report orally on the most important ones.
The decision about the relative importance of each document
lay totally with the mishu. He had to condense the daily load
of about one hundred documents into two such presentations,
one in the morning and the other in the afternoon, each
lasting only ten to twenty minutes.11 It is also known that
9. Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou Enlai he tade mishumen (Zhou
Enlai and His Mishus), Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi
chubanshe, 1992, pp. 100, 181. The contributors are all
Zhou's former mishus.
10. Ibid, p. 263. A mishu once failed to pluck up enough
courage to touch a report from a certain vice-premier but
passed it on to Zhou without re-writing it, Premier Zhou flew
into sharp-tongued fury, accusing the mishu of wasting his
time. (Ibid, pp. 103-104.)
11. Zhang Yunsheng, Maoiiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu
huivi lJ (The Eyewitness Accounts of Maoiiawan: The Memoirs
of Lin Biao's Mishu), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988, pp.
12-13.
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Deng Xiaoping relied heavily on his mishus' oral reports and
presentations in managing incoming information flows.1 Such
practice apparently enables leaders to keep track of a wide
scope of issues and new developments in the bureaucracies.
Enhancing Leadership's Decision-Making Caoabilitv
In order to help leaders cope with the constant deluges
of information from bureaucracies, Chinese mishus not only
sift and condense all incoming information, but also in
effect make large numbers of decisions on behalf of their
leaders. For example, they are said to make preliminary
decisions (niban) on most incoming documents that require
responses from the leaders. A mishu is supposed to read every
document that is intended to be read by his leader, and "for
each document a mishu is expected to offer his suggestions to
the leader as to how it should be handled, providing options
if necessary. In case of several options, the mishu should
indicate his own preference and his reasoning," so as to
facilitate his leader's decision-making. 13 An example is
provided by Deng Xiaoping's practice. It is recorded that
"...Deng would receive a document from subordinate written
for his approval. Deng requested Wang [one of his mishus] to
12. Michel Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication Within
the Chinese Bureaucracy," China Ouarterly, No. 57 (January-
March 1974), p. 20.
13. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
pp. 41-42.
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read it first, and if he [Wang] found nothing objectionable,
Deng signed without examination."!
Chinese mishus are, in many cases, entrusted with the
authority even to "make the final decisions and directly
issue instructions (.i~ban)" on a wide variety of documents.
Carol Famrin has noticed this role of Chinese personal mishus
in her research: "In the Chinese system, like the Soviet
system, these secretaries tend to be better educated than the
leaders and actually do much of the work, making important
decisions on their own."ml When authorized to issue
instructions by himself to subordinate departments in
processing documents, a mishu is expected to "stipulate the
guidelines, principles, and methods for handling the
issues. "16
Moreover, mishus amplify leaders' decision-making
capacity by offering extensive advice. Take Zhou Enlai's
personal mishus for example. "When he [Zhou Enlai] was
reading documents, he would frequently ask us mishus for
opinions and encourage us to offer our thoughts, if he was
not sure about something. One of us mishus once told him:
'All the documents that pass through our hands have already
been signed by the ministers and must have been thoroughly
14. Oksenberg, "Methods of Communications," p. 21.
15. Carol Lee Hamrin, "The Party Leadership System,"
in Lieberthal and Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, p. 122.
16. Qi Peiwen et al, How to Be a Good Personal Mishu, p.
45.
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studied, and so we cannot think of anything more to say.' The
Premier disagreed." 7 Zhou demanded his mishus "to be creative
and not to be confined to routine and technicality. He urged
repeatedly: 'You can make policy suggestions boldly and help
me with ideas.' He often asked questions and discussed
problems with us mishus. He would accept whatever little bits
of our suggestions made sense."-"
A mishu is expected to provide advice on literally
everything to his leader in his leadership work. For example,
before a political leader meets a foreign visitor, it is his
mishu's duty to brief and counsel him with regard to the
relevant information about the visitor, his mission, and his
country, "so that the leader can raise pointed questions and
provide accurate answers during the meeting."19 Before a
leader goes to watch a dramatic performance or sports game,
his mishu is expected to brief and counsel him concerning the
event and each of the actors or players, "so that the leader
can encourage them, point out their shortcomings, and answer
in an informed manner questions they may ask. "2c
17. Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou Enlai and His Mishus, p. 183.
It is typical of Chinese mishus to modestly understate their
role in front of their leaders.
18. Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou Enlai and His Mishus, p. 183.
19. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
p. 150.
20. Ibid. p. 152.
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Part II. Amplifying the Monitoring/Supervision Capability
Collectina and Verifyina Information
Although Chinese political leaders are constantly under
the relentless pressure of information overload, they
experience difficulty of varying degrees in getting true,
accurate and useful information from bureaucracies.
Bureaucrats have a natural tendency to hide the information
that will not show them in a favorable light. Consequently,
Chinese leaders have to rely heavily upon their mishus to
serve as their "eyes and ears,"21 in order to have some
capacity to collect or verify information independently.
Mao Zedong's practice was an example in point. Mao
repeatedly complained that "nobody tells me anything" through
the normal bureaucratic channels.22 So he made frequent
travels across the country in an attempt to obtain
information independently by himself, only in vain. "He
staged surprise attacks, in which he would suddenly order his
special train to halt at an obscure village, leap out, and
hurry to the Party office, hoping to catch the residents
unaware."23 However, the news of his coming always traveled
21. Qi Peiwen et al., ibid. p. 4; Xu Ruixin et al.,
Zhonaauo xiandai mishu aonazuo jichu (The Essentials of
Contemporary Chinese Mishu Profession), Beijing: Gaodeng
jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989, p. 150.
22. Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emoerors: China in
the Era of Mao and Dena, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1992,
p. 79.
23. Ibid.
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faster, so that "even the whisper of a visit by Mao created a
frenzy to fix things up, to paint houses, to fill cupboards,
to bring in food, to find happy peasants to tell Mao
everything was just dandy."24 Mao complained: "Wherever I go
they prepare for me. I can't find out the truth."'- Therefore,
Mao ended up having to depend on his mishus to gather
information on his behalf. He sent them out frequently on
field investigations. He relied particularly on "the no-
words-spared reports" of his then most trusted mishu, Tian
Jiaying, to find out bad news and unpleasant facts. 26
As individual leaders depend heavily upon their personal
mishus to obtain true and accurate information, so leadership
squads rely primarily upon the organizational mishus in the
general offices for clarifying and verifying information from
subordinate bureaucracies. In terms of information flows, a
general office is often described as the "hole of the
24. Ibid. p. 173. Also see Li Yinqiao, Zouxia shentan de
Mao Zedona (The Mao Zedona off the Altar), Shanxi: Zhongwai
wenhua chuban gongsi, 1989, p. 54.
25. Salisbury, The New Emperors, p. 79.
26. Ibid. p. 196. It is noteworthy that in addition to
his mishus, Mao also let his body guards play an important
role in collecting or verifying information for him in order
to be able to circumvent the normal bureaucratic channels.
Mao had a large detachment of body guards directly at his
disposal. Mao ordered that each of his personal body guards
be selected from a different prefecture across the country
without overlapping, so that he could "obtain true
information about the whole country" through them. [Quan
Yanchi, Zouxia shenatan de Mao Zedonag (The Mao Zedong off the
Altar), Beijing: Zhongwai wenhua chuban gongsi, 1989, p. 50.]
Since China has 336 prefectures, this was about the size of
Mao's personal bodyguard detachment.
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funnel," in the sense that virtually all information that
goes to a leadership squad passes through its general office,
to be verified and clarified -- to a greater or lesser
degree.
In order to improve or maximize the truthfulness of the
information from bureaucracies, the Chinese mishu system
maintains an extensive and elaborate information network,
which presumably connects all bureaucratic units vertically
and horizontally throughout the country. For example, both
the Central Committee General Office and State Council
General Office have maintained "an elaborate information
system consisting of information-gathering points and
information gatherers throughout the country.' 27 The same is
true of the general offices at lower levels. For example, the
General Office of the Heilongjiang provincial Party committee
has an information network, which "keeps constant contact
with 1,649 information-gathering points and 4,696 information
gatherers across the province."2 8
In order to counteract the natural tendency of
bureaucrats to distort unpleasant information, this mishu-
operated information network apparently enjoys a measure of
autonomy from the bureaucracies at the various levels in
which the general offices are embedded. They are even
27. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 184. The
information points and gatherers probably refer to
information divisions or sections of lower-level general
offices and mishus in them.
28. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 184.
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entitled to report on their immediate leadership squads to
the superior authorities. For instance, according to Wang
Zhaoguo, then director of the Central General Office, every
general office at all levels has the obligation to report
regularly all important information about its immediate
leadership squad to the higher-level GOs. "The general
offices of all the provinces, autonomous regions, directly-
governed municipalities, and Central ministries and
departments," Wang Zhaoguo states, "have the right and
obligation to report to us [the Central GO] in a timely
manner the information [about their units or localities] with
regard to major work plans, leading comrades' activities,
measures taken to implement Central policies, new local
policies, public opinions, important social trends, etc., so
that we can pass it on to the Central leaders." 2 9 Indeed,
even personal mishus who work directly for individual leaders
have the obligation to report on their bosses under extreme
circumstances, as is explained by a Chinese author: "If the
leader's decision or instructions are clearly in violation of
the Party line or state law, his mishu has the obligation and
right to advise against them and help the leader correct
them, and even report them to higher authorities. " • It is
noteworthy that the mishu-operated information/intelligence
29. Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices," pp. 76-77.
30. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of Mishu Work, p.
105.
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network bears some resemblance to the palace memorial
institution, a highly effective internal communications
system of the Qing dynasty, as will be discussed in Chapter
Six.
Although evidence is lacking as to how this mishu-
operated information network works in practice, namely, how
it actually divides its loyalty between the immediate
leadership squads and higher-level authorities, this network
constitutes at least some constraint on subordinate
bureaucracies deterring them from engaging in fragrant
violations of political leaders' policies and intentions. An
example that offers a glimpse into the inner workings of this
mishu-operated information network is provided by Jiang
Zemin's personal mishus. Jiang's political enemies reportedly
tried to undermine his position by accusing him of boasting,
during his visit to Japan in 1992, to a Japanese politician
about the certainty of his being reelected for the general
secretaryship in the upcoming Fourteenth Party Congress.
Since "every single word of his [Jiang's] had been recorded
_by his mishus who were constantly at his side during the
entire course of the trip," the misghus' transcripts were
reportedly sent over to Deng Xiaoping's personal mishu
office. After examining the transcripts, the accusation was
dismissed as groundless rumor." Another revealing example was
31. Zhai Xin, "Jiang Zemin shi zhenming tianzi ma?" ("Is
Jiang Zemin the Son of Heaven with True Mandate?"), Jiush i
Niandai (The Nineties), No. 32 (September 1993), pp. 32-33.
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found in the intelligence gathering capacity demonstrated by
Marshal Ye Jianying's personal mishus during the Cultural
Revolution. At the request of Ye, his mishus managed to
collect detailed statistics about the organizational strength
and activities of the Gang of Four faction in terms of "how
many people had been promoted [by the Gang], which of them
were still possible to win over, which of them came from a
background of 'Cultural Revolution rebels,' and which of
them were die-hard followers."22
So far as the entire political system is concerned, the
efficiency of the mishu-operated information network seems on
the whole to be remarkable, at least when it comes to
reporting about emergencies and crises. For example, every
general office at all levels has an on-duty division/section,
which keeps watch for any emergencies around the clock, every
day of the year, so that critical information can be brought
promptly to the attention not only of the immediate
leadership and but also of the superior leaderships at next
levels above. The Central General Office is said to be
usually able to obtain the urgent information about a major
incident anywhere in the country and pass it on to the
Central leaders within fifteen minutes.33 For example, when a
Taiwan airliner defected and landed in Guangzhou, the
32. Fan Shuo, Ye Jianvina zai 1976 (Ye Jianvina in
1976), Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1990,
p. 243.
33. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, pp. 186-187.
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incident was reported by the local general office to the
Center within only fifteen minutes. Once when a flood
suddenly inundated a whole county in Shaanxi province, the
report of the disaster from the local mishu office reached
the Center in twenty minutes. .The delay incurred reproach."
A word of caution is in order, however. There are also
reported dissatisfactions about the inefficiencies of the
mishu-operated information system. For example, Central
leaders have complained that in some cases important
information was first provided by the news media instead of
the mishu offices, and that sometimes information provided by
the mishu channels was "little, slow, exaggerating the
positive side, and downplaying the negative side. "0
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that Chinese leaders
are, relatively speaking, able to stay well informed of the
general conditions and major developments in the
bureaucracies. Exaggerating or not, one of our well-informed
interviewees in the State Council claimed:
It is almost impossible for subordinate units to hide
anything from the Central leadership squad. The leaders may
not take immediate action to correct a problem. That is not
34. Ibid. In addition, an considerable amount of money
has been invested in recent years to upgrade communications
equipment and to provide computers for the general offices to
improve their capability to collect, process, store,
retrieve, and transmit information. (Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full
Play to the Role of General Offices," p. 77; Zheng Xinghan
et al, An Outline of the Mishu Work, pp. 174-175; personal
interviews.)
E. Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices," p. 76.
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because they are unaware of its existence, but more likely
because they have not found an appropriate solution yet.
Anyhow, it is safe to conclude that mishus play a
significant role in helping Chinese political leaders stay,
generally speaking, well informed and thus be able to wield
reasonably effective control over the far-flung bureaucratic
structure.
Clearing House for All Official Documents
Mishus' control function is also reflected in the fact
that a mishu squad or general office is supposed to be the
clearing house for all official documents composed by
subordinate bureaucracies. It is said that all such documents
have to be submitted to the relevant mishus for reviewing,
editing, and censoring, before they can be officially
released. In reviewing and editing a document from
subordinate bureaucracies, the general office has the
authority to perform the following "seven checks" (ai cha) in
order to ensure their conformity to the intentions and
instructions of the leadership squad and higher
authorities 36:
1) Check and determine whether the document needs to be
issued, based upon the requirements of the work of the Party
and the state, the leaders' intentions, and the content of
the document itself,...
36. Wei Keyi et al., Mishu aonazuo tonashu (A General
Guide for Mishu Work), Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe,
1992, pp. 111-113. Also see Hou Rui, Zenvana dana banaonashi
zhuren (How to Work as Director of a General Office),
Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 43.
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2) Check and determine whether there are any
contradictions, namely, whether the content of the document
conflicts with the guidelines and policies of the Party and
the state, the relevant laws, statutes, and regulations,
superior leaders' instructions and decisions, and the past
documents issued by the professional department in charge or
by the unit itself....
3) Check and determine whether the new policy is well
defined, namely, whether it is clear what shall be done or
shall not be done, how it shall be done, and whether the
measures are ambiguous, too rigid, too loose, or too
complex,...
4) Check and determine whether the measures are
feasible, namely, whether the measures are clear,
practical,...whether the deadline is appropriate,...and
whether the standards set are too high or too low....
5) Check and determine whether the document has followed
the proper procedure, namely, whether it has been
appropriately sanctioned, and issued in the name of the right
organ..., whether it needs to be deliberated and ratified by
a conference, co-endorsed by other units, approved by the
superior leadership, or coordinated with the professional
department in charge.
6) Check and determine whether the document is worded
accurately, succinctly, and coherently....
7) Check and determine whether the document observes the
correct format.... in terms of rubric, heading, primary
addressee and secondary addressee, confidentiality level,
validity period, and key words.
If a document has serious flaws in those regards, the GO
has the right to return it to the originating department for
major revisions. In practice, it may not be possible to
thoroughly review and edit all documents from the subordinate
bureaucrats. Otherwise, Chinese official documents would not
be peppered with the many contradictions and inconsistencies,
a fact well known to China scholars. Nonetheless, evidence
suggests that this formal clearance authority of mishus does
constitute significant clout over bureaucrats in their
processes of policy formation -- at least with regard to
written documents.
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Enhanced Autonomy of the Mishu System
In order to ensure the reliability and integrity of the
mishu system for the sake of centralized control, Chinese
political leadership has in the last decade made great
efforts to 'enhance a separate professional identity among
miih. personnel across the country. In the past, general
offices used to be accountable primarily to their immediate
leadership squads,37 but they are now more explicitly placed
under the dual leadership of both their immediate leadership
squads and the higher-level general offices, which are to
provide "professional guidance" (vewu zhidao).38 The general
offices are thus now openly regarded as a separate sub-system
running from the Center to the basic level bureaucracies. 3 9
As has been noted earlier, a general office has the
obligation to report to the superior general offices with
regard to the key information about its immediate leadership.
And a higher-level general office is entitled to assign "a
wide scope of tasks" directly to a lower-level general office
with regard to conducting policy investigation, handling
casework, etc. 40
37. Wen Xiang, Mishu renvuan xiuvana vu duiwu iianashe
(Training of Mishu Personnel and Buildina of the Mishu Army),
Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 87. As a matter of fact,
higher-level GOs have always wielded some clout over the work
of GOs in the subordinate units.
38. Wen Xiang, Training of Mishu Personnel, p. 88.
39. Hou Rui, How to Work as Director of a General
Office, pp. 10-11.
40. Ibid. p. 11.
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This new practice is embodied in the slogan which was
first publicized at "National Symposium of Chief Mishus and
Directors of GOs" convened in January of 1985: "Provide
services three ways" (san fuwu) -- "to the Central and
superior leaderships, to the immediate leadership and other
leaderships at the same level, and to the subordinate
leaderships and the broad masses." 41 The main thrust of this
slogan is that an enhanced sense of separate professional
identity should be formed among the mishu personnel, which
should cut across the factional, regional, and institutional
fault lines of the Chinese bureaucracy, so that centralized
control and coordination can be improved.
In order to achieve closer cooperation among general
offices at various levels across the country, regular
professional conferences have been institutionalized,
professional journals established, professional awards
founded, and professional training programs and courses
offered.42  Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, for
instance, two national symposiums have been convened by the
Central General Office, one in 1981 and the other in 1985,43
41. Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices," pp. 70-71.
42. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of the Mishu Work,
p. 119.
43. The second one was attended by many top leaders
including Hu Yaobang, Xi Zhongxun, Song Renqiong, Yang
Shangkun, Yao Yilin, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, and Tian Jiyun, as
well as 166 general office heads from the provincial
governments and Central ministries and departments (Zheng
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for the general office heads across the country to meet and
exchange information and experiences. 44 Moreover, the general
offices of local governments have organized regular
conferences to strengthen their working relationship
horizontally. For example, "In recent years, annual
conferences have been held jointly by the general offices of
Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Guangxi, Tibet, Xingjiang,
Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia to review their past work and
study new situations, new issues, and new experiences."45
Furthermore, Chinese general offices at various levels
issue their own periodicals for internal circulation so as to
exchange information with each other. For instance, the
Central General Office issues a periodical named Summaries
and Abstracts (zonahe vu zhaibao), 4 6  and the State Council
General Office issues a periodical named The State Council
Bulltin (auowuvuan aonabao). 47 In recent years, the Chinese
mishu system have also started to publish its own
professional journals, such as Mishu GonaZuo (Mishu Work),
Xinghan et al., ibid. p. 60; Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full Play to
the Role of General Offices," p. 69).
44. Chen Hongbin et al., eds., Jianmina mishu gonazuo
shouce (The Concise Handbook of Mishu Profession), Shenyang:
Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987, pp. 72-73.
45. Wen Xiang, Training of Mishu Peronnflel, p. 89.
46. Ibid.
47. Zhonaauo Zhenafu Gonazuo Gaivao (An Outline of the
Work of the Chinese Government), Beijing: the CCP Central
Party School Press, 1991, p. 214.
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published by the Mishu Bureau of the Central General Office;
Hanakona Danaan: Mishu Zhuankan (The Aviation Records: Mishu
Column), published by the general office of the Aviation
Ministry; Mishu Zhuanve (Mishu Profession), published by the
general office of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee;
and Mishu Gonazuo (Mishu Work), published by the general
office of the Guangdong Provincial Government.4 8
Across China, more than 150 institutions of higher
learning have set up programs and courses to train
prospective Amish personnel and had turned out more than one
hundred thousand graduates by the end of 1990.4 9 The general
offices themselves have offered regular seminars as short-
term off-the-job or on-the-job training to improve the
quality of mishus. The Central Party School and the Central
General Office have organized national training programs for
provincial-level mishas, and the provincial-level general
offices have organized similar programs for mishus at
prefecture and county levels. 50
As shown in the above analysis, the Chinese leadership
has made great efforts in the past decade to strengthen the
role of the general office system in favor of centralized
48. Wang Qiangong et al., Shivona Mishu Gonazuo Shouce
(A Practical Handbook for Mishu Work), Beijing: Guangming
ribao chubanshe, 1987, p. 400, Zheng Xinghan et al., An
Outline of the Mishu Work, p. 62.
49. Zheng Xinghan et al., ibid. p. 163.
50. Wen Xiang, Training of Mishu Personnel, pp. 73, 75,
88.
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control and coordination, although it has allowed greater
decentralization in some other aspects, economy in
particular. As Lieberthal and Oksenberg shrewdly observed
about the Center-locality relationship, "Frequently, a
publicized grant of increased authority to the provinces, for
example, is accompanied by a quiet, off-setting change in
favor of the Center."51 The strengthened mishu role can be
understood as one such off-setting measure to achieve the
continued effectiveness of Chinese leaders' domination over
the bureaucracy.
SuDervisina the Implementation Process
In addition to helping political leaders find out what
bureaucrats may want to hide, mishus also act to push them to
do what they may not want to do. In other words, mishus are
responsible for closely monitoring and supervising
bureaucrats in order to see to it that they implement
political leaders' decisions promptly and faithfully.
There is a special feature of the Chinese political
process which makes the mishu function of monitoring and
supervision particularly indispensable, from leaders' point
of view. It is a great irony about the Chinese political
process that for all that decision making is highly
concentrated in leaders, written decisions are typically
51. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy
Making in China: Leaders. Structures. and Processes, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 139.
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general, vague, and unspecific. For example, "central
decisions often only set forth goals or prescriptions on what
should be done. They do not bear close resemblance to the
types of detailed implementing and regulating documents that
frequently accompany high level decision making in the United
States. "-.
The generality and vagueness of written decisions has
the advantages of being applicable to a wide range of
different conditions instead of being specifically confined
to one single case,5  leaving room for adaptations for
particular situations and adjustments for unpredictable
changes, and not being held accountable for policy failures.
In terms of Central documents, most of them are understood to
only convey the general "intention" (vitu) of Central
leaders, which "should be followed in spirit rather than to
52. Ibid. p. 27. It is noteworthy that although orders
and instructions from the white House tend to be concrete and
specific, laws and regulations passed by Congress are at
times vague and general. This does not result, however, from
high concentration of decision making power and the remote
distance between the point of decision and the point of
action. Rather it arises largely from the peculiarities of
competitive politics: "The art of assembling majority
support, among voters and legislators, for each program
typically requires fuzzy goals and vague languages. The more
precisely objectives are defined, the easier it is for
competing parties to disagree with them." (James W. Fesler
and Donald F. Kettl, The Politics of the Administrative
Process, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1991, p.
185.)
53. Franz Schurmann, Ideolovy and_ Oranization in
Communist China, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1966, p. 60.
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the letter by local organs." 54 Central documents "typically
permit (and assume) considerable flexibility in how local
units handle them."55  Indeed, even leaders' intentions are
not supposed to be regarded "as something mechanical or
static," but can be treated "flexibly" and "creatively.s 56
Inevitably, however, the vagueness of written decisions
leaves the door widely open for diverse interpretations and
even deliberate distortion in the process of implementation
by bureaucrats.
The problem is further aggravated by the fact that not
only leaders are chronically plagued by upward communication
overload, but subordinate bureaucrats are also beset by
downward communication overload. Since leaders' written
decisions are mostly vague and unspecific, they are not
addressed to one or just a few bureaucracies but instead to
virtually all of them across the board, regardless of whether
they are directly relevant or not. As a result, subordinate
bureaucrats are always swarmed with "an excessive flow of
documents""7 and with "diverse policy guidelines that cascade
54. Kenneth Lieberthal, Central Documents and Politburo
Politics in China, Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies,
1978, p. 6.
55. Ibid. p. 15.
56. Wang Zhande et al., Gonawen zhuanxie vu heaao
(Draftina and Editina of Official Documents), Beijing: Dangan
chubanshe, 1990, p. 22.
57. Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication," p. 33.
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from above. "'" In practice, this downward communication
overload gives, however, subordinate bureaucrats considerable
de facto discretion in treating the documents from above in a
selective manner so as to make them best suit their own
interests. Bureaucrats can "determine which directives are
really serious and merit priority attention and which can
safely be discarded."" 9 They are allowed to summarize and
condense the huge volume of downward flow of documents when
transmitting them to lower level bureaucrats. All these,
again, leave the door open for deliberate distortion, delay
or negligence on the part of bureaucrats in treating leaders'
written decisions, particularly those which harm the
interests of the receiving bureaucracies. As Lieberthal
explains, "It is evidently not unusual, for instance, for a
single Central Document to look quite different by the time
it is presented to the masses in two different provinces.
There is, then, considerable room for 'adjusting' the
contents and implications of a Central Document during the
tranismission process by taking full advantage of the
flexibility built into this system without clearly violating
any of its rules."60
what is more, there is a peculiar feature of Chinese
political culture, which makes implementation of written
58. Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p.
344.
59. Ibid.
60. Lieberthal, Central Documents, p. 78.
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decisions problematic. Chinese typically treat a written
decision not as having the quality of finality but rather as
marking the beginning of a new round of endless haggling and
wrangling. As Susan Shirk puts it, "Governments with a higher
degree of institutionalization solve the problem of
instability in institutional choice by implicit contracts
agreeing not to reconsider issues already decided by the
group. China has not yet established this institutional
rule."61  As for example, one-time chief mishu of the State
Council Chen Junsheng complains, "A decision is formally
made, a correct one at that, but just because it involves the
interests of a certain department, unit, or locality, some
people will refuse to put it into effect under all kinds of
pretext, and the result is a lot of arguing back and forth."6
In order to prevent bureaucrats from excessively
stretching the spirit of written decisions, resort to
61. "The Chinese Political System and the Political
Strategy of Economic Reform," in Lieberthal and Lampton,
eds., Bureaucracy, fn. 23.
62. Quoted from ibid. Chinese's flexible attitude toward
written decisions is also well reflected in their treatment
of international business contracts. Lucian Pye explains: "In
contrast to American practices, the Chinese do not treat the
signing of a contract as signaling a completed agreement;
rather, they conceive of the relationship in longer and more
continuous terms, and they will not hesitate to suggest
modifications immediately on the heels of an agreement. Their
expectation is that agreements will set the stage for a
growing relationship in which it will be proper for China to
make increasing demands on the other party. This Chinese view
of unending negotiation also makes them insensitive to the
possibility that canceling contracts may cause trouble in the
relationship." Chinese Negotiatina Style: Commercial
Approaches and Cultural PrinciDles, New York: Quorum Books,
p. xvi.
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deliberate distortion, procrastination or negligence in
decision implementation, and incessantly wrangling back and
forth, Chinese leaders have to rely heavily upon their
mishus' constant oral communication with bureaucrats to flesh
out, clarify, and adjust the leaders' intentions, as well as
to make sure that the spirit of the written decisions is
carried out with tolerable accuracy and rapidity.
The key for effective monitor and supervision is to have
specifically designated mishus stay in constant touch with
the bureaucrats. Thus, each general office has a counterpart
subunit to virtually every subordinate bureaucratic
department, as will be elaborated in Chapter Five. This
arrangement is even duplicated in some top leaders' personal
mishu offices. For example, Zhou Enlai's personal mishu
office contained several teams, such as "finance and economy
team, political and legal affairs team, culture and education
team, military affairs team, foreign affairs team, and
confidential team, etc." 63 Virtually all the major
bureaucracies had their counterpart teams in Zhou's personal
mishu office. One of Zhou's mishus explained: "Every working
body in all the bureaucratic systems, e.g., the Party, the
government, the People's Congress, the Political Consultative
Conference, the mass organizations, the military, and the
education institution had a mishu to contact in the Office
[of Premier Zhou]." 64  It is now known that each of Zhou's
63. Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou Enlai and His Mishus, p. 331.
64. bhid. p. 92.
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mishus was put in charge of a kou (system),65 which covered
several related fields. 66 One of Zhou's former mishus
explains:
All of us mishus [of Zhou] had each a scope of
responsibility: I was in charge of the kou of agriculture,
forestry, and irrigation; wei Ming, culture and education;
Yao Li, economy and transportation; Gu Ming, the Planning and
Economic Commissions; Xu Ming, agriculture and foreign trade;
so on and so forth.67
It is also known that he had other misbus who were in charge
of the koa of finance, political and legal affairs, military
af fairs, and foreign affairs.68 Zhou's personal mishus.'
control role is explained by one of them: "The Premier was in
charge of the overall work, and we were each in charge of a
specific kou. We had to look after whatever the Premier was
unable to take care of personally."69
Effective monitoring and supervision also requires that
mishus keep frequent face-to-face contact with subordinate
bureaucrats in conferences and meetings. One of Zhou Enlai's
personal mishus recalled: "I was in charge of contacting the
65. Ibid. p. 254.
66. For example, one of Zhou's mishus was in charge of
the culture and education kou and thus was responsible for
"affairs related with propaganda, culture, arts, education,
science and technology, medicine, sports, and mass media."
Ibid.
67. Ibid. p. 57.
68. Ibid. p. 180.
69. Ibid. p. 100.
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Planning Commission, the Economic Commission, and the
Construction Commission, and so I attended the meetings of
their leading Party groups, took notes, reported them to the
Premier, and often conveyed his opinions or instructions back
to them." 0
Furthermore, effectiveness of monitoring and supervision
necessitates mishus keeping up incessant pressures on
bureaucrats. Therefore, mishus are said to have the right to
anytime call them on the phone, send them letters, either
order them to report in person or inspect them personally,
and in general press them (cuiban) to expedite the
fulfillment of the tasks assigned them by the leadership
squad.7 1 Furthermore, mishus are frequently sent out to
subordinate departments or units, delegated with the
authority of the leadership squad, to investigate and solve
(chaban) cases involving violation of the instructions and
policies from above, 72 such as "excessive distribution of
bonuses and benefits, misuse of public funds for sightseeing,
tax evasions, illegal price hikes, cheating in sales, abusing
of authority to promote private interests, and mishandling of
70. Ibid. p. 5.
71. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
p. 47; Wang Fangzhi et al, Weniian Shoufa Yu Chuli
(Receivina. DisDatchinoa. and Processing of Official
Documents), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 78.
72. Song Shizhong et al., Chaban Gonazuo (Investiaatina
and Handlina of a Case), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, pp.
16-17.
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policies concerning the united front work, intellectuals,
privately-owned houses, etc."73
What is noteworthy is the fact that although mishus are
entrusted with pressing bureaucrats for timely and faithful
fulfillment of- tasks assigned by political leaders, that does
not mean mishus themselves have to actively play the personae
role of being aggressive, pushy, nasty, and assertive, as the
White House staff assistants routinely have to. The Chinese
authority structure is such that political leaders
concentrate sufficient intimidating quality in themselves for
their mishus to be able to play the personae role of being
nice and accommodating and yet still be taken seriously. This
peculiarity of Chinese mishus' work style will be examined in
detail in Chapter Seven, where systematic comparison is made
with the practice of American staff system.
The monitoring/supervising function of the mishu system
is said to have been in practice ever since the founding of
the Communist regime, and it was officially institutionalized
in September of 1983 by the Central Committee as a routine
part of all general offices' responsibilities at every
level.74 In the Central General Office, for example, a deputy
director is personally in charge of this monitoring function,
which is routinely handled by the Synthesizing Division
(zonahe chu) of the Mishu Bureau. Every year, the Central
73. Ibid.
74. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 194.
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General Office is said to directly supervise, in the name of
the Central leadership squad, several thousands of cases that
are being handled at lower levels.7 5 It is also known that
almost all provincial and prefectural general offices have
set up a special monitoring division (cuiban chu) to
discharge this function.76 It is said that today, "In every
province or city, hundreds of problems, indeed more than a
thousand, are directly solved each year [with this
practice]," and 'many more problems are indirectly solved due
to a ripple effect [from this practice]." 7 7 In order to
perform effective monitor and supervision, efforts have been
made to give general offices greater clout over the
subordinate bureaucracies, so that they are made to be more
responsive to requests, demands, and inquiries from the GOs.
As a result, the subordinates departments and units usually
take the GOs' supervision very seriously. They will, it is
reported, immediately study the issues involved and take
prompt measures to solve them.7' Therefore, mishus' monitoring
and supervision function is widely applauded as being of
"extremely significant consequence" for "overcoming
bureaucratism, improving the work style, pushing forward the
75. Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices," pp. 78-79.
76. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline
pp. 121-122.
of the Mishu Work,
77. Ibid.
78. Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices," pp. 78-79.
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fulfillment of various tasks," "enhancing efficiency, and
quickening the work tempo."79 Under extreme circumstances, a
general office may even take over the jurisdiction of a
subordinate department, as for example, the Central General
Office largely took over the function of the Central
Organization Department during the Cultural Revolution.80
Summazy
Chinese leaders depend heavily on their mishlus in their
efforts to exercise effective control over bureaucracies.
Mishus perform the control role by sifting, condensing,
collecting and verifying information; by providing extensive
advice and making preliminary and even final decisions on
virtually all routine issues; and by constantly and closely
monitoring and supervising the process of decision
implementation by subordinate bureaucracies. Each mishu squad
is structured in the form of a counterbureaucracy in that it
contains functional counterpart subunits to all the
bureaucracies under the leadership squad; this way the mishu
personnel can provide the leaders with necessary
organizational capacity for attempting constant control over
79. Qi Peiwen et al., ow to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
p. 172; Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of the Mishu Work,
p. 78; Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 194.
80. Christopher M. Clarke, "Changing the Context for
Policy Implementation: Organizational and Personnel Reform in
Post-Mao China," in David M. Lampton, ed., Policy
Implementation In Post-Mao China, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987, p. 32.
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the bureaucratic subordinates in decision implementation. In
order to ensure the reliability and effectiveness of the
control role, efforts have been made in recent years to
enhance a sense of separate professional identity and
autonomy among mishu personnel vis-a-vis their immediate
leadership squads, by means of better professional training,
more exchanges of professional activities, and closer
professional ties, both vertical and horizontal.
Finally, it should be pointed out that Chinese mishus'
control role is not very different from that of their
counterparts in other political systems. For example, the
White House staff in the United States perform the control
role "by originating ideas: gathering, screening, and
appraising ideas from others; giving him [President] orderly
information for his decision making; and keeping track of the
pace of execution of his decisions by the relevant
agencies.""8 The White House staff's control role is well
captured by the report of the Commission on Organization of
the Government for Conduct of Foreign Policy. The President's
staff, it says, must:8 2
* Identify issues likely to require presidential attention.
* Structure those issues for efficient presidential
understanding and decision -- ensuring that the relevant
facts are available, a full set of alternatives are
presented, agency positions are placed in perspective.
* Assure due process, permitting each interested department
an opportunity to state its case.
81. Fesler and Kettl, The Politics of the Administrative
Process, pp. 94-95.
82. Ibid.
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* Ensure that affected parties are clearly informed of
decisions once taken, and that their own responsibilities
respecting those decisions are specified.
* Monitor the implementation of presidential decisions.
* Assess the results of decisions taken, drawing from those
assessments implications for future action.
Nonetheless, if staffs' control role is similar
everywhere, then Chinese mishus' cushioning/integrating role
is highly unique, which is the topic for the following
chapter.
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Chapter Four
THE CUSHIONING/MODERATING ROLE
Chinese mishus work not only to amplify and improve political
leaders' control over their bureaucratic subordinates but
also to cushion and moderate conflicts and clashes and to
coordinate the work and interpersonal relationships among the
leaders themselves as well as between leaders and
bureaucrats. Moreover, mishus' skill and care serve to
compensate for the general inadequacy of infrastructural
facilities in China, so that various activities can proceed
smoothly, reducing "bumps in the road," minimizing
uncertainties, and absorbing disruptive impact of the
unexpected. This chapter concentrates on analyzing the
cushioning/coordinating role of the mishu institution, as is
reflected in these aspects:
* coordination among leaders (of the same leadership squad as
well as from different units);
* coordination between leaders and bureaucrats;
* writing of official documents; and
* organizing and servicing of meetings and conferences.
Coordination Amona Leaders of the .Same Leadership Squad
One of the primary sources of tension and conflict among
Chinese leaders is the problem of establishing authoritarian
pecking orders among them when they come together. It is a
very complicated and difficult job and takes a great deal of
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skill and care on the part of Chinese mishus to make subtle
and proper accommodations that befit the relative status and
importance of all the leaders involved in any situation.
Without such a hierarchic arrangement, friction and conflict
will arise.
One telling example is provided by Lin Biao's personal
mishus in handling the relationship between Lin and Mao. It
was an important job for them to coordinate the timing of
arrivals of Lin Biao and Mao Zedong at Tiananmen for
ceremonious occasions. The perfect timing was considered as
"the biggest political issue": If Lin arrived first and
ascended the Tiananmen balcony before Mao, he would appear
disrespectful. But if he arrived too early and had to wait
for Mao for a long time, that would be demeaning for his
status as the second in command and the heir apparent.
Nevertheless, if Mao arrived first and so had to wait for
him, Lin would appear impolite and insulting. Therefore, the
best timing was "to let the boss [Lin] arrive exactly one
minute before the Chairman and wait by the elevator
downstairs for him [Mao]." A failure in coordination once
caused Mao to arrive at Tiananmen one or two minutes earlier
and to wait for Lin's arrival. Mao's unhappiness was only
thinly veiled in his sarcastic remarks about Lin's sweating.
It was regarded as "a major political accident." So in order
to ensure the perfect synchronization, Lin's mishus had to
make elaborate\ time-and-motion tests to determine accurately
the distances from the residences of Mao and Lin to Tiananmen
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and the times it took respectively. Lin's mishus were to be
informed as soon as Mao departed so as to determine when
Lin's convoy should start off. 1
Once on the Tiananmen balcony, it was the mihus'
"important task" to constantly remind Lin of his proper
position relative to Mao, which must be "neither too far away
nor too close: being too far away would make him appear not
'intimate,' and being too close would cause him to block Mao
from view or to outshine him. "2
Another vivid example of mishus deflecting potential
tension among leaders involves the writing of inscriptions by
Chinese leaders. Chinese leaders have a passion for handing
out inscriptions wherever they go. It is almost a customary
ritual for them to hand-write with brush-pens short slogans
to mark an important occasion, such as Mao's slogan: "Learn
from Comrade Lei Feng," which officially launched the nation-
wide movement to emulate this mythological Communist hero.
Significantly, such public display of their personal
calligraphy is intended more for signaling appropriate mutual
power relationship than explicating new policy ideas. As
Kraus explains in his brilliant study of the connection
between politics and the art of calligraphy in Chinese
politics:
1. Zhang Yunsheng, Maoiiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huivi
Jl. (The Eyewitness Accounts of Maoiiawan: Memoirs of Lin
Biao's Mishu), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988, pp. 230-231.
2. Lin Qingshan, Lin Biao zhuan (A BioaraDhy of Lin
Biao), Beijing: Zhishi chubanshe, 1988, p. 492.
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Clearly, the point of writing inscriptions is not originality
of content. Banality is expected, even demanded. The social
occasions for calligraphy demand reassuring gestures to a
community of readers, not individual expression.3
It is now known that most of such inscriptions are in
fact drafted or suggested by leaders' personal mishus. Short
and simplistic as they may appear, it is a complicated job
that requires no small amount of tact and political skill. In
suggesting an inscription, a mishu should consider the status
of his leader, so as to suit its tone and content with his
relative position:
If he is not a high ranking leader, his inscription must not
take on the tone of appealing to a broad audience. Or if a
higher-ranking leader has already made a wide-ranging appeal
in his inscription, a lower-ranking leader should choose
another perspective to complement his superior's appeal. It
is an absolute taboo for a leader to be arrogant and
disrespectful in writing an inscription undeserved by his
status, not knowing the height of the sky and the depth of
the earth (buzhi tian aao di hou).4
In addition to establishing a ;roper hierarchical
relationship in any situation, mishus' moderating role also
looms large in conducting communication among leaders.
Chinese leaders meet only at certain intervals. During the
time in between, they are not supposed to frequently
associate directly with each other in private. The higher up,
3. Richard Curt Kraus, Brushes with Power: Modern
Politics and the Chinese Art of Calliaraphy, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991, p. 93.
4. Qi Peiwen et al., zenyana danahao linadagren mishu
(How to Be a Good Personal Mishu for a Leader), Beijing:
Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 106.
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the more this is the case. According to our well-informed
interviewee, the leaders of Fujian provincial government
never casually walk into each other's office to have a
friendly chat, even though their offices are adjacent to each
other. In public their attitudes toward each other are as a
rule very formal and aloof; they deliberately shun being seen
mixing with any other leaders too often and too closely,
though they can be jovial and convivial toward each other at
formal meetings. The single most important reason for this
behavior pattern is the anti-factional taboo.
Although it is regarded as the very essence of politics
to actively seek allies and shift alliances on different
policy issues under competitive politics, in China, under the
centralized authority structure, it is an absolute taboo for
some leaders to band together to promote a separate interest,
whether regional, institutional, or factional. A leader does
so at his own peril, which may result in his downfall.
Consequently, for all the fact that factionalism does exist
and even goes rampant at different times and different places
in Chinese politics, Chinese leaders are very cautious in
their open interactions with one another, in order to avoid
arousing suspicion and accusation of committing this cardinal
sin. Even during the periods of intensified factional
infighting, very few leaders have dared to openly defy this
anti-factional taboo. As a result, Chinese leaders'
communication with each other is in fact largely conducted
through their mishus, personal and organizational. Mishu
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personnel are thus in a position to make a significant
difference between apparent unity and intensified
factionalism among political leaders, under normal
circumstances.
Under usual conditions, Chinese mishus tend to play a
cushioning role in mediating communication among leaders.
They are warned: "...it is a matter of principle for mishus
not to get involved in conflicts and clashes between
leaders." 5 In conducting intra-elite communication, they are
required to omit critical remarks, water down t'he venom of
personal enmity, and reconcile divergent opinions, so as to
facilitate a workable accord among the leaders. 6
After all, it is usually not in the mishus' best
interest to openly take sides among conflicting leaders, for
that would antagonize some members of the leadership squad
and thus jeopardize their own chances for getting ahead.
Their best strategy for personal advancement and even job
security is usually to play the role of peace-maker and
reconciliator toward all the leaders.
Indeed, even Chinese leaders' personal mishus, who would
be expected to be the most partisan players, tend to act in a
reconciliatory and sympathetic manner toward their bosses'
5. Xu Ruixin et al., Zhonaauo xiandai mishu aonazuo
iichu (The Essentials of ContemDorary Chinese Mishu
Profession), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989, p. 139.
6. Hou Rui, Zenvana dana banaonashi zhuren (How to Work
as Director of a General Office), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe,
1990, p. 82.
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political rivals and enemies. A personal mishu tends, out of
his self-serving instinct, to strike a delicate balance
between appearing unquestionably faithful to his own boss, on
the one hand, and showing sufficient goodwill to the other
leaders, on the other hand. This is partly because in this
way he can better survive his leader's fall from grace if
that happens, avoid "putting all eggs in one basket," and
increase his chances of career advancement. Indeed, even some
of Mao's personal mishus tried to retain for themselves some
elbow room for maneuver between Mao and his dissidents, by
playing the role of reconciliator and attempting to bridge
the difference between Mao and them.
For instance, during and after the ill-fated Lushan
Conference, Tian Jiaying, Mao's most trusted mishu, was a
secret sympathizer of Peng Dehuai and his supporters. He
surreptitiously informed them of Mao's intentions and tried
to deflect the confrontation. 7
After the circulation of Peng Dehuai's letter, the atmosphere
of the conference became tense. Zhang Wentian was still going
to make a speech at the small group about his judgment on the
work since 1958 and to urge the conference to make an earnest
summary of the experiences and lessons from the "Great Leap"
and the commune movement. Upon learning it, Tian Jiaying
called Zhang Wentian immediately, telling him not to touch
the issue since the one up there [Mao] had a different view.
After the conference switched to fighting "rightism," a
certain comrade came under fire. Tian Jiaying was very
sympathetic toward his misfortune. One late night Tian
7. Peng Yaxin, "Tian Jiaying xiaozhuan" ("A Short
Biography of Tian Jiaying"), in Dong Bian et al., eds., Mao
Zedona he tade mishu Tian Jiavina (Mao Zedona and His Mishu
Tian Jiavin), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989, p.
325.
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Jiaying ran to his place at great personal risk to express
his indignation at the abnormality in the intra-Party life
and to give support and comfort to him.... 8
Years later Mao Zedong still felt paranoid about the
Lushan Conference and wanted to make an issue of the
historical play Hai Rui Dismissed From Office. Again, the
same Tian Jiaying tried to dampen the clash. "In order to
minimize the impact of the campaign and to protect those who
might be hurt, Tian Jiaying courageously left out the parts
against Peng Dehuai...when he was editing Mao's talk." 9 Tian
Jiaying's reconciliatory role was greatly appreciated by
Mao's dissidents, Liu Shaoqi in particular, and thus there
formed a special bond between Tian and Liu. Liu repeatedly
protected Tian when he was in trouble. On one occasion when
Mao was criticizing Tian furiously, Liu put in some words in
his favor to release the tension; on another occasion when
other people were exposing Tian's wrongdoing, Liu adamantly
refused to let them finish. "As a result, Tian was always
grateful and respectful toward Liu."10
In recent years, it is reported that Chen Yun's chief
mishu Zhu Jiamu and Deng Xiaoping's chief mishu Wang Ruilin
once contacted each other, behind the backs of their masters,
8. Ibid. p. 325.
9. Dong Zhiying, ed., Mao Zedona vishi (Anecdotes About
Mao Zedona), Beijing: Kunlun chubanshe, 1989, p. 130.
10. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong he tade mishu Tian
Jiaying" ("Mao Zedong and His Mishu Tian Jiaying") in Dong
Bian et al., eds., Mao Zedong and His Mishu Tian Jiavin, p.
71.
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in an attempt to "establish rapprochement between the two
overlords [Deng and Chen]." 11 After Deng made his earth-
shaking tour in South China in early 1992, which ushered in a
new tidal wave of reforms, Chen Yun's mishus again appear to
have performed a delicate balancing stunt. On the one hand,
they reportedly made telephone calls around, in the name of
their master, urging the responsible cadres at various
localities not to be intimidated but to "hold fast to the
socialist position, defend the socialist flag,...and keep a
clear head and the Marxist viewpoint."1 2 On the other hand,
Chen's current chief mishu Xu Yongyao then made an inspection
tour of Shenzhen on behalf of his boss, which was interpreted
as sending out a subtle signal of reconciliation with Deng,
since the Special Economic Zone was Deng's most cherished
brain-child and the ultimate 'symbol of his economic
reforms.13
11. Shi Liuzi, "Zhonggong 'mishu bang' qunxiang" ("A
Group Portrait of the Chinese Communist Secret
Secretaries"), Minzhu Zhonaguo (Democratic China), No. 11
(1992), p. 28; Luo Ning, "Chumo yu hongse gongqiang lide
renwu" ("The Shadow Figures behind the Blood-Red Wall"),
Passim, p. 42; also see He Pin, "Chen Yun lumian jishi geng
weimiao ("Chen Yun's Public Appearance Lends a Touch of
Subtlety to the Situation"), Zhonaauo zhi chun (China
Spring), June (1992), p. 17.
12. "Beijing zhengju anliu xiongyong: lao Deng nan xun
bu tong xunchang" ("The Turbulent Undercurrents in the
Politics of Beijing: the Unusual Significance of Deng
Xiaoping's Trip to South China"), Ziyou xinwen daobao (Press
Freedom Guardian), March 6, 1992, p. 2.
13. He Pin, "Fengsheng hedi gao gaige" ("Waging Reforms
with a Fear of Dangers Lurking Everywhere"), Zhonaauo zhi
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So far as the whole leadership squad is concerned, the
director of the general office plays a vital role in
moderating conflicts and coordinating various relationships
among the squad members. "The general office director has
great influence over the interpersonal relationship among
different leaders. Since he is in the most frequent contact
with all of the leaders, a good part of the communication
among them is conducted through him, and many tasks have to
be carried out through him. He knows a great deal of
'secrets' about the leadership squad. "1 4  Therefore,
"Experience has proved that the GO director can effectively
patch up the differences between conflicting leading comrades
by taking advantage of his intimate knowledge and easy access
to all of the leaders." To illustrate a GO director's
cushioning role, the following example is given.
There was once a deep rift between the Party secretary and
the administrative head of a certain enterprise. The
administrative head blamed his failure to be admitted into
the Party on the Party secretary's obstruction, while the
Party secretary sensed the ill feelings on the head's part
but found the situation hard to explain. So the GO director
stepped in as the go-between, conveying to the factory head
the Party secretary's goodwill toward him. The
misunderstanding was thus removed and the two were back on
good terms with each other.15
chun (China Sprina), No. 110 (1992), p. 27; Shi Liuzi, "A
Group Portrait," p. 28.
14. Hou Rui, How to Work as Director of a General
Office, p. 22.
15. Ibid.
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When it comes to coordinating work relationship, the GO
head is the person who is responsible for constantly keeping
all the members of the leadership squad properly informed of
each other's activities when they are separate between
meetings and conferences. It is his responsibility to: 1)
pass on to the other leaders the chief leader's intentions,
opinions, and instructions; 2) report regularly to each
leader the condition and progress of the work that the other
leaders are doing; 3) convey to those who were absent due to
illness or on leave the decisions reached at an important
meeting; and 4) reconcile differences and conflicts among the
leaders resulting from the division of labor.1 6 Take the
Central Committee General Office for example, the
communication between the all-powerful political elders and
the current Politburo members is known to be conducted
primarily by the director of the Central GO.17
Trespassing upon the turf of another leader of the same
leadership squad is a major source of tensions and conflicts,
and it is largely the job of the GO head to skillfully smooth
out such conflicts. When a leader instructs the GO director
to handle a job which falls under the bailiwick of another
leader, the GO director "should 1) suggest that he consult
the leader officially in charge of the work; 2) report it to
16. Ibid. pp. 66-67.
17. He Pin, "Zhonggong dui Tai gongzuo diyixian
zhujiang" ("The Front-line Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese
Communist Party's Taiwan Affairs"), Zhonaauo shibao zhoukan
(China Times Weekly), No. 68 (April 18-24, 1993), p. 71.
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the chief leader and ask him for instructions and then convey
them to the leader in charge; and 3) carry out the job first
and then report it to the chief leader and the leader in
charge." 1 8 In a word, the GO head must try his best not to
let any party feel ignored or slighted.
Of significance is the fact that there is some
similarity between mishus in the Chinese political system and
civil servants in a Western political system, in the sense
that both are expected to be non-partisan in order to
preserve the stability and continuity of the political system
as a whole. However, there is a significant difference in
that a civil servant is supposed to stay away from partisan
politics altogether, whereas a mishu is expected to be an
active participant by getting to know all the political
tricks and personal secrets, but, at the same time, playing
the role of impartial reconciliator among various factions or
individual rivals. One typical example is Yang Dezhong, the
current head of the Central Security Bureau, a subunit of the
Central General Office: Yang "is thoroughly familiar with
every nook and corner of the Zhongnanhai politics and all its
factional maneuvers, but he has never involved himself in any
ideological contentions or power struggles,..." As a result,
he has been able to win goodwill and praises from all sides
and stay in his powerful position for decades. 1 9 In practice
18. Hou Rui, How to Work as a GO Director, pp. 66-67.
19. He Pin, "Jiang Zemin de tebie zhuli: Zeng Qinghong,
Yang Dezhong" ('Jiang Zemin's Special Assistants: Zeng
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the thin line between the two roles is, however,
understandably very difficult to maintain, and it is by no
means uncommon for mishus to end up being partisan players,
as will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion.
Moderation Between Leaders of Different Units
It is an even more delicate and difficult job to
moderate and coordinate between leaders of different work
units, since there is greater ambiguity with regard to a
suitable hierarchical order to suit them. There is a
relatively clear hierarchy of ranks among the members of the
same leadership squad, who are unequivocally designated as
"number one leader" (divi bashou), "number two leader" (dier
bashou), "number three leader" (disan bashou), and so on.
However, when it comes to leaders of different danwei (work
units), there is no clear-cut single set of rules to follow
and many factors and ranking methods have to be weighed
carefully before a proper pecking order can be established.
Thus, mishus' moderating function in this regard is all the
more necessary to avoid tension and conflict when leaders of
different units gather together.
The Chinese designed an elaborate bureaucratic rank
system, which serves supposedly to facilitate placement of
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every, official in a hierarchical relationship. The rank
system is composed of the following major levels:20
The Central Level -- Politburo, State Council, Central
Military Affairs Commission, the National
People's Congress, and the National Consultative
Conference of Political Affairs.
Provincial level -- ministry, Central department (bu),
centrally administered municipality, and
army (.=I) in the military rank system.21
Prefecture -- bureau (.iu, Si, tin.), provincial
department, and division (shi) in the
military system.
County -- division (chu), county level municipality, and
regiment (.tuan) in the military system.
Township -- county department," section (k&), and
battalion (;ina) in the military system.
Each of the above major levels has a sub-level for
deputy heads, such as vice premier, vice governor, and so on.
This bureaucratic rank system applies not only to government
officials but also to virtually the entire Chinese society.
For example, full professorship is equal to the rank of a
Qinghong and Yang Dezhong"), Zhonaauo shibao zhoukan (China
Times Weekly), No. 101 (December 5-11, 1993), p. 73.
20. Yan Huai, Zhonaauo dalu zhenazhi tizhi aiantan
(Understanding the Political System of Contemporary China),
Somerset, NJ: the Center for Modern China, 1991, p. 22.
21. The Chinese military rank system corresponds largely
with the civilian rank system.
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prefecture or bureau-level office holder; associate
professorship, that of a county or division-level office
holder. Indeed, the bureaucratic rank system is even used to
determine the status and privilege of access of church
personnel: there are, for example, division-level monks,
section-level nuns, and so on.2 2 Not only individuals all
have ranks but every bureaucratic organization is also
assigned a rank. As Lieberthal and Oksenberg observe:
Every unit in China -- whether it be a government, Party, or
corporate body or a sub-unit of any of these -- has a rank.
This system enables each unit to appraise its status with
respect to all other units.... This rank system is thus
embedded in the hierarchy of formal levels of government that
ascends from villages and cities through counties,
prefectures, and provinces up to the national government (the
"center") itself,... 23
Interestingly, this system of ranks even extends to all
foreign individuals and firms:
The Chinese may conclude that a particular foreign firm is
roughly the rank, for example, of a division (chu) in a
central ministry, and its subordinate representative office
in Beijing will be treated accordingly in terms of access and
amenities.... while Chinese never directly inform foreigners
of their rank, a sensitive observer can assess his standing
based on the access and treatment he receives. 24
Every Chinese cares greatly about his own rank and those
of others' in the system, because the rank "determines a
22. Yan Huai, Understandina the Political System of
Contemporary China, p. 23.
23. Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Polijv
Making in China: Leaders. Structures. and Processes,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 142.
24. Ibid. p. 148.
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cadre's political power, economic welfare, social status,
access to information, and various benefits in terms of
clothing, food, housing, transportation, medical care, and
funeral ceremony."2 5  For instance, there are strict
regulations concerning different treatments for different
ranks. Central-level newspapers can mention by names only
those with provincial-level ranks or above, and regional
newspapers are allowed to mention by name those with
prefecture-level ranks or above. Indeed, even the place of
one's coffin in a cemetery is determined by one's rank in
life: the more conspicuous and easily accessible places are
reserved for the bodies or ashes of higher ranking cadres;
those of lower-ranked ones are relegated to more obscure and
inconvenient spots. Indeed, it has been a "big headache" for
Chinese Central leaders that the family members of the
deceased constantly fight for the limited number of honorable
slots in the Babaoshan Cemetery.2 6
Nevertheless, it is no easy job to establish an
appropriate ranking order among leaders of different units.
The above-mentioned rank system still leaves plenty of room
for equals, and the real challenge is how to properly place
each of the nominal equals into a subtle hierarchy acceptable
to 411, by carefully weighing many other relevant factors and
ranking methods. As Lieberthal and Oksenberg observe,
25. Yan Huai, Understandina the Political System, p. 23.
26. ibid. pp. 23-24.
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"calculations of real authority [and status] inevitably are
complex and often cannot be arrived at by mechanically
applying a [single] set of rules."2 7 The factors that have to
be taken into account are: civil service grade, Party status,
current political standing, unit rank, age, and personal
connections with higher authorities.
In addition to the bureaucratic rank system, the Chinese
have developed a system of civil service grades, that
includes more than thirty grades, with each grade specifying
a salary range for the individuals in that grade.2 8 The
bureaucratic rank system and the civil service grade system
do not correspond with each other exactly, in that the latter
is based more upon seniority. However, Chinese cadres are
sensitive to each other's civil service grades, which can
make a difference in their perception of each other's
relative status. Moreover, Party status is an important
factor. Membership on the Party leading group in the
government system or on the standing committee in the Party
system automatically gives one a great deal of extra weight
in personal stature: "...when two officials of equal
government standing deal with a matter, the Party status of
each can significantly affect their perceptions of each
27. Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p.
146.
28. .id. pp. 145-146. For a more detailed discussion of
China's bureaucratic rank system and civil service grade
system, see Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party
Technocrats in Socialist China, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1991, pp. 195-199.
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other." That is because, "Occasionally, the most powerful
individual within a ministry or other organ is not the person
who formally heads that unit but rather is a 'subordinate'
official who is the leading member of the Party group within
the unit."2 9
Furthermore, a leader's nominal position may not reflect
his real current political standing, for some leaders may
have already fallen out of grace but for one reason or
another still retain their formal positions. As for example,
Peng Dehuai and Chen Yun had already lost their de facto
power in the early 1960s, even though they still retained
their membership on the Politburo. Consequently, a leader's
actual standing must be determined in figuring out his
relative status. Moreover, a person who is from a higher-
ranking unit, who is older of age, or who has important
family ties or personal connections with key superior leaders
will add extra weight to his relative stature.
It is largely the responsibility of the mishus to get
the information, calculate the various factors mentioned
above, and figure out an appropriate hierarchical
arrangement, before the leaders of the different units come
together.30 When the leaders meet, the mishus must take great
29. Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p.
146.
30. Yi Chengjie et al., Zhenawu -ieaia vu lingdao
huodona anDai (Receivina of Official Visitors and Arrangina
of Leaders' Activities), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, pp.
27, 84.
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pains to ensure that the hierarchic arrangement is properly
observed in order to avoid any tension-provoking deviations.
For example, it is a mishu's job to properly introduce the
leaders of the different units to each other. In doing so, he
must introduce the lower ranking leader to the higher ranking
one, the younger one to the older one, the less important one
to the more important one -- not the other way round.31
Moderating and coordinating between leaders of different
units is particularly the responsibility of the general
office directors of the units involved. In order to
facilitate or lubricate interactions between leaders of
different units, GO heads are expected and encouraged to
spend a considerable part of their time and energy
cultivating as wide a network as possible of personal
connections across the local commudity, if not throughout the
country.32
Moderating between Leaders and Subordinate Bureaucrats
Chinese mishus' cushioning/moderating role between
leading and led is such that leaders and subordinate
bureaucrats do not usually contact or confront each other but
go through the intermediary of the mishu personnel. The
leaders pass most of their orders, instructions, decisions,
and task assignments to the subordinate departments and units
31. ibid. p. 27.
32. Hou Rui, How to Work as a GO Director, pp. 13, 61,
70.
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through the general office.3 3 And in most cases the
subordinate departments and units have to go through the GO
to get access to individual leaders. "The subordinate
departments or units usually do not go directly to the
leadership squad to report their work or to request for
instructions. Instead, they go to head of the GO first. For
instance, if a department needs approval from the leadership
for a new project, it sends in the proposal first to the
GO." 3 4 That is because the "head of the GO is responsible for
contacting the leaders concerned and deciding whether a
conference should be held to further examine the proposal,
what kind of conference it should be, and who should
participate." 35 This role of the GO is particularly important
with regard to the subordinate departments' annual work plans
involving budgets and appropriations. The subordinate
departments have to "consult and negotiate repeatedly with
the GO" before they submit to the leadership squad the final
version for approval. This is said to be the case with the
planning process between the State Council, its GO, and the
various Central ministries and agencies.3 6 Moreover, "if a
unit wants to invite the leaders to an activity it is going
to organize, it has to go to the GO head and let him contact
33. Ibid. p. 22.
34. Ibid. p. 11.
35. Ibid.
36. Xu Ruixin et al., The essentials, p. 206.
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the leaders to see whether they are available and which of
them are interested in coming."37
On the other hand, when the leaders are unsatisfied with
the work performance of a bureaucrat, they usually do not
confront him directly; it is the GO director's job to drop a
hint about the leaders' wrath without spelling out its full
extent, in order to avoid "having a frontal confrontation
with him, hurting his pride, increasing his psychological
stress, affecting his enthusiasm, or engendering negative
effects." Furthermore, if a leader has thought up a new plan
whose effects he is not sure about, it is also the GO
director's job to drop hints about it here and there to test
out the responses from the various parties, so that the
leader retains the flexibility of either following it through
openly or backing off quietly. 38
Moreover, the GO is also in many cases placed in charge
of a most troublesome and stressful job, that is, balancing
among the subordinate departments in terms of material
interests, such as distribution of honors, bonuses, ration
coupons, salary raises, and housing allocation.39
Besides, mishus perform an important part in correctly
conducting various rituals and punctilios when leaders give
audiences to lower-level bureaucrats or ordinary people, so
37. Hou Rui, How to Work as a GO Director, p. 11.
38. Ibid. p. 80.
39. Ibid. p.23.
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as to smoothen the process. When a leader receives low-level
bureaucrats, it is his mish's job to signal them where to
sit, when to sit down, when to take a sip at their tea cups,
and when to light up their cigarettes. 40 On such occasions,
bureaucrats automatically look up to the mishu for cues for
how to act properly.
Writing of Official Documents: Moderating Policy Differences
So far what has been examined about Chinese mishus'
cushioning and coordinating role deals primarily with various
inter:personal relationships; mishu personnel also play a
crucial part in moderating disagreements and conflicts over
policy issues in order to facilitate coherence and continuity
of the Chinese political process. Such role is best reflected
in the writing of official documents, a task which is largely
handled exclusively by mishu personnel. In China virtually
all official documents are written by mishu personnel, though
they are issued in the name of individual leaders or
leadership squads. The result is, however, that mishus'
crucial role in document writing works to cushion and absorb
much of political leaders' arbitrariness and smooth out their
disagreements and conflicts.
Under usual conditions, leaders may just mumble vaguely,
incoherently, or even unintelligibly, but it is their mishus'
job to draft, edit, and censor each document in order to
40. Yi Chengjie et al., Receiving of Official Visitors,
pp. 86-87.
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guarantee its conformity with policies, regulations, and laws
of the Party and state and its consistency with past
commitments and precedents, as well as to make sure that it
conforms to correct format, style, and grammar.41
One important reason for mishus' virtual monopoly of all
document-writings is that Chinese leaders are generally inept
in this regard. The Chinese mishu authors themselves give a
picture of the typical leader as being helplessly dependent
upon his mishu for any kind of writing of documents. "A
leader has only some rough idea, being unable to spell it out
clearly but wishing to 'trade a brick for a piece of jade
(Dao zhuan vin vu). '"42 Some leaders may offer a few concrete
ideas for composing a document, but they "are not necessarily
sensible, essential, but may be disconnected, incomplete,
illogical, self-contradictory, and inaccurately worded.".43
In some cases, leaders may simply be ignorant: "It is
understandable that the leading comrade of a danwei (work
unit) may not be totally knowledgeable about his work or
about complicated realities and therefore may utter some
ideas which conflict with the real situation." 44 Thus, "In
the process of composing a document, leading comrades need
41. Wang Zhande et al., Gongwen zhuanxie vu heaao
(Draftina and Editing of Official Documents), Beijing: Dangan
chubanshe, 1990, pp. 116-117.
42. Ibid. p. 19.
43. Ibid. p. 24.
44. Ibid. p. 26.
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badly the help of their mishus, hoping that they can give
full play to their wisdom, talent, and creativity so as to
guarantee the quality of the document being composed.1"45
Therefore, a mishu is advised that it is not appropriate
"to write just what was told by the leader."4 6  Instead, he
"should use the sensible ideas and dismiss the senseless
ones, put together the disconnected ones, complete the
incomplete ones, smooth out the illogical ones, correct the
ungrammatical ones, and reconcile the contradictory
ones,.... 47  Indeed, mishus are even encouraged to think
creatively regardless of what their leaders have actually
uttered. They should "think independently in an attempt to
combine his own correct ideas with the leader's intentions:
not just reflecting the leader's intentions but also
injecting his own new opinions and thoughts."48
Chinese mishus' extraordinary discretion in composing
official documents is euphemistically referred to as
"figuring out a leader's intentions (linghui linadao yitu)."
What a leader has said may not be what he means, and what a
leader really means may not have been said by him, because,
"There is always a gap between what the mishu has heard and
what is going on inside his leader's mind, and it is all up
45. Ibid. p. 23.
46. ibid. p. 22.
47. Ibid. p. 24.
48. Ibid. p. 23.
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to the mishu to figure out what his leader's intentions
are."4 9  So, a mishu "should not understand his leader's
intentions as something mechanical or static, but should dare
to think actively, independently, and skillfully, and to give
full play to his own brain in figuring out and elaborating on
his leader's intentions in a creative way."5 0  In order to
"figure out a leader's intentions," a mishu is advised to do
the following.
First, the mishu should "familiarize himself with the
policies, regulations, and laws issued from above, the
reports sent in from below, the precedents made by the other
leaders of the same unit. This way the mishu can be sure that
what he writes will not deviate from the instructions from
the superior leaders, will reflect the reality and maintain
the consistency of the policy concerned,... " 51
Second, "in drafting a document, the mishu should
thoroughly familiarize himself with the actual work of his
danwei (work unit). "52
Third, "it is a good practice for the mishu to talk it
over with other [more experienced] mishus or director of the
general office in order to benefit from collective efforts,
49. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 136.
50. Wang Zhande et al., Drafting and Editing of Official
Documents, p. 22.
51. Ibid. p. 19.
52. Ibid. p. 25.
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wisdom and experience in figuring out the essence of the
leader's intention."53
Fourth, the mishu should record his leader's
idiosyncratic expressions diligently and promptly. The mishu
should keep a notebook constantly handy and write down his
leader's new ideas and catchwords. Particularly, he should be
familiar with his speech habit so as to be able to give some
semblance of his leader's authorship to the document being
composed.54
Fifth, "in drafting a document for a leader, the mishu
should consult the other leaders of the same danwei (work
unit) in order to avoid the limited vision of the single
leader that results from the division of labor." 55
Chinese mishus are responsible not only for writing
documents but also for reviewing, editing, and censoring
documents sent in from subordinate bureaucracies, as has been
noted in the previous chapter. All the subordinate
departments and units usually have to send their official
documents concerning policies, regulations, and work reports
to the general offices first before submitting them to the
leadership squads or officially releasing them. "Take the
general offices of the Party committee and government of a
province for example," explains a Chinese GO mishu, "there
53. Ibid. pp. 18-19.
54. Ibid. p. 20.
55. Ibid. pp. 26-27.
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are more than one hundred differently specialized departments
directly under the provincial leadership....All the documents
they submit to the provincial Party committee or government
have to go through the respective GOs for reviewing and
editing." 5 6 Normally, subordinate departments and units are
not allowed to send their documents directly to individual
leaders. Even if they do so, leaders are supposed to turn
such documents, usually called "extra-channel documents"
(zhangwai aonawen), over to the GO for proper processing
before they can be accepted.57
In reviewing and editing a document, the GO plays the
coordinating/integrating role by making sure that it conforms
to "the guidelines and policies of the Party," "the laws and
regulations of the state," and "the instructions from above,"
and that they dovetail with "the decisions made by the same
unit in the past or made by other related units of the same
rank," in addition to being written in the correct style and
format.58
56. Wen Xiang, Mishu renvuan xiuvana vu duiwu iianashe
(Trainina of Mishu Personnel and Buildina of the Mishu Army),
Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 41.
57. Personal interviews. Also see Wei Keyi et al.,
Mishu aonazuo tonashu (A General Guide for Mishu Work),
Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1992, pp. 121-122.
58. Hou Rui, How to Work as a GO Director p. 43.
Handling of the format of Chinese official documents is a
highly complex matter, in that there is a plethora of labels,
such as: minalina (order), ledina (decision), auidina
(regulations), zhishi (instruction), tonazhi (circular),
vi ian (opinion), chagan (draft), tonabao (notification), to
name just a few. Each label suggests a subtle shade in the
different degrees of bindingness. Each official document
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Because mis h personnel play a crucial
coordinating/integrating role in writing, editing, and
censoring official documents and because they are the
principal carrier of the institutional memory and a primary
medium of communication among leaders, it can be argued that
Chinese official documents betray much fewer glaring
contradictions than would be the case, given the sheer size
and complexity of the country's bureaucratic structure. This
contributes in a significant way to stability and coherence
of the Chinese bureaucracy.
Organizing Conferences and Meetings
Chinese mishus' role of cushioning, coordinating, and
integrating is most comprehensively demonstrated in the
organizing of conferences and meetings, in that in doing so
they have to coordinate both among leaders and between
leaders and bureaucrats, and with regard to various
interpersonal relationships as well as to differences or
conflicts over policy issues. Therefore, a detailed
must be assigned one of them to indicate to the receiving
bureaucrats whether they must implement the letter as well as
the spirit of the document, or implement only the spirit, orjust treat the document as reference materials. Those labels
are so complicated and confusing that only mighu personnel
are competent to use them correctly. This is another
important reason why mishus' role looms so large in the
process of document writing. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal,
Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China, Ann Arbor:
Center for Chinese Studies, 1978, pp. 10-15; Michel
Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication Within the Chinese
Bureaucracy," China Ouarterly, No. 57 (January-March 1974),
p. 17.
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examination is made below of the functions of mishus during
the entire process of organizing a conference, with a focus
on their moderating and smoothening effects.
In China, all conferences and meetings are organized and
serviced by mishus of various general offices involved. In
order to appreciate mishus' significant role in this regard,
it is necessary first to realize the important place that
conferences and meetings hold in the Chinese political
process. They are the occasions for leaders to meet face to
face or for leaders and subordinate bureaucrats to gather
together for consultations and bargaining. If a meeting is
mishandled and thus flounders, it can trigger off serious
confrontations and infightings. An example is the ill-fated
Lushan Conference in 1959 in the wake of the Great Leap
fiasco, where Mao and Defense Minister Peng Dehuai openly
crossed swords. This confrontation was perhaps the most
decisive origin of the Cultural Revolution. On the other
hand, well-organized conferences and meetings facilitate
consensus-building, and serve as a major
coordinating/integrating mechanism for the Chinese political
system.59 The part that mishus play is crucial for the smooth
proceeding of any conference.
The importance of the conference system is reflected in
the fact that there are a large variety of conferences in the
59. The view that the meetings system is one of the
primary integrative mechanisms was perhaps first suggested by
Lieberthal and Oksenberg in their Policy Making in China.
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Chinese political arena; some of the most common types are as
follows. 60
WORK CONFERENCES (aonozuo huiyi). A work conference is
"a comprehensive meeting which searchingly reviews past
policy and decides upon future tasks." 61 Work conferences are
held by Central ministries and departments, and various
'bureaucratic systems" (xitong) annually or semiannually. 6 2
Of particular importance is the institution of the Central
Work Conference, where Central and provincial leaders get
together. Parris Chang regards the institution as an
important forum "for consensus-building in which diverse
viewpoints were aired, differences were ironed out and there
was considerable give and take among the participants." 63
SPECIALIST CONFERENCES (zhuanve bumen huivi). This type
of conferences is similar to the work conference in purpose,
but differs "'by having fewer participants, having a better
defined and limited agenda and by being much more narrow and
technical in scope." 64
60. The following description of conference types is
based on these two articles: Parris Chang, 'Research Notes on
the Changing Loci of Decision Making in the CCP," China
Ouarterly, No. 44 (October-December 1970), pp. 169-194;
Oksenberg, 'Methods of Communication."
61. Oksenberg, ibid. p. 3.
62. Ibid.
63. Parris Chang, "Research Notes," p. 173.
64. Oksenberg, 'Methods of Communication," p. 9.
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'SIT AND TALK" MEETINGS (zuotan hui). These are
consultative meetings for informal exchange of opinions
without having to reach decisions.
'BUMP HEADS" MEETINGS (penltou hui). They are similar to
'sit and talk" meetings in informality, serving the purpose
of ad hoc exchange of views. But they 'are usually secret and
are held in a private office or in a small conference room,"
confined to 'only a few participants, all occupying
leadership positions in the same unit," to "evaluate their
choices before policy has been set.' 65 Informal as they are,
'bump heads" meetings are 'really more important than the
bigger [formal] meetings." 66
TRANSMISSION MEETINGS (chuanda huivi). They are held to
communicate higher level decisions to lower level units.
EXCHANGE OC EXPERIENCE MEETINGS (jinuyan iiaoliu hui).
These are held to exchange information on how a certain
policy has been implemented or a certain issue resolved
successfully.
There are still other types of conferences and meetings,
such as national congresses of the Party Central Committee
and the National People's Congress; administrative
conferences (bangong huivi), where members of a leadership
squad meet regularly to discuss and decide administrative
affairs; and various ad hoc meetings, which key leaders can
65. Ibid. p. 12.
66. Ibid.
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convene anytime on almost any topic that they are dealing
with.
Moreover, the importance of the meeting system for the
Chinese political process can also be measured by the time
and energy that Chinese officials spend on them.
Participating in various conferences and meetings takes up a
lion's share of Chinese cadres' waking (and even many
sleeping) hours. According to a random survey conducted by
the Chinese authorities in 1983, the Party and government
leaders of a certain city spent 65 percent of their work days
attending various conferences. 6 7 In the same year, the
Chinese Railway Ministry conducted a random survey of 1,000
train passengers, out of whom more than 300, or 35 percent,
were on their way to one conference or anther. It is
estimated that over six hundred million railroad tickets are
sold every year to people to attend miscellaneous
conferences. 68 In order to propagate and implement a single
Central policy, a certain provincial-level unit convened 112
conferences over a period of nine months, or one conference
every other day on average. 69 Moreover, conferences can be
very large and last over a long period of time. For example,
"the leadership has at times gathered together as many as
67. Hou Rui, Huivi Zhuzi Yu Fuwu (Organizing and
Servicing of Conferences), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990,
p. 104.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid. p. 106.
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seven thousand of the highest-ranking cadres in the country
for almost a month of discussion....P70
Acting upon the instructions by the Politburo, the
Central General Office stipulated in 1954 that the general
offices be responsible for organizing all conferences and
meetings.71 As a result, "today, all conferences to be held
by every Party or government organ at various levels are
organized by its general office."72 It is known that many GOs
at Central and other levels contain a division or section
which, called "conference division/section," is exclusively
responsible for organizing various meetings and
conferences.73
In case of a large conference, an ad hoc secretariat may
be set up composed of personnel coming from various
departments or units, but the major work is still to be
carried out by the general office of the host unit.74 A
70. Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Bruce J. Dickson, A
Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in
China. 1949-1986, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989, p.
xxxii.
There are so many conferences and meetings that even
Chinese cadres themselves complain of them being drowned in
"an ocean of conferences," so much so that some localities
have had to designate a few days of the year as "no
conference day," in order to have some reprieve from the
relentless pressure of conference participation. (Hou Rui,
Organizing and Servicing of Conferences, pp. 105, 110.)
71. Ibid. p. 14.
72. Ibid. p. 21.
73. ibid. P. 14; personal interviews.
74. Hou Rui, Organizina and Servicing of Conferences, p.
21.
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conference secretariat is commonly called the conference
mishu division, conference mishu office, or conference mishu
team, depending on the size of the conference. A conference
secretariat is usually headed by one or several members of
the leadership squad(s), who meet and make major decisions
periodically. It consists typically of four staff components
to constantly take care of the various needs of the
conference: administrative section, briefing/information
section, service section, and security section.7 5 The
functions of these sections are spelled out as follows:
The administrative section is responsible for guiding,
organizing, and managing the conference, setting the agenda,
and assigning or handling various add hoc jobs. The
briefing/writing section is responsible for processing all
documents, e.g. conference papers, keynote speeches, minutes,
bulletins, resolutions, etc. The service section is
responsible for decorating and cleaning the conference
room/hall and providing room and board, finance, equipment,
transport, recreation, and medical care. The security section
is responsible for maintaining confidentiality, security, and
safety of the conference.7 6
In organizing and servicing a conference, it is largely
the mishus' job to propose or prepare the agenda. Proposed
topics for the conference may come from four sources:
superior leaders, members of the immediate leadership squad,
mishus of the general office, and subordinate bureaucrats.
The GO mishus are expected to evaluate, select, and set up
priority of the topics, and then propose the agenda to the
chief leader of the leadership squad for approval. According
75. Ibid. p. 22.
76. Ibid. pp. 22-23.
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to our interviews, the chief leader's personal mishu and the
GO director wield considerable sway over what issues are to
be brought up, when and how, at a conference.
Then, the mishus involved conduct research and
investigations for the conference -- retrieving and
collecting relevant documents, reference materials, data and
evidence for the discussion of the prepared topics, proposing
policy options for deliberation and resolution, and
investigating the backgrounds of the nominees for the
positions under consideration. Very importantly, the mishus
are expected to:test out the private opinions and preferences
of the participants.7 7 Ideally, they should play some part in
discussing the selected topics with the participants and
reconciling their differences of opinion informally before
the conference actually takes place.78
In addition, the mishus are responsible for proposing
the list of participants for the conference. The list should
distinguish clearly "regular participants," "non-voting
participants," and 'special guests." For some exclusive,
highly confidential conferences, the list should also include
the note-takers.7 9 This responsibility is considered as "a
very important job," in that, 'If someone entitled to attend
the conference is not invited, that means that his legitimate
77. Ibid. pp. 25-26, 38-39.
78. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 191.
79. Hou Rui, Oraanizina and Servicina of Conferences, p.
104. pp. 26-27.
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right has been deprived inadvertently," but if the wrong
persons are invited, "it will have negative impact on the
conference. 80
During the conference, the mishus are responsible for
drafting, editing, printing, and distributing all documents,
which include speeches, outlines, *notes, transcripts,
records, bulletins, announcements, reports, minutes, motions,
resolutions, news releases, etc. Mishus' great discretion in
writing and editing conference documents is the same as was
analyzed in a previous section. For a major conference a
special writing team is formed, which works in shifts on a
continuous basis in order to guarantee the timeliness and
quality of each conference document. 8 1 Most of our
interviewees expressed their amazement at mishus' remarkable
ability at handling document-writing during conferences.
"Looking at a mishu's summary of my speech," said one of
them, "I couldn't help but wonder how I could have uttered
something so elegant, logical, and profound. They [mishus]
are really masters at writing documents." (Of course,
complaints about mishus' incompetence in this regard are not
unheard of.) However, it seems that in "summarizing" a
speech, a mishu feels little need to be faithful to its
letter or even spirit, and that the speaker himself tends to
80. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
p. 111.
81. Ibid. p. 62.
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feel grateful for the mishu's "refining" and editing. aighas'
great discretion in this regard is helpful toward apparent
harmony and consensus-building of a conference, under usual
circumstances.
The efficiency of the .document-processing during a
conference is also emphasized. For example, it is usually
expected that what is discussed in the morning should have
been processed, printed and distributed to the participants
by the end of the afternoon; what is discussed in the
afternoon should have been processed in the same manner and
distributed to the participants first thing the next
morning.82
To ensure that a conference goes smoothly, the GO is
expected to go to extraordinary lengths to take care of every
detail of the administrative and logistical support. Mishus'
excessive care is not necessarily superfluous given the
general inadequacy of infrastructural facilities in China.
For example, an indispensable precaution that mishus must
take for every major conference is to inform the local power
station of the time and location of the conference. Details
like this can mean the difference between success and failure
of a conference. Once the mishus of the Party committee of a
certain locality failed, in 1984, to do so while inviting a
key Central leader to make a speech at a large conference
being attended by thousands of people. As a result, the power
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82. bid. . 68.
station cut off electricity for a full hour due to a shortage
of supply, thus leaving the Central leader in a very
embarrassing and humiliating situation. 8 3 Another example
involved Premier Zhou Enlai and the visiting Indian prime
minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The two were having a dinner and
were about to make a toast, when a blackout occurred, leaving
the dining room "pitch dark." Premier Zhou was so mad that he
held his ire deliberately until three o'clock the next
morning. Then he rang the leaders of the Central General
Office and the Beijing Power Supply Bureau, waking them up
from their deep slumber and summoning them for an emergency
meeting in his office. The first words he flung at them were:
"I got you up from your beds and asked you to come at this
hour on purpose in order to leave a deep impression on
you."84
The mishus are also responsible for maintaining
confidentiality, security, and safety of the conference
including both its participants and documents. In case of a
top secret conference, the mishus must make sure that nobody
takes notes, no documents are issued, or else that the
documents are confined to the restricted areas and returned
properly and promptly without being copied. 85
83. Ibid. p. 45.
84. Cheng Hua, ed., Zhou Enlai he tade mishumen (Zhou
Enlai and His Mishus), Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi
chubanshe, 1992, pp. 270-271.
85. Ibid. p. 98.
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Moreover, the mighus are in charge of news censorship.
"Journalists are usually not allowed into important and
confidential conferences, and so all the news reports are
drafted, edited and censored by the mishU department." 86
During a conference, the mishjs are responsible for
providing comfortable rooms, delicious food, convenient
transport, delightful recreations, and prompt and reliable
medical care. They are also supposed to ensure the sanitation
of the rest rooms, dining rooms, food, utensils, and drinking
water, as well as to "remind the participants to pay
attention to their personal hygiene, change clothes
frequently, and take regular baths."8 7 Mishus' negligence in
any of these respects can cause disaster, according to the
Chinese specialist on the mishu work. For exampie, a certain
locality held an important conference, but it had to be
called off because most of the participants fell ill by
eating contaminated food. This unfortunate event happened
"because the misj.s had neglected to have the food analyzed
before hand."88
One of the most sensible issues (or headaches) that the
mishus must handle with extreme caution is to set up an
appropriate hierarchical order among conference participants.
The mishjs should propose the proper seating arrangement
86. bid. p. 99.
87. Ibid. p. 88.
88. Zhig. p. 45.
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specifying who should be sitting on the podium and who not. 8 9
They should also suggest the suitable order in which the
leaders enter the conference room/hall, ascend the podium,
and deliver speeches. During photo-taking for the purpose of
news release, special care is taken as to where each of the
leaders should be positioned, for people will read tremendous
significance into, or conjure up all kinds of speculations
about, such positioning. In case of TV coverage, meticulous
attention must be paid as to how long the video camera should
stay on each of the leaders in strict accordance with his
relative rank or importance. It is said that conference
participants are fastidious about all these nuances, proper
treatment of which makes a great deal of difference between
unbearable tensions and apparent harmony.9 0 It is no easy
job, for participants may come from different units, and many
factors have to be carefully weighed in determining their
relative ranks vis-a-vis each other, as has been discussed
earlier.91
In short, without the delicate skill and intensive care
of mishus, hardly any conference or meeting can proceed
89. =,i p. 34.
90. Based on personal interviews.
91. It is also noteworthy that after the conference, it
is the duty of the mishus to try various means to prod and
urge the units concerned to implement the decisions and
resolutions reached at the conference and to collect the
relevant feedback so as to keep the leaders informed of the
results. Hou Rui, Oroanizina and Servicina of Conferences,
pp. 69-70; Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
pp. 125-126.
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smoothly and successfully in China, given the complexities of
interpersonal relationships, inevitable disagreements and
conflicts of opinions and interests, and general inadequacy
and unreliability of infrastructural facilities.
Summary
Mishus play the cushioning/coordinating role among
leaders by properly handling hierarchical and work
relationships, soothingly mediating interpersonal
communication, and skillfully reconciling or glossing over
policy disagreements. Mishus also act as intermediaries
between leaders and subordinate bureaucrats in order for them
to avoid or minimize direct contacts and confrontations
between each other. Misjhus' moderating role is also well
reflected in the writing, editing, and censoring of official
documents. Mishus' extraordinary discretion in this regard
works to facilitate the continuity, consistency, and
coherence of the policy process. Moreover, mishus are
responsible for organizing and servicing all conferences and
meetings. Their meticulous care and moderating role are
conducive to smoothening and lubricating the conflict-prone
process of bargaining and negotiation involved when political
actors of different ranks or levels and different
bureaucratic units come together face to face.
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Chapter Five
STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS
China is one of the largest countries in the world and has by
far the largest population on .earth -- over one billion and
one hundred million. To govern this vast territory and huge
population, Chinese political leadership has to have a
gigantic bureaucracy, which numbers over thirty million
cadres.1 In order to effectively control this bureaucratic
mammoth, the Chinese political leadership has to rely upon
large staffs, as is the case with many other political
systems. There are over one million mishus personnel in the
Chinese political arena,2 who perform the two basic roles --
amplifying leadership's capacity for bureaucratic control and
smoothening and coordinating the political process, as has
been analyzed in the foregoing two chapters. The purpose of
is chapter is to sort out the formal structures and functions
of the Chinese mishu institution. This chapter consists the
following three parts.
1. This number was given by Yan Huai, who used to be
director of the Research Institute of Organization and
Personnel of the Central Committee Organization Department.
Included in the statistics are those in the official
nomenklutura in Party and state organs and corporations at
Central and local levels. Yan Huai, Zhonaauo dalu zhenazhi
tizhi aiantan (Understandina the Political System of
Contemporary China, Somerset, NJ: the Center for Modern
China, 1991), p. 23.
2. Xu Ruixin et al., Zhonaauo xiandai mishu oonazuo
iichu (The Essentials of Contemporary Chinese Mishu
Profession), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989, p. 178.
188
* Part I -- General Discussion
* Part II -- Case Analyses: the Central Committee General
Office and the State Council General Office
* Part III -- The Relationship of General Offices to Other
Key Organs and Actors
Part I. General Discussion
In the Chinese political system, every formal
organization, e.g., Party committee, government, enterprise,
school, etc., at each level - Center, province, prefecture,
county, ot township - is directed by a leadership squad,
which is served and assisted by a mishu squad. The mishu
squad is formally called the "general office" (hereafter,
GO). At the Central level, for example, the Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee, the State Council, the standing
committee of the National People's Congress, the National
Consultative Conference of Political Affairs, and the Central
Military Affairs Commission all have a GO.
A GO at the Central or provincial level is called a
"banagnating"; one at the level of prefecture, municipality,
county, or large state enterprise is called a "bangonashi."
At lower levels it is sometimes called a "mishu chu"
(secretarial division) or "mishu zu" (secretarial team).3 For
3. Chen Hongbin et al., eds., Jianmina wenmi aonazuo
shouce (A Concise Handbook of Mishu Profession), Shenyang:
Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987, p. 58.
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the purpose of this study the generic term "general office"
will be used. Provincial-level GOs contain divisions (chu),
which in turn consist of sections (=e). Lower-level GOs are
usually composed of sections (g9) or teams (Z1). (The
organization of the CCPCC GO and the State Council GO will be
discussed in a separate part later in this chapter.)
For all the inconsistencies about the names, evidence
indicates that GOs at all levels share similar organizational
structures and functions, as explained by Wang Zhaoguo, then
director of the CCPCC GO, in his sweeping statement in
January of 1985 to the "National Symposium of Chief Mishus
and Directors of GOs": "A GO's responsibilities include
offering secretarial services, providing security services,
conducting research and investigations, processing electronic
communications, handling visits and letters, supplying
transportation, providing health care, maintaining
confidentiality, looking after [leaders'] personal life,
etc." 4 The support and assistance being spelled out here fall
into two basic categories: political/administrative services
and logistics/personal services.5 Obviously, these services
4. Wang Zhaoguo, "Chonafen fahui banaongtina de canmou.
zhushou zuovona" ("Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices in Providing Advice and Assistance"), in inda
tonazhi tan mishu aonazuo (The Remarks by Leadina Comrades on
Mishu Work), Beijing: Xiandai chubanshe, 1989, p. 70.
5. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 180; also see
the Central Document entitled "Decisions for All Levels on
Mibhu Organs and on the Responsibilities of Chief Mighus and
of Directors of General Offices in Agencies Without Chief
Mighus," in Hou Rui, Zenvana dana banaonashi zhuren (How to
Work as a Director of a General Office), Beijing: Dangan
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affect each and every member of the leadership squad that the
GO serves, whereas any of the other subordinate bureaucratic
departments or units may involve only one or just a few of
the leaders. Putting all these services within one single
staff unit .is facilitative toward the coherence and
integration of the leader squad it serves.
The political/administrative services that the GO
provides include:
* collecting, analyzing, synthesizing, transmitting, and
storing information;
* conducting research and investigation and providing
options and advice for policy-making;
" drafting, editing, censoring, printing, and distributing
official documents and maintaining their confidentiality;
* arranging meetings and conferences and leaders'
activities;
* receiving and handling visits and letters;
* monitoring, supervising, and coordinating subordinate
departments and units in policy implementation; and
* carrying out various ad hoc tasks assigned by leaders.
In order to perform all of these political functions, a GO is
usually composed of these standard divisions or sections:6
chubanshe, 1990, pp. 50-51.
6. Based on Zhonahua renmin aonaheauo shena zizhiqu
zhixiashi dana zhena aun iiauan zuzhi aaivan (An Outline of
the Oraanization and Functions of the Provinces. Autonomous
Reaions. and Directly-Governed Municinalities of the Peonle's
Republic of China), compiled by Division of Organization of
Local Governments, Personnel Department of the State Council,
Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1989; Zheng Xinghan et
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Secretarial Division
Confidential Division
Information Division
Administrative Division
Reception and Accommodations Division
Foreign Languages Translation Division
Printing Division
Investigation and Research Division
Division for Handling Letters and Visits
Discipline Inspection Division
Political Work Division
Personnel Division
On-Duty Division (zhiban chu)
It should be noted that in practice these sub-units may not
all be neatly juxtaposed on the same footing, but some may be
subordinate to, or embedded in, the others.
In addition to the above common components, Party and
government GOs often have other more specialized divisions of
their own. A Party GO may contain a division for handling
Party-public relationship (dana aun chu), a division for
collecting Party historical data (danashi zhenaii chu), Party
publications division, inspection tour division, etc.7 The
governmental GO usually contains such professional divisions
al., Dang zheng iiauan mishu aonazuo gaishu (An Outline of
the Mishu Work in Party and State Oraans), Beijing: Dangan
chubanshe, 1990, pp. 121-122.
7. bid.
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as:8
Industry and Transportation Division
Finance and Economy Division
Auditing Division
Science and Technology Division
Agriculture Division
Culture and Education Division
Laws and Regulations Division.
In terms of logistics/personal services, a GO looks
after the personal life of leaders with respect to food,
housing, transport, health care, salaries, recreations,
security, down to funeral services.9 For these purposes, a GO
usually contains the following sub-units:1 0
Personal Life Division (shenahuo chu)
Housing Division
Motor Vehicle Management Division
Retired Cadres Division
Medical Care Division
Finance Division
8. Ibid.
9. In some cases this category of functions belongs to a
separate unit, usually called "Administrative Affairs
Management Division* (jiauan shiwu auanli chu), which reports
directly to the chief mishu instead of director of the GO.
Hou Rui, How to Work as a GO Director, p. 18.
10. Based on An Outline of the Oraanization and
Functions; Zheng Xinghan at al., An Outline of the Mishu"
Work, pp. 121-122.
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Construction Division
Security Division.
The core structure of a typical general office can be
illustrated as follows.
Table 5.1: The Core Structure of a General Office
-------------------------------------------------------------
General Office
I I1
Political Functions Loaistical Functions
Secretarial Work Personal Life
Confidentiality Housing
Information Motor Vehicle Management
Policy Research Finance and Accounting
Handling Letters/Visits Security
On-Duty Medical Care
Construction
-----------------------------------------------------
It is noteworthy that in some cases, a GO's subdivisions do
not bear the above-mentioned names, but instead are called
Division/Section Number One, Division/Section Number Two, and
so on. But they still perform the same functions as spelled
out in the foregoing self-explanatory names.
The higher up a GO is, the more divisions and sections
it contains and the greater the division of labor within it.
A GO at a lower level of, say, a county, generally does not
have so many sub-units, and so each section or individual
mishu has to handle a wider scope of responsibilities. A GO
is, however, generally quite sizable. For instance, the
average size of a provincial Party committee GO is 269
members and that of a provincial government GO is 244,
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figures which put them among the largest departments.11 It is
interesting to note that in the Party system at the
provincial level where there are on average twelve
departments, the GOs are by far the largest; in the
government system at the provincial level, they are among the
largest of the usual sixty departments and bureaus, surpassed
in size only by Public Security Bureau, Internal Security
Bureau, and a couple of other departments.12 The average size
of a prefecture-level GO is about forty people.13
As a rule, almost all subordinate departments of the
bureaucracy have their counterpart divisions, sections, or
individuals in the GO of the presiding leadership squad.1 4
This organizational structure reflects the GO's role as a
counterbureaucracy serving the purpose of providing the
leadership squad with countervailing capacity to closely and
constantly control the bureaucracy, as was noted in Chapter
Three.
11. Based on the numbers provided in An Outline of the
Oraanization and Functions.
12. 1WA.
13. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of the Mishu Work,
p. 150.
14. There are, however, two major exceptions in the
Party system: the organization and propaganda departments,
whose heads are usually members of the leadership squad and
so report directly to the squad without having to go through
the GO. (Hou Rui, How to Work as a General Office Director,
p. 10.) Even so, the GO can intervene on occasion and still
has an important role to play in terms of logistical/personal
life support.
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Formally, a GO has a status equal to that of a
bureaucratic department at each level of the bureaucratic
hierarchy. Thus, the CCPCC and State Council GOs have the
same rank as a Central department or ministry; a provincial
GO has the same rank as a provincial department;1 5 so on and
so forth. In practice, according to our well-informed
interviewees, a GO enjoys a status equivalent, or even
superior, to a supra-departmental/supra-ministerial
commission (wei).1 6 Thus, the GO director"-is generally
treated as the first among equals vis-a-vis heads of the
other departments or ministries. Head of a GO is usually a
member of the standing committee in the Party system or a
member of the leading Party group (danazu) in the government
system. 17
15. nhonaauo Zhenafu Gonazuo Gaivao (An Outline of the
Work of the Chinese Government), Beijing: the CCP Central
Party School Press, 1991, p. 213.
16. Some commissions (wai) are generally regarded as
enjoying a status a half rank higher than a regular
ministry/department (hu) and thus wield a certain amount of
authority over several relevant ministries or departments, as
is the case with the State Planning Commission and the State
Economy and Commerce Commission vis-a-vis other ministries in
the State Council.
17. According to personal interviews; Hou Rui, How to
Work as a GO Director, p. 5.
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Part II. Case Analyses
The Central Committee General Office
To further illustrate the organization and functions of
a GO, a case analysis of the Central Committee GO is made
here. The Central GO, usually shortened as zhongban in
Chinese, is the most powerful and important in the Chinese
mishu system. The current director of the Central GO is Zeng
Qinghong.1 8 Unlike a provincial GO, the Central GO is
composed of bureaus (j.i), which in turn contain divisions.
China watchers in the West have been aware of the importance
of the Central GO, as for example, Barnett observes that,
"The Central Committee bureaucracy run by the Secretariat is
extensive and includes a sizable number of departments,
committees, small groups, and research units, all presumably
coordinated by the Central Committee's General Office." 1 9 But
so far scholars have been unable to delineate its exact
organizational structure and functions, largely because the
Office was, and still is, shrouded in deep secrecy.20 To date
the only publicly available official description of its
18. Gao Xin, &Wen Jiabao dang quan pang luo zhi mi"
("The Mystery Surrounding Wen Jiabao's Loss of Power in the
Party"), Zhonaguo shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly), No. 73
(1993), p. 73.
19. A. Doak Barnett, The Makina of Foreian Policy in
China: Structure and Process, Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, Inc., 1985, p. 42.
20. Our interviewees in the State Council were reluctant
to answer any questions about the structure and functions of
the Central GO.
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functions is found in The Contemporary Chinese Encvclonedia,
published by the Center-run publishing house, Danaan
Chubanshe (Archive Publishing House). The entry about the
Central GO goes as follows.
The Central General Office is one of the organs directly
under the Central Committee and is the Center's working body
(banshi iiaou) for daily operations. It was first founded in
the formative years of the Party and originally called the
Central Mishu Office. 21 Its major responsibilities include:
providing secretarial services, organizing and servicing
conferences, conducting research and investigations,
processing and synthesizing information, and providing advice
and information for the Center in making major decisions;
handling classified mail and electronic communications;
collecting, classifying, and utilizing Central archives;
conducting communication and coordination among Central
departments in their work; and taking care of Central Party
and state leaders in terms of security, personal life,
medical care, etc.22
Although there are still many mysteries surrounding the
Central GO, the general description in the foregoing part
about the GO institution should be basically applicable to
its structure and functions, and from the pieces of evidence
21. According to Xu Ruixin, head of Mishu Bureau of the
Central GO, the Central GO, as it is called today, was first
established in 1941 -- its predecessor was the Central
Committee Secretarial Division (zhonavana mishu chu) -- and
its basic organizational contours have remained largely
unchanged over time. The CCPCC Secretarial Division was first
brought into existence by a Central document, "The Resolution
Concerning'the Organizational Issues," which was passed at
the Third Plenum of the Fourth Party Congress in July of
1926. (Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, pp. 76-79.) It is
not clear what influence, if any, the Soviet Communist Party
or the Comintern had over the formation of the Central
General Office. Answer to this question depends on further
research.
22. Zhang Feng et al., eds. Danadai Zhonaauo Baike
Daidin (The Contemporary Chinese Encvclooedia), Beijing:
Dangan chubanshe, 1991, p. 85.
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gleaned from the recent outpouring of mishu xue literature,
the Central GO is known to consist of at least the following
bureaus or sub-units to perform the above-mentioned
functions.23
Mishu Bureau. It is one of the most important
components of the Central GO. It was formerly called
"Confidential Section" and then "Confidential Office," which
was once headed by Ye Zilong, one of Mao's five major
personal mishus.24 The Bureau's current head is Xu Ruixin,
who is also a deputy director of the Central GO.2 5 The Bureau
has a highly important role to play in policy formation and
implementation in terms of processing information, conducting
research, providing advice, drafting and editing Central
documents, and supervising subordinate departments and units.
Its Synthesizing Division constantly monitors and stays in
close touch with various subordinate departments and units to
press for timely and faithful fulfillment of tasks assigned
them by the Central leaders.26
Moreover, the Bureau is responsible for providing and
23. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of the Mishu Work,
p. 121.
24. Ibid. p. 41; Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p.
80.
25. Shi Liuzi, "Zhonggong 'mishu bang' qunxiang" ("A
Group Portrait of the Chinese Communist Secret Secretaries"),
Minzhu Zhonaauo (Democratic China), No. 11, August, 1992, p.
24. The author used to be a journalist in China.
26. Wang Zhaoguo, "Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices," pp. 78-79.
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managing personal mishus for Central leaders. Although
working directly for individual Central leaders, most of
those personal mishus are known to organizationally belong to
the Bureau, and so are at least partly accountable to it.2'
Confidential Bureau. It is responsible for
printing, distributing, transmitting, storing, retrieving,
and destroying all classified and top-secret materials and
documents of the Center. These materials include highly
sensitive (even damaging) historical records about Central
leaders. If the following source is to be believed, the
confidential materials being kept by the Bureau include:
the resumes of Party and state leaders, and the record of
each promotion and penalty they have received; the original
minutes of the Politburo meetings to criticize certain
leaders, and the records of their oral or written self-
criticisms; the letters of repentance and self-incrimination
addressed to Chairman Mao and the Center by capitalist
roaders with ranks above provincial and army levels; the
original minutes of the thirteen Politburo standing committee
meetings hr±d before 1966 to help Comrade Mao Zedong realize
[the sin of] the philandering acts he had committed
repeatedly, and Mao's several oral self-criticisms; the
transcripts of Comrade Mao Zedong's self-criticizing speeches
during the 1960-61 period regarding [his responsibility for]
the nation-wide famines following the Great Leap Forward;
Premier Zhao Enlai's twelve self-criticizing reports
addressed to Chairman Mao and the Center regarding his
mistakes of rightist conservatism; Premier Zhao Enlai's many
written self criticisms and pledges addressed to Chairman Mao
and Vice Chairman Lin [Biao] during the initial period of the
Cultural Revolution; state president Liu Shaoqi's letter of
repentance addressed to Chairman Mao and the Center at the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping's letter
written to Chairman Mao and the Center pledging &never to
reverse the verdict on the Cultural Revolution" during his
exile in Xinjian county, Jiangxi province in 1972;...28
27. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 133.
28. Zhong Guofeng, 'Zhonananhai iuemi wenjian shiqie an"
("A Case of Top Secret Documents Stolen in Zhongnanhai'),
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Regardless of the reliability of the above information,
one thing that is for sure is the fact that the top leaders
put the most trusted mishus in charge of this Bureau. The
Bureau has an extensive electronic communication network and
a courier system of its own across the country. It is also
responsible for providing professional guidance for, and
exercising supervision over, its counterparts in lower level
bureaucracies.
Bureau for Handling Letters and Visits (xin flan
ii&). Acting as ombudsmen of sorts, the mishu personnel in
this Bureau are responsible for receiving visits and letters
from bureaucrats at lower levels and from the general public.
Those letters and visits involve primarily complaints about
poor quality of government.services, exposures of corruption
or other evil-doings, petitions for redressing wrongs or
reversing past verdicts, reports on policy violations, and
the like. The Bureau is supposed to look for serious problems
or tendencies from those visits and letters and bring them to
the attention of Central leaders. It also has the authority
to refer them to the relevant bureaucratic departments or
units for solutions or to conduct investigations on its own.
The Bureau is considered as an important "window' for letting
in formation from below in order for the Central leaders to
keep an eye on the bureaucracy. The Bureau, first established
at Mao's instructions in 1951,29 was organized from scratch
Cheng Mina, May (1993), p. 15.
29. An Outline of the Work of the Chinese Government, p.
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by Mao's top mishu, Tian Jiaying.30
Information Center. It is responsible for collecting,
analyzing, distributing, and storing information and data for
Central policy making. The Central GO is said to have an
extensive! ai-d elaborate information network across the
country, so as to provide the Central leadership with timely
and adequate information about the bureaucracies at all
levels and about the society at large. It was reported that
the Information Center was responsible for co-developing the
computer software for servicing the Fourteenth Party Congress
convened in 1992, an indicator of its strong in-house
computer capacity.31
Administrative Affairs Management Bureau (Jigjuan
shiwu auanli 1u). This Bureau looks after Central
leaders with respect to housing, food, recreations,
transport, office equipment and supplies, etc. It is
interesting to note that it is also the responsibility of
this Bureau to take care of the funeral services of all
Central leaders. Moreover, it is its job as well to look
after the livelihood of those top leaders who have fallen out
of power due to political defeats or even criminal
241.
30. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong he tade mishu Tian
Jiaying" ("Mao Zedong and His M±abh Tian Jiaying'), in Dong
Bian et al., eds., Mao Zedona he tade mishu Tian Jiavinp (Mao
Zedona and His Mishu Tian Jiavina), Beijing: Zhongyang
wenxian chubanshe, 1989, pp. 7-13.
31. Peoole's Daily, overseas edition, October 12, 1992,
p. 3.
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prosecution. For example, when Jiang Qing was released from
prison on probation to receive medical treatment, her
personal life was arranged and taken care of by this
Bureau.32 It is reported that the fallen general secretary
Zhao Ziyang's vacation in 1993 at the summer retreat of
Chengde Mountain Village was also organized and taken care of
by the Bureau.33 In short, once a person becomes a Central
leader, he or she will be permanently under the care of the
Bureau, living or dead, in power or out of power.
Health Care Bureau. The bureau is responsible for
providing medical care for Central leaders and their mishus.
In addition to the facilities and medical personnel directly
at its disposal, it is entitled to commission any outside
experts and equipment from anywhere in the country for
discharging its duty.34
According to one source, this Bureau has eight
permanent "comprehensive health care expert groups," which
are located respectively at Zhongnanhai, the People's Great
32. An Gongren, "Jiang Qing zai Qingcheng de zuihou
rizi" ("The Last Days of Jiang Qing in the Qingcheng
Prison"), Xinwen Zivou Daobao (Press Freedom Guardian), April
16, 1993, p. 3.
33. Ming Heng, *Zhao Zivang bishu Chenade Shanzhuana
(&Zhao Ziyang Retreats from Summer Heat at Chengde Mountain
Village*), Cheng Mina, August (1993), p. 20.
34. This Bureau was once abolished in 1964 at Mao's
order, and its function was taken over during the Cultural
Revolution by a special department of the Beiji-g Hospital,
which was called "General On-Duty Office." Cheng Hua, Zhou
Enlai he tade mishumen (Zhou Enlai and His Mishus), Beijing:
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1992, pp. 516-517.
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Hall, Beijing Hospital, Hospital Number 301, Jingxi Hotel,
Xiangshan (Fragrant Mountain), Xiehe Hospital, and Air Force
Hospital, where Central leaders reside or sojourn. In
addition, the Bureau has medical expert detachments at key
locations across the country,. such as Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Zhongshan, Qingdao, Dalian, Beidaihe, and Xian, so that
prompt and first-rate medical support is available wherever
Central leaders go. The beneficiaries of the Bureau's
services include 'political elders," as well as those Central
leaders, retired or still in office, who hold the ranks
equivalent to, or above, "vice premier, Politburo member,
state councilor, vice chairman of the National People's
Congress, member of the Central Military Affairs Commission,
and vice chairman of the National Consultative Conference of
Political Affairs. " 3  It is reported that the Bureau
suggested in June 1993 to the Politburo standing committee
that Deng Xiaoping should no longer swim in the sea
considering his health condition.36
Special Accounting Office. One of its
responsibilities is to provide special funds for top leaders.
For example, the Office managed Mao Zedong's royalties on his
publications, which amounted to about one million yuan in the
1950s, an astronomical figure at that time. The office gave
35. Luo Bing, "Zhengzhiiu zhu Dena hai vona' ('The
Politburo Tries to Dissuade Deng from Swimming in the Sea'),
ChengaMina, August (1993), p. 8.
36. Ibid. p. 6.
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some of them in 1981 to Mao's daughter, Li Min, and his
former wife, He Zhizhen, as their inheritances. 37 It is
noteworthy that it is a common practice for Chinese top
leaders to have their speeches and writings published through
the government publishing houses regardless of whether there
is any market demand and then receive handsome royalties.
This is an important source of their personal wealth.
Security Bureau. It is usually called "Central
Security Bureau." It is noteworthy that the Central Security
Bureau is the same institution as the Central Guard Regiment,
also known as Unit 8341.38 The Central Security Bureau may be
headed either personally by director of the Central GO, as
was the case with Wang Dongxing,3 9 or by a senior deputy
director of the Central GO, as was the case with Zhang
Yaoci, 4 0 and is now the case with Yang Dezhong. Since the
37. Qiu xiaolong et al., eds., Zhongauo de da beiiu
renwu (The Great Tragic Figures of China), Beijing: Zhongguo
renmin daxue chubanshe, 1989, pp. 9-10.
38. He Pin, aJiang Zemin de tebie zhuli: Zeng Qinghong,
Yang Dezhong' ('Jiang Zemin's Special Assistants: Zeng
Qinghong and Yang Dezhong"), Zhonaauo shibao zhoukan (china
Times weekly), No. 101 (1993), p. 73. The Regiment is
estimated to be equal in size to an army. "Wang Tung-hsing -
The Head of Peiping's Undercover Agents," Issues & Studies,
August (1976), p. 95.
39. Wang Hebin, zivun Xuan zhuren: wo suo iiechu de Mao
Zedona (The Master of the Purple Cloud Compound: Mao Zedona I
Knew), Beijing: the CCP Central Party School Press, 1991, p.
38. The author used to be Mao's personal physician and
administrative mi•hu.
40. Ruan Jihong, "Mao Zedong he tade jiyao mishu Zhang
Yufeng" ("Mao Zedong and His Confidential MinuA Zhang
Yufeng"), in Zhang Yufeng et al., eds., Mao Zedona vishi
(Anecdotes About Mao Zedona), Changsha: Hunan wenyi
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late 1970s and up to now, Yang Dezhong, a member of the Party
Central Committee, has been head of the Central Security
Bureau.41
Head of this Bureau is personally responsible for the
security of the paramount leader, and the deputy heads of the
Bureau are personally in charge of the security of the other
key Central leaders including the general secretary, premier,
chairman of the Central Military Affairs Committee, and state
president. 42 In addition to providing security services to
the Central leaders, it is also the responsibility of the
Bureau to arrest them if they are purged, as happened to the
Gao Gang-Rao Shushi clique, the Lin Biao faction, and the
Gang of Four. The Bureau's task is so important and sensitive
that it is known to be under the dual leadership shared
between the Central GO and the Public Security Ministry.4 3
Also worth mentioning is a peculiar new development in the
leadership arrangement of the Central Security Bureau: On the
one hand, head of the Bureau, Yang Dezhong, is the first
chubanshe, 1989, p. 28. Zhang Yufeng was Mao's confidential
mishu during his last years.
41. He Pin, 'Jiang Zemin's Special Assistants," p. 73.
42. Zhang Yunsheng, Maoiiawan iishi! Lin Biao mishu
huiri JI (The Evewitness Accounts of Maoiiawan: Memoirs of
Lin Biao's Mishu), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988, p. 243.
43. See Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of the Mishu
Work, p. 121; John Buron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the
Draaon: Kana Shena - The Evil Genius Behind Mao - ;nd His
Leaacy of Terror in People's China, New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1992, pp. 331-332; Wang Hebin, The Master of the
Purple Cloud Compound, p. 39.
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deputy director of the Central General Office, thus being
officially subordinate to zeng Qinghong, the current director
of the Central GO; on the other hand, Zeng is deputy head-
cum-deputy commissar of the Central Security Bureau, thus
being subordinate to Yang.44 Confusing as it appears, this
arrangement is obviously intended as a measure of checks and
balances to guarantee the reliability of the Bureau.
It should be pointed out that at present China watchers'
eyes are focused on the 'king-making" role of the Chinese
military in the succession struggle likely to follow Deng's
death, but the Central Security Bureau's role in this regard
is equally critical, and, perhaps, even more directly
relevant and indispensable. For one thing, the Chinese
military is not a united political force but is divided for
historical, institutional, and factional reasons, while the
Central Guard Regiment is one coherent and tightly controlled
unit. For another, it would be politically too disturbing and
unorthodox to call in troops from outside for a showdown
within the Zhongnanhai compound, while the physical
propinquity makes the Central Security Bureau an ideal
instrument for quietly twisting arms or breaking necks in
court politics behind a facade of calm and normality.
From the above discussion of the Central GO's subunits,
it is clear that they each perform services that are crucial
44. Zi Zhi, wzena Oinahann liexi Zhenazhiju huivyi
('Zeng Qinghong is Allowed to Attends Politburo Meetings as a
Nonvoting Participanta), Cheng Mina, October (1993), p. 19.
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and indispensable for the Central leadership squad. With
respect to the overall powers of the Central GO, its director
is usually a full or alternate member of the Politburo and/or
of the Secretariat. Although the Central General Office has
officially the same bureaucratic rank as the other Central
departments, it seems to be in fact superior to them.
According to Gao Xin, a well-informed Chinese political
observer, "the Central General Office not only wields command
over the various departments directly under the Central
Committee but also is in control of the Party committee
systems within the State Council and the National People's
Congress. "45
The actual power of the Central GO is reflected in the
fact that one of its depaty directors usually doubles as the
chief personal mishu to the paramount leader, as was the case
with Mao's top aide Tian Jiaying,4 6 Deng Xiaoping's chief
personal mishu Wang Ruilin,4 7 and Jiang Zemin's chief
personal mishu Zeng Qinghong, 4 8 who has recently been
45. Gao Xin, "The Mystery Surrounding Wen Jiabao's Loss
of Power," p. 74.
46. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong and His Mishu Tian
Jiaying," p. 83.
47. He Pin, "Deng Xiaoping Beidaihe cehua shisida"
("Deng Xiaoping is Planning the Fourteenth Party Congress at
Beidaihe"), Zhonaauo zhi chun (China Spring) , No. 119
(September 1992), pp. 15-16.
48. Zhang Changgong, "Jiang Zemin bu gan zai Zhongnanhai
la bang jie pai" ("Jiang zemin Does Not Dare to Form His Own
Faction in Zhongnanhai"), Zhonaauo shibao zhoukan (China
Times Weekly), No. 46 (1992), p. 17. Moreover, Zeng
accompanied Jiang as one of his two Nspecial assistants' when
Jiang came to Seattle in November 1993 to attend the APEC
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promoted to be the current director of the Central GO.4 9
Indeed, it is even believed by some well-informed China
watchers that one of the key factors leading to Zhao ziyang's
downfall was the fact that he had never been able to put the
Central GO under the charge of someone personally loyal to
him. As a result, Zhao's "every word and act was closely
controlled and restrained by the Central General Office."5s
Moreover, the Central GO is known to be responsible for
maintaining constant contact and conducting continuous
information coordination with all the provinces, directly-
governed municipalities, and autonomous regions; with all
Central departments, commissions, and ministries; and with
the Central Military Commission, its departments and the
various military district commands.51 In the post-Mao era,
the Central GO has had the added important duty of conducting
communication and coordination between the Politburo and the
political elders, or the "Ancient Ones," Deng Xiaoping, Chen
Yun, Peng Zhen, Li Xiannian, et al. 52 These political elders
conference. The other "special assistant" was Yang Dezhong,
the current head of the Central Security Guard. (He Pin,
"Jiang Zemin's Special Assistants," pp. 72-73.)
49. Zhong Xingzhi, "Jiang Zemin quanmian jieban" ('Jiang
Zemin is Taking Over the Supreme Power"), Zhonaauo shibao
zhonkan (China Times Weekly), No. 77 (1993), p. 10.
50. He Pin, *Jiang Zemin's Special Assistants," p. 73.
51. He Pin, "Zhonggong dui Tai gongzuo diyixian
zhujiang" ("The Front-line Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese
Communist Party's Taiwan Affairs"), Zhonaaguo shibao zhoukan
(China Times Weekly), No. 68 (1993), p. 71.
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52. Ibid.
may hold no formal leadership positions and live a highly
secluded life, but they enjoy greater personal prestige and
de facto authority than ordinary current Politburo members.
There is no exact information about the size of the Central
GO, but it is probably over a thousand, excluding the
security forces at its disposal.
The State Council General Office
Evidence suggests that in terms of
political/administrative support the State Council General
Office (usually shortened as guoban in Chinese) perform
basically the same staff services for the State Council
leadership squad as the Central GO does for the Central Party
leadership squad. The State Council leadership squad consists
of the premier, vice premiers, and state councilors. The
major responsibilities of the State Council GO are: 1) "to
process incoming and outgoing electronic communications,
draft and edit documents, organize conferences and meetings,
keep watch around the clock, conduct communications and
liaisons, and collect and transmit information;" 2) "to
distribute and keep track of State Council documents,
reference documents and other materials, compile and edit The
State Council Bulletin, and compile the chronicle of major
events of the State Council;" 3) "to conduct investigations
and research and offer policy suggestions, according to the
current primary task and leaders' instructions, and conduct
210
preliminary censorship on major news releases;' 4) "to handle
letters and visits from the public;" 5) 'to carry out tasks
assigned by leaders, which do not fall into the jurisdictions
of any commissions or departments; and' 6) "to take charge of
personnel work and logistical support for the [State Council]
apparatus.m53
The State Council GO apparently differs, however, from
the Central GO in several aspects, and these differences
should serve as a reminder that the GO system contains
significant complexities and variations in actual practice
which cannot be fully explored in this study. First, the head
of the State Council GO is called the "chief mishu" (mishu
zhang) instead of "GO Director." The current chief mishu of
the State Council GO is Luo Gan, who is also a state
councilor. Second, according to one of our interviewees, the
State Council GO is considerably smaller in size than the
Central GO, largely because it does not contain a counterpart
to the Central GO's Administrative Affairs Management Bureau.
In the State Council, the Administrative Affairs Management
Bureau used to be a component of the GO until 1954, when it
was separated to form an independent unit.54 When asked why
in the State Council the GO and the Administrative Affairs
Management Bureau are two separate units, a Chinese official
explained:
53. An outline of the Work of the Chinese Government, p.
212.
54. 1bid. p. 253.
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All the State Council leaders are also Central leaders, and
their personal life is already taken care of by the Central
GO. So, it would be redundant for the State Council GO to do
the same. The State Council's Administrative Affairs
Management Bureau looks primarily after the administrative
and personal life needs of ordinary people working in the
State Council. Relieved of the responsibility of logistical
and personal life support, the. State Council GO can better
concentrate on policy affairs.
Third, the State Council GO has an additional
responsibility of managing foreign experts who work in China;
it is known that the State Bureau for Managing Foreign
Experts (auoiia waiauo zhuaniia Ju) is directly under the
jurisdiction of the State Council GO.55 Fourth, it seems to
be more visibly involved in the operational responsibilities
of the line ministries and agencies. It is defined as "the
comprehensive administrative body (banaona iiaou) of the
State Council, "56 whereas the Central GO is defined as "the
working body of the Center" (banshi iiaou).57 The distinction
between the two definitions seems to be important for the
Chinese. The wide scope of the State Council GO's operational
responsibilities is exemplified in the following documents
that were issued in its name.
"A Notification from the State Council General Office
Regarding Several Issues in Stabilizing Commodity Prices,"
which specified measures to be taken to control price
55. Zhang Feng et al., eds., The Contemmorarv Chinese
Encyclopedia, p. 115; An Outline of the Work of the Chinese
Government, p. 21.
56. Zhang Feng et al., eds., The Contemporary Chinese
Encyclogedia, p. 115.
57. Ibid. p. 85.
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hikes.58
"A Bulletin from the State Council General Office
Regarding the Three Major Accidents Causing Multiple
Casualties in the Commune or Brigadier-Run Coal Mines of City
X, Province Y," which spelled out precautions to be taken to
prevent more of such accidents. 59
"A Bulletin from the State Council General Office
Regarding the Recent Illegal Activities of Poaching, Selling
and Purchasing Wild Animals," which stipulated steps to be
taken to fight the wave.60
Indeed, the State Council GO has a de facto status
superior even to those powerful supra-ministerial
commissions. This fact is reflected in our well-informed
interviewee's observation: "So far as the State Council GO is
concerned, those Commissions are just like regular
ministries. It doesn't treat them any differently, even
though they are comprehensive organs and have some authority
over the relevant ministries." 61
58. Wei Keyi et al., Mishu aonazuo tongshu (A General
puide for Misau Work), Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe,
1992, pp. 65-66.
59. The names of the city and provinces were omitted in
the original. Ibid. pp. 74-76.
60. Ii. pp. 76-78.
61. According to our well-informed sources, officially
the commissions (aei) have exactly the same status as regular
ministries (bu) in terms of the bureaucratic rank. Their de
facto supra-ministerial stature derives primarily from the
fact that they are often headed by vice-premiers or state
councilors, or members of the State Council leadership squad.
Evidence suggests that the routine operation of these
commissions is in fact managed by their first deputy heads,
who refer only major decisions up to the double-hatted
chiefs. But the actual level of involvement by such chiefs
may vary from individual to individual and from time to time.
In this regard, the Chinese arrangement is different from
that of the Soviet Union, where the Gosplan (State Planning
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So far as the daily operation of the State Council is
concerned, the most important subunit of the State Council GO
is its Mishu Bureau, which contains specialized divisions or
sections for such issue areas as finance and economy,
agriculture, education and culture, foreign affairs, industry
and transportation, laws and regulations, science and
technology, etc. In a word, it has the capacity to handle and
process all incoming information from every commission,
ministry, and directly-administered tureau of the State
Council. From our well-informed sources, all the members of
the Mishu Bureau of the State Council have been "selected
after a strict scrutiny check," and they are 'politically
reliable" and in general "competent" and 'well-educated."
They are mostly young, between thirty and forty years of age.
It is said that anyone under thirty is considered 'too young"
and anyone above forty "too old* for the position. The vast
majority of them hold at least bachelor degrees in their
specialized fields and many have more advanced degrees.
The functions of the GOs for provincial Party committees
and provincial governments are illustrated in Appendices A
and B at the end of this chapter. At the provincial level, it
also seems to be the case that looking after personal life of
both Party and governmental leaders is primarily the
responsibility of the Party Committee GO, while the
government GO is more visibly involved in operational
Committee) was, for instance, officially superior to all the
ministries, with any of its branch departments holding the
same bureaucratic rank as a ministry.
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responsibilities of the line departments and bureaus. This
arrangement, at both the Central and provincial levels, is
obviously an important factor contributing to the Party's
domination over the government, given the indispensability of
GO support for the personal livelihood to every Chinese
leader, Party or governmental.
Part III. The Relationship of the GO with
Other Key Organs and Actors
As a comprehensive staff unit, a GO's scope of
responsibilities is extensive, being conterminous with that
of the leadership squad it serves. Although the GO's
functions apparently overlap with some other key organs and
actors, some division of labor is still discernible. Although
a great deal of confusion and functional overlapping does
exist in practice, as is inevitably the case with all large,
complex organizations, some clarification is possible with
regard to the following four relationships: 1) chief mishu
and GO director; 2) GO and research centers; 3) GO,
leadership squad, and leadership small groups; and 4) GO and
leaders' personal mishus.
Chief Mishu and GO Director
In China every political organization has a "chief of
staff" to take overall charge of all staff work and' daily
operations of the leadership squad. The title for such a
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person may be either "GO director," as is exemplified by the
CCP Central Committee, or "chief mishu," as is exemplified by
the State Council. In many other cases, however, the two
positions may exist simultaneously, as is the case with the
Central Military Affairs Commission, which, unlike the
Central Committee and the State Council, has both the chief
mishu and the GO director. These three arrangements cover all
the possibilities in this regard at the Central and
provincial/ministerial levels.
If the two positions co-exist, the GO director is
usually a deputy chief mishu, and the typical division of
labor between the GO director and the chief mishu is
illustrated in the following table.62
62. This table is provided in Wei Keyi et al., A General
Guide for Mishu Work, p. 7. Also see Liang Buting, "Zai _uan
shena shi di wei mishu zhana banagnashi (tina) zhuren
zuotanhui shana de i anahua" ("Speech at a Provincial
Symposium of Chief isjhus and GO Directors of the Levels of
Province, Municipality and Prefecture"), in The Remarks by
Leadino Comrades on Mishu Worlk, pp. 100-101; Zheng Xinghan et
al., An Outline of the Mishu Work, pp. 53-54.
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Table 5.2: Relationship Between Chief Mishu and GO Director
Chief Mishu
General Office Research Center(s)
I
Political support sub-units
Logistical support sub-units
In other words, the chief mishu is superior to the GO
director in the authority structure, and has an additional
portfolio of the policy research center(s).63 It is also
known that there exists another configuration, which is as
below:64
63. In some provincial level units, it is known that the
research centers belong directly to the GOs, instead of being
independent organs. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of the
Mishu Work, p. 124.
64. Personal interviews.
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Table 5.3: An Alternative Chief Mishu-GO Director
Relationship.
m-- -- a~----- ---- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Chief Mishu
General Office Logistical support unit
I
Political support sub-units
Policy research center(s)
General Office and Research Centers
Every government at'nearly all levels contains both a
general office and one or more research centers, and both of
them conduct policy research. For example, the Party Central
Committee is known to have had the following research
centers:65
The Party History Research Center
The Central Document Research Center
The Central Secretariat Research Center
The Rural Policy Research Center
The Political Reform Research Center
65. Zhonahua renmin aonaheauo dana zhena uin aun
linadaoren minalu (Who's Who in the Party. Army. Government.
Porular Oraanizations of the People's Republic of China),
Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1990; Peole's Daily,
overseas edition, October 20, 1992, pp. 22-23.
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The Central Policy Research Center
Moreover, Nina Halpern's research has revealed that
several research centers were established under the State
Council during Zhao Ziyang's tenure as premier in the 1980's.
They include the following:66
The Economic Research Center
The Technical Economic Research Center (TERC)
The Price Research Center
The Economic Legislation Center
The Rural Development Research Center
The Center for International Studies
The National Research Center for Science & Technology
Development.
According to Halptrn's analysis, these research centers were
brought into being out of two factors: policy considerations
and power considerations. In terms of power considerations,
by sponsoring such centers and staffing them with researchers
who are sympathetic and enthusiastic toward his policy goals,
a Central leader can thus enlarge his own power base. With
regard to policy considerations, Halpern suggests that the
centers work to promote policy coordination in three ways:
1) by increasing the leadership's information on policy
externalities (through independent research and the pooling
of ministry-collected data and analysis, the organizing of
66. Nina P. Halpern, "Information Flows and Policy
Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy," in Kenneth G.
Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy. Politics,
and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, California: University
of California Press, 1992, pp. 130-131.
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interagency discussions of policy choices, and long-term
planning procedures) so that coordinated policies could be
formulated; 2) by shifting the balance of informational
authority between the leadership and the ministries (by
diminishing the latter's relative monopoly of expertise) so
that coordinated policies could be implemented; and 3) by
altering the environment of researchers and ministries so as
to produce both new capacity and new incentives for
coordinating behavior (causing the ministries either to take
account independently of the impact of their policy proposals
on other policy spheres or to reach accommodation through
bargaining with other units). 67
Our research reveals that although both the GO and the
research centers conduct policy research, there exists
observable division of labor between them. The GO is
typically responsible for handling information processing and
policy advising with regard to "short-range" issues, while
the research centers are responsible for conducting research
on "long-range" policy issues.6 8 The Chinese make a
distinction between "hot-line" issues and "cold-line" issues.
The former refer to the temporary tasks that are currently
being tackled by the leadership squad, and the latter refer
to those issues which are lasting or which have long-term
consequences but are only under consideration or debate at
present. 69 A typical example of the long-term research issues
taken up by a Central research center is "a thirteen-volume
report on 'China to the Year 2000' produced over a three-year
period under the overall.supervision of the TERC (later the
67. Ibid. pp. 146-147.
68. Personal interviews; Zheng Xinghan et al., AU
Outline of Mishu Work, pp. 76-77.
69. Ibid.
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ETSDRC). "70
General Office. Leadershin Suead. and LeadershiD Small Groups
The Chinese distinguish clearly, at least in theory,
between the -leadership squad (lingdao banzi) and the mishu
squad (mishu banzi) with regard to their respective roles in
policy making and implementation: only the former is entitled
to make decisions while the latter is to assist the decision
making process and monitor and supervise the decision
implementation.
Again, take the Central Committee for example. The
Central leadership squad comprises three types of leadership
bodies: the Politburo, the Secretariat, and some major
leadership small groups (.lingdao .iaozu). There is a great
deal of overlapping in terms of membership among the three.
For example, many Central leaders are concurrently members of
the Politburo and the Secretariat and heads or deputy heads
of one or more of the major leadership small groups.
The Politburo, the Secretariat, and the various
leadership small groups are all policy-making bodies, but
have different weights *of authoritativeness and different
scopes of competence. Composed of twenty to thirty full or
alternate members, the Politburo is "the leadership core and
the supreme policy-making body," 71 and is responsible for
70. Halpern, "Information Flows," p. 136.
71. According to the new Party constitution, Peoles
Daily, overseas edition, October 22, 1992, p. 2; Zhang Feng
et al., eds. The Contemporary Chinese Encyclopedia, p. 85.
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making major policies of wide-ranging and far-reaching
impact. However, the Politburo meets in plenary sessions only
three to five times every year.72 The Politburo has a
standing committee made up of about 5 to 7 members, who meet
only irregularly. During his interview with Doak Barnett,
then premier Zhao Ziyang admitted that the Politburo standing
committee did not hold regular meetings, and that the
Politburo itself "does not have regular meetings."7 3 The
Politburo "only holds meetings when there are some major
issues to be discussed." 74
The Secretariat meets more frequently -- about twice a
week.75 The Secretariat is composed of about ten members, who
are usually younger and more energetic than regular Politburo
members, and who are more often than not also on the
Politburo as full or alternate members. The Secretariat is
led by the General Secretary, who is without exception also a
member of the standing committee of Politburo. The
Secretariat is formally defined as "the working body of the
Politburo and its standing committee," in the new Party
Constitution. 7 6 In practice, the Secretariat is more
72. Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, p.
13.
73. Quoted from ibid. p. 10.
74. Quoted from ibid.
75. Zbid. p. 33.
76. Peodlels Daily, overseas edition, October 22, 1992,
p. 2.
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appropriately perceived as "the leadership organ (jinidao
iiogu) in charge of daily operation [of the Center].'.77 As
Zhao Ziyang explained, "The daily functioning of our
government machine (structure) rests with the Secretariat and
the State Council."7 8 As such, the Central Secretariat is
responsible for making decisions with regard to the overall
work of the Party and state (with a focus on the former), but
these decisions are of a more routine nature than those
reserved for the Politburo. Although in theory the
Secretariat is subordinate to the Politburo, the actual
allocation of power between the two has varied drastically
from time to time. At times, the Secretariat has been de
facto, if not de jure, the more powerful of the two. For
example, during the first*five years or so since the founding
of the Communist regime in 1949, the Central Secretariat,
consisting of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun,
and Zhu De, worked as the de facto standing committee of the
Politburo and thus represented the highest policy making body
in the country.7 9 When headed by Hu Yaobang, the Secretariat
wielded more decision-making power than the Politburo, which
was at the time peopled mostly by aging and frail elders. The
77. Zhang Feng et al., eds., The Contemporarv Chinese
EncycloDedia, p. 85.
78. Quoted from Barnett, The Makina of Foreian Policy,
p. 10.
79. Yan Huai, Understanding the Political System, pp.
19-20.
223
Politburo regained the upper hand, however, at the Thirteenth
Party Congress in 1987.80
Leadership small groups (LSG) are specialized decision-
making bodies in charge of specific policy areas or issues,
such as agriculture, industry, foreign affairs, education,
legal affairs, ideological work, united front work, etc.,
which typically straddle the jurisdictions of both the Party
and the government systems. 81 The actual membership of a LSG
is typically kept secret. According to our well-informed
interviewees, there are two types of LSGs. The first type may
be called "squad-level LSGs," in that they contain one or
even several members of the leadership squad. Take the
Central "squad-level" LGS for example in this regard. Such a
LGS is typically composed of one or more
Politburo/Secretariat members or key Central leaders, who
serve as its head and deputy head(s), as well as of leading
officials of relevant line departments, commissions, and
ministries. A typical example is provided by the Foreign
Affairs Leadership Small Group during the mid-1980s. Its head
was the then state president Li Xiannian, and its core
members included: Premier Zhao Ziyang; First Vice-Premier Wan
Li; State Councilor and former foreign minister, Ji Pengfei;
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian; Minister of Foreign Economic
80. Abid.; Carol Lee Hamrin, "The Party Leadership
System," in Lieberthal and Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy,
Politics, and Decision Makina, p. 121.
81. A detailed study of leadership small groups at the
Center is provided by Hamrin, ibid. pp. 95-124.
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Relations and Trade Chen Muhua; and head of the Party's
International Liaison Department. 82 Another example is the
current Agriculture LSG, which has Zhu Rongji, the senior
vice premier and a member of Politburo standing committee, as
its head, and Wen Jiabao, a member of the Central
Secretariat, and Chen Junsheng, a state councilor, as its
deputy heads. 83 A Central "squad-level" LGS is typically in
charge of coordinating several departments, ministries,
agencies or bureaus, which are involved in the issue area
under its jurisdiction. The Central LSGs do not have regular
schedule for meetings and meet about once a week or more
irregularly.84
The second type of LSGs may be called "departmental
level" LGS, in that they have a lesser status, which is
equivalent to a subordinate department or ministry under the
leadership squad. These LSGs are usually formed to deal with
specific issues or ad hoc tasks. Containing no members of the
82. Barnett, The Makina of Foreian Policy, p. 44.
Another example of the makeup of a Central "squad-
level" LSG is the current Central LSG for Taiwan Affairs.
Its head is the Party General Secretary and State President
Jiang Zemin; its deputy head, Foreign Minister and Vice
Premier Qian Qichen, a Politburo member. Other members
include the director of China's Taiwan Affairs Office Wang
Zhaoguo, and the nation's chief spy master, Minister of State
Security Jia Chunwang. Chinese News Diaest (e-mail network),
July 4, 1993; originally reported by Japan Economic Newswire,
July 3, 1993 (no page number given).
83. Gao Xin, "The Mystery Surrounding Wen Jiabao's Loss
of Power," pp. 72-73.
84. Personal interviews. Also see Barnett, The Makina of
Foreign Policy, p. 44.
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leadership squad, the lower-ranking LSGs consist of leading
officials of the subordinate departments or ministries. These
lesser-ranked LSGs are often subordinate to the more
comprehensive and more powerful "squad-level" LSGs. As Hamrin
observes: "Obvious examples are the Foreign Investment LG
[leadership group] and Electronics LG; directors of both were
also members of the Finance and Economics LG, responsible,
respectively, for foreign economic relations and for industry
and communications."8 5 Other likely lower-ranking LSGs in the
State Council are as follows:86
The LSG for Settling Demobilized Army Officers
The LSG for Fighting Counterfeit and Inferior Quality
Commodities
The LSG for Nation-Wide Sanitization of Books,
Magazines, and Audio/Video Tapes
The LSG for Coordinating Adaptations to Climatic
Changes
Although a lower-ranking LSG may be made up of leaders from
several departments or ministries, it is typically headed
( uashuai) by the leading official of one of the interested
units, and its staff assistance is primarily provided by the
GO of this host unit.
According to our interviews, the LSGs mostly do not
85. Hamrin, "The Party Leadership System," p. 120.
86. Gao Xin, "'Fei changshe jigou' yin weiji sifu er
changshe" ("'Temporary Organs' Turned into Permanent Ones
Amidst the Crisis Situation"), xinwen zivou daobao (Press
Freedom Guardian), No. 132 (June 11, 1993), p. 2.
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have permanent mishu squads, or staff offices, of their own,
but their staff support is provided primarily by the relevant
GOs.8 7 Our interviewee in the State Council GO explains:
For us, those major [squad-level] LSGs are just like the
State Council leadership squad .itself. They don't have their
GOs and we provide all the mishu services for them in terms
of processing information and providing advice, drafting,
editing, printing, and distributing their documents,
supervising the implementation of their decisions, and
organizing and servicing their meetings and conferences. when
it comes to those minor [departmental level] LSGs, we treat
them no differently from regular ministers. Their mishu
services are provided by the ministerial GOs concerned.
Constituting the Central leadership squad, the three
types of leadership bodies -- Politburo, the Central
Secretariat, and the Central "squad-level" LSGs -- have one
feature in common: they are composed basically of Central
leaders and that their members meet only at certain
intervals. During the time in between, Chinese leaders are
not supposed to contact each other in private too frequently.
A primary reason for this arrangement is that factionalism is
supposed to be an absolute taboo in Chinese elite politics,
as was analyzed in Chapter Four. In contrast, the Central
General Office is composed of staff members, who are
constantly in touch with each other, with the Central
leaders, and with the line departments and subordinate units
involved.
The Central GO is, technically, not a decision-making
body, but a "comprehensive" and "constant" "working body for
87. This is also Michel Oskenberg's understanding
(personal correspondence).
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the daily operation of the Central Committee."8 8 In practice,
the Central GO also makes decisions, but they are typically
"administrative decisions" dealing with very concrete and
detailed issues.
In the process of policy making, the role of the
Central GO and that of various leadership bodies are
different, too. The Central GO's role is typically confined
to collecting and processing information and formulation of
policy options, leaving final decisions up to the other three
organs. It is noteworthy that the 'squad-level" LSGs are
sometimes also referred to by the Chinese leaders themselves
as the "advisory bodies" for the Secretariat or the
Politburo 89 and that their decisions are often issued in the
name of the Secretariat of the Politburo rather than in their
own right. 90 But those leadership small groups may bring
finished policy packages to the conference table of the
Secretariat or the Politburo,91 whereas the Central GO is
supposed only to provide information and policy options for
88. Zhang Feng et al., eds. The Contemnorarv Chinese
Encyclonedia, p. 85;Xu Ruixin et al., eds., The Essentials,
p. 81.
89. Barnett, The Makina •o Forei n Policy, p. 44.
90. According to our interviewee, the 'squad-level"
leadership small groups also issue orders and instructions
directly to line departments and units from time to time, and
these decisions ahave to be obeyed and implemented."
91. In many cases, such policy packages are submitted
for pro forma confirmation, particularly if they deal with
technical or specialized issues.
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the political principals to choose from. Reality is, of
course, more complicated than is outlined here. In practice,
information, advice, and decision are inseparably
intertwined, and thus the GO's role in the decision process
may be in effect much more than just providing information
and options, as the findings presented in Chapter Three
regarding mishis' control role may suggest. 92
GO and Leaders' Personal Mishus
The Central document stipulates that only leaders above
a certain rank are entitled to have personal mishas and the
number of personal mishus allowed is in accordance with his
rank. For example, leaders with the ranks of vice minister,
minister, deputy governor, governor and their equivalents are
entitled to have one personal mishu; state councilors, vice
premiers, members of the Secretariat and their equivalents
are entitled to have two or a few more personal mishus; and
key national leaders, e.g., general secretary, premier,
chairman of the Central Military Affairs Commission, state
president, and so on are entitled to have their personal
mishu offices, which are simply named after the leaders they
serve. For example, Zhou Enlai's personal mishu office was
usually shortened as "zhou Ban (Zhou's Office)," Deng
92. It is not inconceivable that the Central GO may
take a strong position of its own on a certain policy issue,
as does the White House staff vis-a-vis an executive
department in American politics, though evidence is lacking
to prove that. This possibility was suggested by Harry
Harding and Michel Oksenberg in personal correspondence.
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Xiaoping's as "Dena Ban," Zhao Ziyang's as "zhaoaBan," and
so on and so forth. 93 According to the PRC materials we have
consulted, the number of mijhus in a personal office ranges
from five to over twenty in most cases. For example,
according to one source, the personal mishu office of Li
Xiannian, the later chairman of the National Consultative
Conference of Political Affairs, had 31 staff members; that
of Wang Zhen, the late vice state president, 41; that of Yang
Shangkun, former state president, has 32; that of Song
Renqiong, former vice chairman of the Central Advisory
Commission, 32; and that of Peng Zhen, former chairman of the
National People's Congress, only 8.94 It is noteworthy that
in additional to their regular staffs, Central leaders can
enlarge their personal miashu manpower almost at will simply
by "borrowing" people from elsewhere. At times, there can be
much more such detailees than regular staffers in a top
leader's personal mishu office, as was the case with Lin Ban
(Lin Biao's Office).95 A noteworthy new development is that
the personal mijsh offices fo,' younger top leaders, like
93. An outline of the Work of the Chinese Government, p.
213. Also see Jiang Zhifeng, Wanacai chu iina de Zhonananhai
gj (The Last Card of the Game of Zhonananhai), San
Francisco, CA: Minzhu zhongguo shulin chubanshe, 1990, p.
143.
94. Yue Shan, -ChenYun nai you tiaozhan Dena Xiaonina"
('The Chen Yun Faction Challenges Deng Xiaoping Once Again"),
Chbna Mina, January (1993), p. 18.
95. Zhang Yunsheng, The Evewitness Accounts, p. 21.
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Premier Li Peng and senior Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, are much
smaller in size, while they rely more upon collective mish•us
in the General Office for staff assistance.96 Altogether
there are reportedly more than 8,600 personal mishus working
in the Party Central Committee and the State Council. ý
It is noteworthy that Chinese leaders' personal mishus
organizationally belong to the general office of the
leadership squad.98 So they are under the "dual leadership"
of both the individual leaders whom they serve and the
general office, its mishu division (or bureau) in
particular.99 It is not uncommon for personal mishus to
concurrently hold key positions in the GOs.
Leaders with lower ranks are not, theoretically,
allowed to have personal .mishbs, but they are to be served
collectively by organizational mishus working in the general
offices. According to interviews, however, this stipulation
is often circumvented in practice. A lower-level leader can
simply designate a particular GO member to work exclusively
96. Personal interviews.
97. Yue Shan, "The Chen Yun Faction," p. 18.
98. The general office's authority over personal minhus
is reflected in the remark of Wu Shaozu, Minister of State
Commission for Physical Culture and Sports: "I have left
selecting and changing of my personal mia•s entirely to the
general office. I only let it know my general requirements
but never impose detailed specifications or interfere with
its decision." [(Shouzhang mishu gongzuo zongheng tan"
("Extensive Observations on the Work of Leaders' Personal
Maibus"), in The Remarks by Leadina Comrades on Mishu Work,
p. 112.]
99. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, pp. 133, 144.
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for him, thus turning him into his de facto, if not de jure,
personal mishu. This practice is said to be wide-spread at
the level of prefecture and municipality.
Personal mishus perform basically the same services to
individual leaders, namely, political/administrative services
and logistical/personal services as do the organizational
mish~us, only to a greater degree of thoroughness and
comprehensiveness. There are a huge variety of personal mighu
types to take care of virtually every need of leaders, as has
been discussed in Chapter Two. Following are the official
definitions of some of the most common types of personal
mishus and their responsibilities.100
ADMINISTRATIVE MLSHU. "An administrative misahu is
one of the most important assistants to the leader. His major
work is to assist in...administration and management, such as
keeping track of and summarizing information, handling
administrative affairs, organizing conferences, and drafting
documents and correspondence....An administrative mishu has
an extremely close working relationship with his leader and
the quality of his wor:k performance has direct impact on the
leadership work."
CONFIDENTIAL MIaUL. The major responsibilities of this
type of mishau include 1) "management of confidential
documents and fulfillment of other tasks assigned by the
100. The information about the following mishu types is
provided in Chen Hongbin et al., eds., A Concise Handbook,
pp. 130-133.
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leading comrade;" 2) "keeping the official seals and
letterheads of the danwei (work unit) and ensuring their
legitimate use;" and 3) "maintaining secrecy and
confidentiality."
PERSONAL LIFE MISHU. "A personal life mjah is to
take care of clothes, food, housing, transport, and other
needs of a leader...so that he can concentrate on leadership
work."
POLITICAL MLSHU. "A political miahu is a special
position designed to provide advice for high ranking leaders
in forming directives and making policy for important
political events." He is responsible for "keeping track of
developments of domestic affairs, providing timely and
reliable information, drafting speeches, and arranging the
schedule for a leader's daily activities."
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MISHL . He or she is "to provide
advice for high ranking leaders in foreign affairs
activities, to collect and summarize the information about
the important events that have happened during the day or
recently and about their background, and to explain the
measures that have been taken to cope with them. They are
also responsible for arranging meetings and handling various
affairs in international activities."
SECURITY MISHu. It is "an extremely important
position specially designed to absolutely ensure the safety
of a high ranking leader. He must accompany closely the
leader whenever he goes out....A security mishu must possess
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not only a high sense of duty but also the courage and
readiness to sacrifice himself."
WRITING MISHU. His responsibilities are "to manage
documents, to initiate, revise, and finalize a document, and
to draft important speeches and directives for a leader."
However, a writing mishu's realm of duty also includes 1)
"running errands assigned by a leader on a regular basis and
going out to implement a plan on the leader's behalf;" 2)
"passing directives downward and getting feedback from
below;" and 3) "providing advice" and "suggesting options"
for the leader to choose from.
It is significant to note that for all the nominal
classification, personal mishus are supposed to be
generalists performing multiple functions, so as to take care
of miscellaneous personal needs of the leaders whom they
serve, as was explained in an earlier chapter.
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Summary
This chapter describes the formal structures and
functions of the Chinese mishu system. The system consists of
two categories of mishu personnel: 1) organizational mishus
who work in general offices and serve and assist leadership
squads at various levels collectively; and 2) personal mishu,
who, organizationally belonging to the general offices,
provide services and assistance to individual leaders
directly. Chinese mishus, both organizational and personal,
provide two basic types of staff support to political
leaders: 1) policy/administrative services; and 2)
logistics/personal services. Efforts are also made to clarify
the relationships between general offices and other key
organs and actors. In order to help the reader better
understand the organization of the Chinese mishu system, case
analyses are conducted of the Central Committee General
Office and the State Council General Office.
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ALpendix A: The Functions af a Provincial Party Committee General
1) To draft, edit, and censor documents of the provincial
Party committee (hereafter, PPC); to receive, distribute, and process
(i•anm) incoming documents and urge for timely fulfillment of the tasks
stipulated in them; to print or reprint, and distribute documents of
the Center or the PPC; to manage, circulate, and sift documents for the
leading comrades of PPC; to maintain confidentiality of documents and
ensure their safe; to classify and file documents; to keep and manage
the official seals; and to draft or help draft work reports and
speeches for chief leading comrades of PPC.
2) To organize, arrange, and service plenary PPC conferences,
conferences of the PPC standing committee, executive meetings of the
PPC standing committee, and other conferences convened by the PPC; to
arrange and service official or social activities of the PPC leaders;
and to edit the minutes of conferences and executive meetings of the
PPC standing committee.
3) To be responsible for passing down the instructions and
opinions of the PPR leading comrades and supervising their
implementation; to assist the PPC leaders in coordination with their
superiors, subordinates, and equals; to supervise the implementation of
the decisions and instructions made by the PPC leaders and urge for
timely fulfillment of them; and to investigate and handle cases
assigned by Central or PPC leaders.
101. Translated from An Outline of the Oraanization and
Eunctions, p. 5.
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4) To collect and process information and feedback about
majors tasks in various periods of time; and to report thi information
to the PPC and the Center in a prompt and timely manner, and suggest
work plans accordingly.
5) To be responsible for receiving and dispatching
correspondence for the PPC organs; to be responsible for managing or
handling codes, telegrams, enciphering telephones, and confidential
correspondence for the departments directly under the PPC.
6) To be responsible for organizing and directing the work of
handling letters and visitors from the masses across the province and
for handling letters and visitors from the public to the PPC.
7) To be responsible for providing guidance for mishu work,
confidentiality-maintaining work, and the work of handling letters and
visitors from the masses across the province, and for training workers
in these fields.
8) To be responsible for receiving and accommodating leading
comrades and senior comrades (lao tonazhi, meaning retired senior
cadres) from the Center and other provinces and municipalities.
9) .To be responsible for handling administrative affairs,
which includes construction and maintenance of buildings, installation
and service of electronic equipment, needs of personal livelihood,
planting of trees and grasses, management of motor vehicles,
procurement and supply of various materials, financial management,
health care, etc.; and to look after personal life of the current and
retired leading comrades of the PPR and other provincial departments.
10) To ensure and maintain safety, security, and orderliness of
the PPC and its departments.
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11) To conduct work in ideological and political affairs,
management of cadres and ordinary workers, and political education of
Party members, and discipline inspection, within the GO itself.
12) To carry out other ad hoc tasks assigned by the leading
comrades of the PPC.
APPendix B: The Functions of a Provincial Government General Office 1 02
1) To be fully acquainted of the guidelines and policies laid
down by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (hereafter,
CCPCC), the State Council (hereafter, SC), the Provincial Party
Committee (hereafter, PPC), and the Provincial Government (hereafter
PG); to be fully informed of the work plans of these leadership organs
and the progress in their implementation; to be fully informed of the
major tasks and the progress of their implementation in all the
prefectures and departments under the jurisdiction of the PG; and to
report the major information in those regards to the PG in a timely
manner.
2) To assist the responsible comrades of the PG in their daily
routine work, and to conduct coordination among the prefectures and
among the departments.
3) To handle assignments from the SC and the PPC and the reports
from the departments under the jurisdiction of the PG; to draft,
process, classify, print, distribute, and circulate geeral documents,
telegrams, and conference reports of the PG.
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102. AIb. p. 15.
4) To organize Party leading group meetings, administrative
meetings, and plenary meetings of the PG and small conferences
sponsored by the responsible comrades of the PG; to take notes and
write the minutes for the meetings and conferences; to press for timely
implementation of the decisions made in these conferences; organize and
arrange major activities of the PG; and to process applications for
convening conferences submitted by the provincial departments.
5) To receive, dispatch, print, distribute, return, circulate,
file, and classify documents and telegrams; to keep and manage the
official seals; to maintain security and confidentiality; and to
collect, manage, and provide books and materials.
6) To handle the suggestions, criticisms, and comments made by
representative of the National People's Congress (hereafter, NPC) and
the Provincial People's Congress (hereafter, PP Congress) or by the
members of the standing committee of the PP Congress concerning the
work of the PG; and to handle the motions submitted to the PG by the
National Consultative Conference of Political Affairs (hereafter,
NCCPA) or by the Provincial Consultative Conference of Political
Affairs.
7) To keep track of the movements of the leaders of the PG and
PG GO; and to arrange the major activities of the leaders.
8) To conduct research, investigation, analysis, and
summarization in order make policy suggestions to the PG and assist in
policy making in accordance with the strategic blueprint of the Center
and with the current focal task of the PPC and the PG.
9) To collect and process information and materials from various
channels concerning major economic activities, reforms, and problems,
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and provide them to the provincial leaders.
10) To handle letters and visits to the PG or its leaders from
the masses, from compatriots of Hongkong, Macao, and Taiwan, and from
foreigners; and to handle the issues reflected in such letters and
visits, which are forwarded from the CCPCC, the SC, the NPP, and the
NCCPA.
11) To study and make local economic laws and regulations, and
supervise the drafting of such laws and regulations by other related
departments, if necessary.
12) To receive and accommodate persons coming on official
business from governmental organs of various provinces, prefectures,
cities, counties, and the Central government.
13) To take charge of the management of administrative affairs,
security, and orderliness of the compound where the PG is located.
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Chapter Six
HISTORICAL ROOTS
After surveying the structures, functions, and dynamics of
the mishu system of today, this chapter shifts to a
comparison between the mishu system with its historical
predecessors, in order to further enrich our understanding of
the mishu phenomenon in terms of continuities and changes
from a longer historical perspective.
China has the longest history of bureaucratic
administration in the world, and it has been a long tradition
for political leaders of various times to depend on their
personal staffs to help control their formal subordinates.
Michel Oksenberg points out in personal correspondence:
...the General Office and miahu are not new phenomena on the
Chinese bureaucratic landscape.....The endemic problems that
any Chinese ruler faces -- no matter at what level -- are
coordination, securing information or acquiring intelligence,
and monitoring and control. The leader must surround himself
with [staff] people loyal to him, lest he become a captive of
those he seeks to lead. This is the classic problem of the
inner versus outer court.
Oksenberg further suggests that the Grand Council' at
the center and the muau institution in the provinces during
the Qing dynasty can be regarded, in a sense, as precursors
1. The best study of the Grand Council institution in
English literature is no doubt Beatrice S. Bartlett, Manarghs
and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ina China. 1723-
1820, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, which
provides most of the information for the subsequent
discussion of its practice.
241
to the mishu system of today.2 Accordingly, the historical
comparison in this chapter is primarily between the mishu in
contemporary Chinese politics and those two staff systems of
the Qing dynasty, although the conclusions thus drawn should
have broader relevance for other historical times.
The Mufu System at the Regional Levels
Mufu, literally meaning "tent government, "3 referred to
a privately hired staff working for an official at the
provincial or county level. A member of a mufu was usually
called muvou (tent friend).4 Like their modern-day successors,
there was a variety of muvou to assist a host official in the
various aspects of his work. The following were the common
types.5
THE LEGAL MUYOU. He was responsible for all cases
involving "fighting, fraud, marriage, disputes over
2. The best study of the mu.u system is probably Kenneth
E. Folsom, Friends. Guests. and Colleaoues: The Mu-Fu System
in the Late Ch'ina Period, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1968. The information about the mufu system for this
comparison is largely derived from this book.
3. The same two characters are used by the Japanese for
the term abakufuo to refer to the military government of the
Shogun. The principal difference between the Japanese and the
Chinese usages was that the former was a military staff
serving the central government, while the latter could be a
civilian or military staff working for provincial-level
governors or generals. (ihid. fn. 1, p. 33.)
4. A mulu staffer could also be called au in or muk&
(tent guests), or muliao (tent colleagues).
5. The following discussion is based on Folsom, iends
Guests. and Colleaaues, pp. 50-52.
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graveyards or the designation of an heir, and other cases in
which family members were involved," as well as more serious
ones involving homicide and larceny. It was the duty of this
muayo to receive the initial complaint, study the case
carefully, and write up for the official's approval a
rescript, in which he explained whether or not the complaint
would be accepted for trial. If the case was accepted, then
the legal muvou was responsible for setting the dates of the
hearing, advising the official before and after the hearings,
and preparing a detailed report to be sent to the superior
officials for review and approval, if the case involved penal
servitude, banishment, or death.
TAXATION MUYOU. He was responsible for determining the
total amount of taxes required from the area of jurisdiction,
keeping track of what taxes had been paid, and in general
supervising their collection. In addition he had jurisdiction
over cases involving disputes over property, loans, and
business transactions. He was also responsible for
expenditures and the delivery of government funds.
Since the primary functions of the traditional
government were just to keep order and collect revenues and
taxes, "the most important muvou were the legal mvy u and
taxation muvu.06 In addition to these two major mvag types,
there were some other minor ones, which are as follows.
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6.* Zhij g. 50.
CORREPONDENCE MUYOU. He was responsible for preparing
draft letters for the official's approval and for either
copying or supervising the copying of the letters in their
final form.
REGISTRATION MUYOU. His duty was to register all
incoming and outgoing documents, official notices, and
warrants, and keep a check on the status of each document.
BLACK-BRUSH MUYOU. His duty was to copy in black the
documents and rescripts prepared by the legal and taxation
RED-BRUSH MUQYO. He used red brushes to write the key
words and add the red signs and flourishes to documents.
BOOKKEEPING ELUYOU. He handled the actual receipt and
disbursement of cash and kept track of gifts sent and
received, of fees paid to gate porters of superior amen
(government compound), and of various expenses involved in
entertaining visiting officials.
LITERARY MUYOU.. He was responsible for drafting
memorials to the throne and other major documents.
In the late Qing period when the Western civilization
penetrated the Chinese society, the scope of government was
expanded. As a result, some new muy= types were added to a
provincial level mufu, such as education mUy.gh, military
affairs muva, and foreign affairs muvou.~
7. Pao Chao Hsieh, The Government of China. 1644-1911,
New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966, pp. 297-298.
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Like a mishu of today, a muvou was expected to handle
multiple responsibilities in spite of the nominal
classification. Therefore, "The mu.Qu, in addition to his
regular duties, would also assist the host official in any
one or all of his multifarious duties, such as suppressing
pirates, administering disaster relief and water transport,
and reading the preliminary examination papers which a
magistrate set before candidates for the provincial
examinations. "8
As is universally the case with staffs, a major function
of a mufu was to help the host official to control his formal
subordinates or bureaucrats. The leader-staff-bureaucrat
nexus was played out in the provincial politics of imperial
China in the form of official-muLyo.-u-clerk triangle
relationship. The officials were mostly Confucianist scholars
(shi), and as such they were generalists or amateurs in
government,9 with their training for government service
consisting primarily of literary knowledge and style as well
as Confucianist morality. Nevertheless, scholar-officials
were generally regarded as moral exemplars, enjoyed greater
social respectability, and were placed in the leadership
position over the clerks. The clerks (li) "were the experts
in government who had learned their trade through practical
experience." 0o For one reason or another, the clerks did not
8. Folsom, Friends. Guests. and C1lleaauea, p. 52.
9. =id. p. 39.
10. I='. p. 38.
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have a chance to pass the civil service examinations, and so
had a lower social status. But they managed to make their
service indispensable and accumulate a great amount of de
facto power by becoming specialists in one skill or another
in handling legal affairs, taxation, bookkeeping, commerce,
modern weaponry, and foreign affairs.
In imperial China, government politics was plagued by
"the perennial conflict between scholar-officials on the one
hand and clerks with practical knowledge on the other.-"' On
the strength of their superior practical knowledge, clerks
presented a serious problem of uncontrollability, as is
stated:
Everywhere the Confucian civil official found himself
surrounded by these clerks and dependent on their knowledge
of the region he governed and the technical problems of his
administration.....the clerks were often in a position to
sabotage an official's policies and blackmail the people.12
Moreover, the control problem also arose from the fact
that scholar-officials were "temporaries" and outsiders, who
were shifted from post to post periodically, but clerks were
local people who stayed on as "permanents." In this regard,
the basic features of the clerks were as follows:
They were recruited locally and thus spoke the local dialect.
Their families, relatives, and friends had lived in the area
for generations and had built up a network of connections and
vested interests which were the spawning grounds for
11. Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese
Conservatism: The T'una-Chih Restoration. 1862-1874,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957, p. 92.
12. Ibid. p. 93.
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corruption in matters related to taxation, labor services,
and lawsuits.,"
In contrast:
The officials were not familiar with the files and the local
situation, and usually did not speak the local dialect. In
addition they often had little or no connection with the
local people.....Under the "Laws of Avoidance," the officials
were normally shifted every three years, but the clerks
stayed on in the local Yamen [government compound].14
The muifu personnel shared some features with both
categories but were different from them in other aspects.
Like the clerks, they were experts and professionals in one
skill or another, but unlike the clerks they were temporaries
and outsiders hired privately by the scholar-officials and
were personally loyal to them. As a result, the muui's
assistance was indispensable for the scholar-officials in
controlling the clerks. For instance:
One of the chief functions of all muvou was to supervise the
clerks and to try to prevent their corrupt practices. Since
the clerks received no salary and were in charge of the
files, it was only natural that they would not be above
changing a document, dropping someone's name from a tax list,
marking someone's taxes paid, and the like in return for a
monetary consideration. The muvQu were experts in their
fields and were much more aware of the ingenuity and
multiplicity of clerical manipulations than the officials and
were, therefore, in a better position to control them. s1
If the mufu system played as great a role as the mishu
system of today in amplifying political leaders' control over
their subordinates, then the cushioning/integrating role
13. Folsom, Friends. Guests. and Colleaaues, p. 45.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. p. 52.
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played by the mufu system was much weaker. The muifu tended to
create or intensify tensions rather than soften and mitigate
conflicts and clashes. This results from the following
structural differences:
* Mishus mostly serve a leadership squad collectively whereas
muy.Qs served only one individual official privately.
* Mishus belong to a separate unified subsystem running
vertically and horizontally throughout the country, whereas
a muifu was a privately hired staff without any
organizational affiliation with any other organs or
offices.
* Mishus and a.uks have different career paths. Mishus are
groomed for becoming political leaders whereas muyous were
mostly to remain outside of formal officialdom.
Because of the above structural determinants, the muvou
tended to behave in such a way as to aggravate the tensions
and conflicts between an official and his superior,
colleagues, and subordinates rather than play the role of
cushion, and reconciliator, and moderator.
For instance, as a privately hired assistant serving one
single master, a anyn tended to create troubles with the
other government workers. When an official arrived in a new
post, the first thing his taxation muvjn was supposed to do
was "checking all the tax records and determining how much
had been embezzled by his predecessor or other vamen
personnel."16 It does not take much imagination to understand
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16. Ibid." p. 51.
the immediate unpopularity the muvou would incur onto
himself.
Furthermore, in order to sustain this built-in mutual
suspicion and hostility between the mufu and the local
clerks, "the muvou were supposed to remain within the yamen
[government compound] and within their quarters as much as
possible. These restrictions on their movements were to keep
them from creating a network of local alliances that could be
used for corrupt purposes."'7
The mishu institution of today is a unified system
running throughout the country and working to strengthen
centralized control and coordination. In contrast, the mufu
were privately hired staffs, which operated separately from
one another and independently of the central government.
Therefore, "their [muvous'] primary loyalty was to the
officials who paid their salaries, and their primary purpose
was to protect the officials from the [central]
government.....'18 Thus, the mufJ system worked in effect as "a
greater corrosive of central authority."19
As a result, the imperial central government always had
an attitude of uneasiness and suspicion toward the mufu
system, fearing it "as an added source of depredationw20 and
17. ibid. p. 53.
18. Ibid. p. 56.
19. Ibid. p. 151.
20. Ibid. p. 56.
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regarding it more or less as a necessary evil to be tolerated
and yet to be guarded against. The central government's
ambivalence was best illustrated by a decree of the Qianlong
Emperor of the Qing dynasty:
Because the provincial officials' affairs are very heavy,
they cannot help but invite some mubin [tent guests] to help
them manage. But the mubin are not consistently virtuous.
Therefore it is easy for corrupt practices to arise.21
The top rulers' suspicions against the mufu practice was not
unfounded, since evidence was not lacking to indicate that,
"Incapable and ignorant governors left the whole
administration to them [muyoaus]. Wicked ones used them as
instruments of corruption."22
Although the national government of China today regards
the mishu system as a centripetal, integrative force, the
center of the imperial times tended to treat the mufu system
as a centrifugal force working to undermine the central
control. As a result, the Central leadership of today seeks
to strengthen the role of the mishu system, but the imperial
government tried various measures to restrain the role of the
mufu practice.
If the Center today makes great efforts to encourage and
strengthen the connection, vertical and horizontal, among
mishu personnel themselves and between miahus and other
institutions and actors across the country, then the imperial
21. =bid. p. 53.
22. Pao.Chao Hsieh, The Government of China, p. 298.
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central government tried various measures to restrain muvous'
relations not only with their host officials, with the amn
clerks, but also with the muvous in other localities. For
example:
No official was permitted to hire members of his family, his
relatives, or his friends as muvou. No person who came from
the province to which the official was assigned, or from the
neighboring province within a distance of 500 Ii, was allowed
to be hired as a amuvu, nor were the mu~u. permitted to
follow the host official from an old post to a new one;
moreover, anyone who had been in a mufu for five years had to
be replaced, and a newly appointed official was not allowed
to take over a muY of his predecessor.... The officirls
were not permitted to recommend mruv. to their subordinate
officials, or to allow members of their family to recommend
MUVOU. 23
Moreover, various special precautions were taken to
limit the contact of the msvus with the local populace and
prevent them from creating alliances with it, as has been
mentioned earlier. They were barred from marrying people from
the local area, from setting up private businesses, from
giving friends and other officials privileged information,
and in general from becoming too friendly with the local
populace. An imperial decree explained:
The mSayu's friendliness causes corruption, and this is the
beginning of injury to the government, so we must find ways
to clear it up and severely prohibit it.24
Another reason for the conflict-prone behavior pattern
of the mufu personnel was that they followed a different
career path from scholar-officials. Muyas mostly did not
23. Folsom, Friends. Guests. and Colleaaues, pp. 53-54.
24. Z* . p. 54.
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become officials and were actually forbidden to do so.2-
Therefore, muv~us' primary ambitions were not to become
officials or be promoted to higher ranks, but instead to gain
recognition of, and respect to, their skills and talent and
get greater access to material. benefits. 26 Thanks to the fact
that they were specialists in important skills and so their
services and assistance were indispensable, muy.vas enjoyed
great de facto respect for all that their social status was
generally perceived as lower than that of Confucianist
scholar-officials. For example:
When the muvau was hired,...he was referred to as *1anfuzi"
(old master), a term of respect conventionally used for
teachers....Colloquially, the mumju were referred to as shiye
(teacher-master), and it was the host who humbled himself to
receive their instructions. It was not an uncommon occurrence
for the host to go to the rooms of the muvru to seek their
advice and teaching.27
Moreover, although nuy6us were hired privately by the host
official and were paid out of his own pocket, they were paid
25. This interdiction was largely abandoned in practice
during the late Qing period, when many gmuous of important
leaders like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang were appointed to
be high-ranking officials, because of their much-needed
skills or talent in coping with the national crisis.
26. It is noteworthy that although mishus of today
desire the same things, their different career path inclines
them to defer immediate gratification for the benefit of
future promotions and other rewards, whereas such incentives
were much weaker for muvos.
27. Folsom, Friends. Guests. and Colleaaues, pp. 48-49.
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very generously and handsomely. Their salaries were almost as
high as the host officials'.28
Consequently, muvous refused to become officials even
when the central government once attempted to incorporate the
mufu system into the official bureaucratic structure. The
center proposed that:
Muvou who had been working for a governor-general or a
governor would be assigned to the 7th rank; those who had
worked for a provincial treasurer or judge, the 8th rank; and
those who had worked in a f., zhou, or &xin, the 9th rank.29
ous resisted the implementation of this plan because they
felt that "the ranks assigned would have degraded the
position of the amuou in relation to the host official, and
the M~uyM would have suffered a sizable loss of salary.w"3
Since maJy.s were not motivated primarily to seek higher
official ranks, they did not feel it particularly necessary
to cultivate good relationships with superior officials or
the central rulers. This inclined them to try their best to
advance their employing official's interest at the cost of
those of higher authorities.
The Concat of Inner Court at the Central Government
In the central government of the Qing dynasty, the
leadership-staff-bureaucracy model was incarnated in the
28. ihid. p. 50.
29. Ibid. p. 56.
30.
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triangle interaction.among the emperor, the inner court, and
the outer court. The outer court consisted of regular
bureaucracies, such as the six boards (ljiubu) (e.g.,
personnel, revenue, war, rites, justice, and works),
Censorate, and Grand Secretariat.3 1 Although in theory the
emperor held absolute authority over them, these
bureaucracies frequently proved in practice highly
recalcitrant and resistant to the emperor's personal control.
In addition to omnipresent self-seeking misconduct of
individuals, the very logic of bureaucratic politics was
always at play to prevent the outer-court bureaucrats as
institutional players from being truly responsive to the
emperor's personal desire. As Bartlett explains:
The outer-court agencies of the government were set up under
the administrative code and generally ran according to its
statutes and precedents.... [As a result,] (t)he outer-court
government thus ran more by a combination of law and
consensus than by the imposition of raw imperial power, even
though the rhetoric of governing always strongly implied that
such power existed.32
Not surprisingly, the outer-court bureaucrats tended to
uphold meticulous observation of precedents, rituals, routine
procedures, and written regulations and statutes, down to
"minute and sometimes exasperating detail,"3 3 in order to
preserve or enlarge their power and protect themselves
against the vagaries and arbitrary interventions of the
31. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, pp. 18-19.
32. Ibid. p. 6.
33. Ibid. p. 29.
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emperor. And the best strategy for them to thwart the
emperor's any new policy that might harm their bureaucratic
interests was "to call on other precedents to dismiss one of
his [emperor's] cherished proposals' or even to 'manufacture
a precedent from any imperially authorized government
action." Moreover, relying on their greater familiarity with
administrative knowledge, details, and expertise, the outer-
court bureaucrats were never short of means 'to run the gamut
of obstructionism at both the central and the provincial
government levels" in the process of implementation "once an
approved proposal was returned to the outer court."34
In contrast, as members of the inner court 'the imperial
assistants and staffs were regarded as the emperor's own men:
his to appoint, his to command." As a result, '(i)n the inner
court no statutes could be summoned to confound the monarch's
desire. The sovereign's will was law."35 Thus, the inner
court was much more responsive or sensitive to the emperor's
personal wishes and needs.
In the Qing dynasty the so-called inner court was
composed, roughly speaking, of two staff bodies -- the Grand
Council and palace eunuchs. Both Grand Councilors and eunuchs
resided or worked within the walls of the imperial palace, as
in contrast to the outer-court bureaucrats whose offices were
located outside of the Forbidden City. The physical proximity
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34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. p. 6.
was no doubt an important factor contributing to the inner
court's greater personal loyalty and reliability than the
outer court.
The Grand Council (iunii .chu, literally "military
affairs division") was first set up to handle affairs related
to military affairs, such as strategic planning, logistical
supplies, and rebel suppressions, but it soon became a
personal staff office entrusted with "the all-embracing duty
of giving general assistance to the emperor on [both]
important military and political affairs." 36
Like a mishu squad of today, the Grand Council was
characterized by diffusiveness of role, a characteristics
which was personally beneficial and convenient to the
emperor. Like a general office in contemporary Chinese
politics, the Grand Council's wide scope of responsibilities
included both political/administrative matters and
logistical/personal life support, such as: 'Military
planning, financial control, command of the imperial
bodyguard divisions, work in irrigation projects and in
matters great and small that were connected with the imperial
family and the entire imperial household...., 37 The Grand
Council's diffusive role in handling #matters great and
small" can be glimpsed at in the following episode:
36. Pao Chao Hsieh, The Government of China, p. 79.
37. Silas H.L. Wu, Communication and Imgerial Control in
China: Evolution of the Palace Memorial System. 1693-1735,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 90.
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In that year [1784], at the age of seventy-three, Qianlong
achieved the ideal of five living generations in the male
line when he became a great-great-grandfather for the first
time. The councilors were ordered to find out how many other
similarly blessed great-great-grandfathers were living in the
celestial empire. Their investigation (limited to members of
the gentry class) ranged over all the provinces of China
proper and turned up twenty-seven men in their seventies,
ninety-nine in their eighties, sixty-two in their nineties,
and four over the age of one hundred. The council presented
its findings to the emperor in a listing tabulated by
province, and the individuals were celebrated for their
achievements.38
Of course, the Grand Council's routine work concerned
matters of a far more serious nature. In helping control the
outer-court bureaucracy, the Grand Council played a primary
role in amplifying the throne's information-processing and
decision-making capacities. The Grand Councilors read almost
all incoming information to the throne, conducted
deliberations, offered advice, and drafted imperial
instructions. Significantly, the Grand Council had a large
part to play in operating the palace memorial system, a
confidential internal communications network, which is
generally regarded as a mainstay that sustained the imperial
authority over the far-flung empire throughout the Qing
dynasty.
Under the palace memorial (zhouzhe) system, the emperor
hand-picked one or only a few people in each of the local
governments and the central departments, whom he could trust
personally, and authorized them to write secret reports
directly to him from time to time. The information passed
38. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, p. 190.
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upward through this channel concerned a wide scope of
matters, ranging from administrative irregularities, corrupt
behavior, social unrests, local food prices, harvest
prospects, and weather conditions. 39
The memorials were carefully sealed, delivered by
special personal messengers, and allowed, theoretically, to
be opened and read only by the emperor himself in order to
guarantee the absolute confidentiality of their content.
Then, the emperor would write his replies in vermilion, a
color reserved for imperial use, directly on the margins of
the memorials, which were sent back so that the memorialists
would read his sovereign's responses. In practice, however,
almost all incoming palace memorials were in fact first read
by the Grand Councilors, who then suggested proper responses,
to the extent that on occasion the emperor just copied their
recommendations word for word into his rescripts. 40
The Grand Council and the palace memorial system made it
possible for the throne to draw a much wider scope of affairs
under its direct supervision and direction. The effectiveness
of the Grand Council institution for sustaining imperial
control over the bureaucracy is generally recognized by
historians. The Grand Council institution is regarded as
being largely responsible for enabling the Qing government to
39. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, p. 50.
40. Zbid.. pp. 101, 184.
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"run effectively whether or not a strong monarch prevailed in
Peking" and even when the empire was reigned by 'debilitated
and infant emperors."41 Eventually the Grand Council and the
palace memorial system became the primary safeguards that
sustained a measure of effectiveness of the central
authority, under repeated blows of international humiliations
and internal unrests, for 'a long time before the spokes
[local governments] were finally torn from the shaft [the
center] and the umbrella shredded in the wind.*42
Effective as its control function was, the Grand Council
often worked as a major source of conflict in the emperor-
staff-bureaucracy interactions, due to some determinants in
terms of structural arrangement and career pattern. For one
thing, the Grand Councilors were hand-picked by the emperor
and was accountable exclusively to him. For another thing,
their career pattern provided them with few incentives to
carefully cultivate good personal relationships with other
officials. Unlike the mishus of today who are mostly young,
with low ranks and little seniority, but anxious to climb
higher on the ladder of officialdom, the Grand Councilors
were typically already at the apex of the civil service
system, holding the highest official ranks and, in most
cases, occupying concurrent top positions in the outer court
bureaucracy.4 3 In order to demonstrate their loyalty and
41. Ibid. p. 278.
42. Wu, Communication and Imnerial control, p. 123.
43. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, pp. 178, 186.
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reliability to the throne and to avoid 'the slightest
appearance of any questionable involvement," they tended to
behave in a rude manner toward regular outer-court
bureaucrats, who were mostly their inferiors anyway. It was
not an uncommon occurrence that ordinary officials' gifts
'were unceremoniously rejected" or their visits insultingly
refused.44
As a result, there existed a condition of perpetual
tension, confrontation, and power struggle between the Grand
Council and the outer court. The outer-court bureaucrats
often perceived the Grand Council as pursuing 'relentless
aggrandizement of power" "at.the expense of the outer-court
agencies" and thus disrupting the traditional 'checks and
balances" between the two courts.45 As a result, they
"petitioned again and again for the curtailment of the
Council's power."46
At times such confrontation flared up to murderous
intensity. For example, He Shen, the long-time powerful
ranking Grand Councilor during the Qianlong and Jiaqing
reigns, was a notorious victim to this rivalry. He was
accused of harboring imperial ambitions for, allegedly,
possessing 'two hundred pearl bracelets hidden in his
residence -- 'several times as many as those possessed by the
44. bid.
45. bid. pp. 190, 239. 253.
46. Pao Chao Hsieh, The Government of China, p. 85.
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imperial palace' -- with one extremely large pearl 'even
larger than that worn by the emperor himself. ''47 The most
devastating piece of evidence collected by the outer-court
officials against him was perhaps that he allegedly "had
possessed a string of pearls of imperial style: at night when
he thought 'no one was around,' he would take them out and
'walk to and fro in front of a mirror, laughing and talking
to his reflection (as if perceiving a monarch in what he saw
reflected).'" 48 The intensity of the mutual hostility between
the Grand Council and the outer-court bureaucracy was amply
demonstrated in the latter's recommended punishment for He
Shen after his downfall -- death by slow-slicing.49
The inner court also included another important staff
institution -- the palace eunuch system.50 Although the palace
eunuchs' responsibilities usually centered around the
logistics/personal life support for the imperial household,
it was by no means uncommon for them to assume critical roles
in controlling the outer-court bureaucracy and even the Grand
Council at times.
47. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, p. 234.
48. Zbid.
49. .hid. p. 239.
50. The information about the traditional Chinese palace
eunuch system is based on Mary M. Anderson, Hidden Power! The
Palace Eunuchs of Imperial China, Buffalo, New York:
Prometheus Books, 1990.
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Significantly, like muyous in the provinces, eunuchs
served only one single master -- the emperor; they did not
form a national system; and they were forbidden to enter
officialdom. Consequently, the political function that the
palace eunuchs performed was more that of controlling than
that of cushioning and smoothening.
In order to help amplify the emperor's control over the
state bureaucracy, palace eunuchs were frequently sent out as
the emperor' personal representatives or "imperial
supervisors," armed with imperial seals and special
detachments of troops, to collect taxes, spy on and oversee
field army commanders and outlying governors. They were at
times authorized to be in charge of the palace guards and
parts of the military, operate the secrete police, run their
separate prisons, and investigate and impeach government
officials.
As a result, like the mufu and the Grand Council, the
palace eunuch system tended to be a major source of tensions
and conflicts within the Qing bureaucratic system, and there
existed a perpetual rivalry, deadly at times, between
politically active eunuchs on the one side and ministers,
generals, and governors on the other throughout China's
imperial history.
The mishu system can trace its historical roots to the
staff practice in the Qing dynasty, which consisted of the
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mufu system in the localities and the inner court (e.g., the
Grand Council and the palace eunuchs) at the center. The Qing
rulers both at the central and regional levels encountered
various difficulties in controlling their bureaucratic or
organizational subordinates, who usually enjoyed the
advantage of being more knowledgeable about procedural
details, technical skills, special expertise, and/or local
conditions. As is the case with the mishu practice, the Qing
staffs played a crucial part in strengthening their leaders'
control capability over their subordinates. In contrast with
their successor of today, however, both the mufu and the
inner court tended to focus their efforts primarily on the
role of controlling at the cost of the function of cushioning
and reconciling. Some factors in structural arrangements and
career patterns were found particularly salient in limiting
the cushioning/integrating role of the Qing staff personnel.
Unlike mishus who serve multiple masters all wielding some
clout over their career advancement, the muvous, the Grand
Councilors, and the palace eunuchs attended to the needs of
only one master, who solely wielded the power of reward and
punishment over them. In contrast to the unified national
organizational framework of the mishu system, the Qing staffs
were isolated units without formal institutional lies with
their counterparts or other government organs elsewhere. If
mishus are young, junior people but are being groomed for
fast upward mobility within the officialdom, their Qing
counterparts were older in age, and were either forbidden to
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enter formal officialdom (as in the case of maMy.s and palace
eunuchs) or already comfortably perched at the highest
echelon of the bureaucratic hierarchy (as in the case of the
Grand Councilors). Either way, the Qing staff personnel found
little necessity or incentive to go out of their way to
cautiously and patiently forge long-term goodwill and
friendships with other officials or institutions than their
own masters. Rather, they often felt it necessary to act
rudely and insensitively toward others or to actively promote
the interests of their own masters at the expense of other
officials, in order to convince or reassure their masters of
their loyalty and reliability. As a result of all these, the
Qing staffs did not serve as a major mechanism for mediating,
softening, and reconciling. intra-elite conflicts and clashes
or for integrating the bureaucratic structure on a nation-
wide scale, as the minhu institution does in China today.
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Chapter Seven
COMPARISON WITH THE US STAFF SYSTEM
After the historical comparison of the last chapter, our
understanding of the miAhu phenomenon can also benefit from
comparing it horizontally with the practice of the American
staff system. In order to avoid accusations of
oversimplification of which a brief comparison of two
immensely complex systems is unavoidably susceptible, readers
are advised to bear it in mind that the following analysis is
aimed primarily at revealing the different central tendencies
of the American and the Chinese staff systems at the cost of
complexities and variations that are inevitable in reality.
No claim is here made to scientific rigor. Admittedly, the
method for this brief comparative venture is that of
caricature, and as such the picture so drawn will carry all
its strengths and weaknesses, depending on different criteria
or tastes. The picture may be perceived as bringing out the
kernel of truth in a vivid, interesting, and provocative
manner, thus offering some useful heuristic insight; or it
may be regarded as leaving out too many significant lines and
colors, thus exaggerating to grotesque proportions the
contrast in the contours that remain. As a caveat, it should
be made clear that in reality the difference between the two
staff systems often lies more in degrees than in kinds.
What the following comparison will highlight is the
argument that the most striking contrast between the Chinese
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mishu and the American staff system is that the former serves
primarily as a mediator or reconciliator between leaders and
bureaucrats and among the members of the leadership squad,
reconciling differences and cushioning clashes, whereas
staffs in American organizational environments function
typically as a major source of tensions, conflicts,
innovations, and changes. While the reconciliatory and
stabilizing tendency in Chinese mishus' behavior pattern has
already been amply demonstrated in foregoing chapters, the
tension-arousing, conflict-provoking penchant in American
staffs' conduct is illustrated by the following examples.
According to a Senator, the daily activity in the US
Congress is galvanized by "(m)y staff fighting your staff,
your staff competing with mine," to the extent that
"(e)verybody is working for the staff, staff, staff; driving
you nutty."1 The everlasting fight between the White House
and Congress is energized by their respective staffs, too: "A
very large proportion -- my guess is three-quarters to nine-
tenths -- of the time of the Executive Office staff and of
congressional staff is spent in defensive maneuvers against
each other,..." 2 Even within the White House staff, strife
between key staff aides is a commonplace. As Patterson
1. Harrison W. Fox Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond,
Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American
Lawmaking, New York: The Free Press, 1977, pp. 4-5.
2. Don K. Price, America's Unwritten Constitution:
Science. Religion. and Political Responsibility: Louisiana
State University, 1983, p. 149.
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explains: "The staff...is a nest of brainy and aggressive
people....0f most significance, they are brought into the
White House from every faction of the president's party --
liberals, conservatives, moderates, and hard-liners." 3 The
Truman administration witnessed "warring camps" between
Clifford or Murphy and Connelly or Steelman. Kennedy's white
House was entangled by infighting between so-called "egg-
heads" (Ted Sorensen and Myer Feldman) and "the Irish
politicians" (Kenneth O'Donnel and Larry O'Brien). In Nixon's
years, "Daniel Patrick Moynihan crossed swords with Arthur
Burns on domestic policy while Buchanan jousted with Garment
on school desegregation." The Ford administration saw
acrimony between Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Hartmann. And
during the Reagan term "pragmatists" feuded with his 'true
believers. 4
Indeed, in the American business world, competition
between staff personnel and line executives is equally
cutthroat, and the line-staff conflict is a perennial problem
in American organizational environments. For example: a large
number of companies "are already falling apart at the seams
because of conflict between line and staff," and "in only one
3. Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., The Ring of Power! The
White House Staff and Its Ex andina Role in Government, New
York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1988, p. 295.
4. j=
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out of twelve companies, recently surveyed, did line and
staff relationships appear to be reasonably satisfactory.' 5
It is argued in this chapter that the contrast in the
behavior patterns of Chinese mishus and American staff
assistants are caused or influenced by the following six
pairs of variables:
* Structure of the political game: competitive politics
vs. monopoly of power.
* Political process: openness vs. secretiveness.
* Cultural attitude toward politicians: low esteem vs.
veneration.
* Restraining mechanism: inner vs. outer constraints.
* Career path: "in-and-outerso vs. groomed successors.
* Technological orientation: techniques vs. human
relations.
Different Structures of the Political Game
Perhaps the most striking contrast between Chinese
mishuls and American staff aides lies in the different
personae roles they tend to adopt vis-a-vis their bosses.
Chinese misajs tend to be easy-going, self-effacing, and
accommodating, whereas American staff aides act typically as
persons who are tough, aggressive, and pushy. This results
largely from the fact that under the pressures of elective
5. Robert C. Sampson, The Staff Role In Manaaemunt: Its
Creative Uses, New York: Harper, 1955, p. 174. Although this
source is apparently outdated, the basic pattern for- line-
staff conflict seems to remain basically unchanged today.
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politics, American political principals prefer to reserve for
themselves the role of being nice and popular while letting
their staff assistants play the role of being tough
taskmasters.
The contrast is best exemplified by a comparison of a
typical general office director, which is the Chinese version
of chief of staff, and the White House chief of staff. The
White House chief of staff is typically a tough taskmaster
who constantly cracks the whip and presses the deadlines
ruthlessly. He tends to act like a drill sergeant or "an
abrupt and arrogant martinet." 6 For instance, President
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff Sherman Adams was called "the
great stone face"; President Nixon's, Bob Haldeman "the Iron
Chancellor," who had 'a gaze that would freeze Medusa"; and
President Ford's, Donald Rumsfeld the "Praetorian."7 By
contrast, a typical Chinese GO director is a "nice man"
(laohao ren), who is popular and acceptable to all members of
the leadership squad. In terms of personality and behavior
pattern, Yang Shangkun, who was director of the Central
Committee General Office for over twenty years, is
representative of Chinese GO heads. From his extensive
interviews inside China, including some with Yang himself,
Harrison Salisbury formed the following picture of Yang's
behavior pattern as director of the Central GO:
6. Patterson, The Ring of Power, p. 306.
7. Ibid.
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There was...no one of consequence in the Party with whom he
was not on familiar terms.....Yang liked people and people
liked him....In Zhongnanhai he was never too busy to pass the
time of day or do a favor. Children [of the top leaders]
adored him.8
In addition, Zeng Qinghong, the current director of the
Central General Office, shares a similar style, which is
characterized by: "remaining strictly neutral" among clashing
leaders, "being nice and friendly in handling his work,"
"never being rough-mannered and demanding toward his
subordinates," and "spreading his network of friendships as
widely as possible."9
when it comes to the White House chief of staff,
popularity is not a highly valued quality. Rather, as a tough
taskmaster, the White House chief of staff is expected to do
all unpopular "dirty work" in behalf of the President. As a
former White House staff assistant explains about the
division of personae roles between President Carter and his
chief of staff Hamilton Jordan, "It'S time Jimmy Carter
kicked ass, and Hamilton is his chief ass-kicker."1 0
President Nixon's chief of staff Haldeman himself remarked
8. Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emnerors: China in the
Era of Mao and Dena, Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
Publishers, 1992, pp. 201-202.
9. He Pin, OJiang Zemin de tebie zhuli: Zeng Qinghong,
Yang Dezhong" ('Jiang Zemin's Special Assistants: Zeng
Qinghong and Yang Dezhong"), Zhonaauo shibao zhoukan (China
Times Weekly), No. 101 (1993), p. 72.
10. Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents: The Secret
History of the Chief Executives and Their Top Aides, New
York: Times Books, 1979, p. 363.
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even more bluntly: "Every President needs a son of a bitch,
and I'm Nixon's. I'm his buffer and I'm his bastard. I get
done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of
him."11 Haldeman was responsible for handling all the chores
of firing and reprimanding Nixon's subordinates and thus
"spared the President the unpleasantness."12 For example,
when Secretary of State William Rogers, Nixon's longtime
personal friend, was going to be fired, 'it was Haldeman --
and not the President -- who gave him the bad news that he
would ultimately be replaced by arch rival Henry
Kissinger.a13
What is more, at the celebration party on the next
morning of Nixon's election victory for his second term in
office, "the senior staff gathered in the Roosevelt Rooir of
the White House to hear a statement of appreciation from the
President."1 4 After Nixon spoke briefly, he left and turned
the meeting over to Haldeman. The stern-faced chief of staff
'went straight to the point" of demanding all present to
submit their letters of resignation, with a no-nonsense
explanation: 'We just want to show we mean business."1 5 with
11. Richard M. Pious, The American Presidency, New York:
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979, p. 244.
12. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 315.
13. Ibid.
14. Ib i d. p. 322.
15. Iid.
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that he turned on his heel, "leaving the assemblage too
stunned for protest."16 Politically, Nixon benefited from his
chief of staff "acting the part of the heavy," since "(t)his
arrangement allowed disgruntled officials to direct their
anger at Haldeman and to continue thinking of Nixon as their
friend and protector.u17
A similar example of the division of personae roles
between the American president and his chief of staff is
provided by President Eisenhower and his chief of staff
Sherman Adams. Adams was so tough and demanding that "(o)ne
or another of them [his own secretaries] frequently burst
into tears and a newsman once walked into the outer office to
find all five sobbing simultaneously."18 His subordinates
often stormed out of the office shouting "that impossible
beast!" or "He's a madman -- he's insane!" In contrast, they
felt that President Eisenhower was much more personable, as
is illustrated by the following episode.
His secretaries unanimously relished those infrequent
occasions when Adams left Washington on errands for the
President. During one such absence, three of them celebrated
by kicking off their shoes, reclining on the boss's private
couch and enjoying a leisurely cigarette. Suddenly, the
President of the United States walked into the office.
Surveying the situation and noting their horrified
16. Ibid. p. 323.
17. Ibid. pp. 315-316.
18. Ibid. p. 248.
272
expressions, Eisenhower smiled. "Don't worry, girls," he
said. "I won't tell the governor [Adams]." 19
In sharp contrast, in China where political power is
monopolized by a singe party, Chinese political leaders do
not have to face the pressures of elective politics. In other
words, they have to concentrate their attention and efforts
more on pleasing their superiors who wield the nonmenklutura
(appointment) power than on catering to the general public
who wields the voting power. As a result, Chinese leaders
themselves like to play the role of being tough, demanding,
aggressive, and menacing, while leaving to their mishus the
role of being unassuming, affable, and pleasing.20 It is a
general expectation that if the chief leader is a domineering
figure, the general office head is supposed to "try every
means possible to smooth out tensions and establish
interpersonal rapport" in the leadership squad.21 Chinese
leaders are expected to be feared so as to be promptly
obeyed. In practice, a dreaded leader is often the only
19. hbid. Adams used to be the governor of New
Hampshire.
20. Xu Ruixin et al., Zhonaauo xiandai mishu aonazuo
fichu (The Essentials of Contemnorarv Chinese Mishu
Profession), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989, pp.
131-132.
21. Gao Yang, "Zenvan2 zuo viae chenazhi de mishu zhana
he banaonatina zhuren" ("How to Be a Qualified Chief Mijh or
General Office Director"), in Linadao tonazhi tan mishu
onzuo (The Remarks by Leadina Comrades on Mishu work),
Beijing: Xiandai chubanshe, 1989, p.123.
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effective means to keep bureaucracies functioning properly or
get things done in general. Consequently, Chinese chief
leaders are generally tough and even ruthless.
For example, senior Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, the
fledgling strongman in Chinese politics, threatened to "chop
off the head" of any provincial banking and financial
official who would be found dragging his feet on Zhu's
austerity measures for cooling off the economic overheat.22
Mao Zedong's bullying manner was given the fullest play
during the Lushan Conference in 1959, where he threatened to
go into the countryside once again "to recruit another red
army" and "overthrow the government" when facing the strong
opposition led by defense minister Peng Dehuai against his
"Great Leap" adventure.23 Deng Xiaoping's tough and ruthless
style was well reflected in his notorious "Three Don't Be
Afraids" speech during the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, in which
"he told the Politburo that they should not be afraid of
foreign opinions, public reactions or the shedding of
blood."24 Indeed, even Zhou Enlai, who has been generally
regarded as the ultimate paragon of modesty and kindness in
22. Zhong Xingzhi, "Zanting tiaokong, jinxing tiaozheng"
('Giving Up Overall Control for Piecemeal Adjustments"), in
Zhonaauo shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly), No. 100 (1993),
p. 14.
23. Li Rui, Lushan huivishilu (The True Record of the
Lushan Conference), Changsha, 1989, p. 171.
24. Lucian W. Pye, "An Introductory Profile: Deng
Xiaoping and China's Political Culture," The China Ouarterly,
No. 135 (September 1993), p. 424.
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China, was in fact quite a dreaded figure to his subordinate
bureaucrats. His mishus have recently revealed: "The Premier
was very strict and tough. He was hard even on the ministers.
As a result, the ministers of the State Council were all
somewhat afraid of him, never daring to act causally or
carelessly [in front of him.]"2 5 On occasion, he would yell
and throw papers at them, when he was unhappy with their
work. Consequently, no minister had the nerve to make the
same mistake for a second time.2 6 Indeed, the intimidating
quality of a Chinese leader is such that:
It occurs frequently that before going to see a superior
leader, a comrade has fully prepared every detail of what he
is going to say, down to greeting remarks, its tone arn:
gestures. The moment he sees the leader, however, he forgets
everything. All his wits are gone and what is left is nothing
but dullness and nervousness.27
As a word of caution, Chinese leaders do not have just
one personae face; they do have the soft, agreeable side.
Nevertheless, although they do not need to be intimidating
all the time, it is necessary for Chinese political leaders
to assert their bullying or fear-striking power at certain
intervals in order to sustain the integrity of the authority
structure.
While Chinese leaders are inclined to be tough-mannered
and critical, it is their mishus' job to smooth out the
25. Cheng Hua, zhou Enlai he tade mishumen (Zhou Enlai
and His Mishus), Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi chubanshe,
1992, p. 131.
26. Ibid. pp. 131-132.
27. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, pp. 125-126.
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ruffled features or soothe the hurt feelings: "...if a leader
is being excessively critical, his mishu should cushion the
impact by comforting the person being upbraided; if a leader
has uttered something one-sided or inaccurate, his mishu
should round it out and touch it up.w2 8 It is a mishuIs
important responsibility to preserve his leader's popularity.
In handling a leader's publicity, it is the mishu's duty to
be cautious, discreet, and watchful, even though the leader
himself may be somewhat impulsive and indulgent. For example:
Some leaders hold themselves aloof from the masses, liking to
order around subordinates down below,...and rarely going down
to the grassroots to solve concrete problems; some go down
but for fleeting moments and only for display; some like to
be received, wherever they go, with fanfare, a large number
of attendants, and extravagant feasts;...29
The leaders themselves should bear a part of the blame, but
their mislaUs are also to blame because "they fail to make
appropriate arrangements." It is believed that, "If their
mishus always keep it in mind to let the leaders go down to
the grassroots and keep in close contact with the masses when
arranging their activities, the leading comrades in the Party
28. Wu Shaozu, "Shouzhang mishu gongzuo zongheng tan"
("Extensive Observations on the work of Leaders' Personal
Mishus"), in The Remarks by Leadina Comrades, p. 115.
29. Yi Chengjie et al., Zhenawu ieaia vu linadap
huodona annai (Receivina of Official Visitors and Arranjina
of Leaders' Activities), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990; p.
55.
276
and government will surely have fine images among the
masses. 30
Behind the manifest difference in the division of
personae roles, Chinese and American politicians have very
different mental attitudes toward the character trait of
toughness and aggressiveness in their staff assistants.
American politicians often appreciate and even admire such
quality in their staff aides. For instance, Medved, a
historian on the White House staff, detects a strong sense of
admiration on President Nixon's part toward his rough-
mannered chief of staff Haldeman. Medved wrote:
Haldeman -- the broad-shouldered authoritarian who never
registered his emotions -- represented the sort of manly
self-sufficiency Nixon wanted for himself. In several
revealing diary entries during the Watergate crisis, Nixon
expressed his respect for Haldeman's ability to 'hang tough.'
"I marvel at the strength of Haldeman,' he wrote....When they
finally parted after a dramatic conversation and Haldeman
stepped into a waiting car, the badly shaken President told
him, "I wish I were as strong as you.'31
By contrast, Chinese leaders never like an aggressive
and assertive miahu. Take Mao for example. "For all that he
hurt others' feelings badly in some cases," explains a
Chinese biographer of Mao, "he extremely disliked those who
would hurt his feelings casually. For all that he was a firm
believer -in the 'philosophy of struggle,' he liked to have
harmonious and relaxed relationship with people immediately
surrounding him in daily life.*32 Therefore, "he laid down a
30 id.
31. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 315.
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very important condition for being his mishus: he or she must
have a soft, easygoing temperament."33
Also related with the division of personae roles is the
issue of manner and style. Here, again, there is a vast
difference in terms of boss-staff relationship between the
American and the Chinese cases. In America, political
principals typically have pleasing, polished, and well-
studied manners, while their staff aides tend to exhibit more
rough edges in their conduct. For instance, President
Carter's Chief of Staff Jordan "became a national synonym for
boorish behavior. In one-memorable cartoon, Jim Berry showed
a schoolgirl complaining to her teacher about a naughty
classmate beside her. 'He's acting exactly like Hamilton
Jordan!' the child whined. 34 A prominent Democrat complained
about President Kennedy's top aide Sorensen with regard to
his manner: "He is one of the toughest and most ruthless
people I have ever dealt with, insulting, belittling,
condescending."35 President Roosevelt's top aide Hopkins was
also well known for his highly idiosyncratic and ill-mannered
style:
32. Hai Lude et al., eds., Shenahuo zhong de Mao Zedona
(Mao Zedona in the Real Life), Beijing: Hua Ling chubanshe,
1989, p. 301.
33. Ibid. p. 300.
34. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 357.
35. bid.. p. 272.
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He generally received guests with his feet on the desk, a
cigarette dangling from one side of his mouth, and dandruff
covering his shoulders....His smile was equally lopsided,
encouraging his detractors to speak of his "perpetual
leer..36
President Roosevelt once commented approvingly on Hopkins's
no-nonsense, arrogant work style:
He doesn't even know the meaning of the word "protocol." When
he sees a piece of red tape, he just pulls out those old
garden shears of his and snips it. And when he's talking to
some foreign dignitary, he knows how to slump back in his
chair and put his feet up on the conference table and say,
"Oh, yeah?"3 7
It is a different story when we turn to the Chinese
case. Leaders often have idiosyncratic styles and rugged
manners. Mao is well known for his biting, sardonic language
and rustic manners. Deng feels no embarrassment when he spits
noisily and chain-smokes in front of foreign visitors. For
that matter, if a leader shows excessive attention to making
his manners acceptable and pleasant, he may well be perceived
as betraying signs of insecurity and weakness.
Nevertheless, Chinese mishus must make their manners and
appearances pleasant and presentable. In their training, a
plethora of do's and don'ts are prescribed for this purpose:
"(H)ave regular hair cuts. Don't have a weird hairdo. Shave
your face and groom your nostril hair well. Don't wear
clothing that is glaringly out of place. Iron and clean your
clothes and let your trousers show two straight line creases.
Keep your collar and sleeves clean, and polish your shoes
36. bid. . 202.
37. =bid. p.. 210. Indeed, Hopkins "received even the
most important visitors in his pajamas..." (Thid. 206.)
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until they shine.....Don't allow yourself, under any
circumstances whatsoever, to receive visitors in shorts or a
sleeveless shirt.....Don't pick your nose or clip your nails
in front of others....Don't eat garlic or other food with
offensive odors before receiving visitors. If that cannot be
helped, chew some tea leaves to get rid of the odor.....38
The list goes on and on.
Political Openness vs. Secretiveness
A word of caveat is in order. The difference in manner
and style between Chinese mishus and American staff aides may
be exaggerated, in that the lack of political openness and
the absence of a free press may keep the misconduct of
Chinese mishus from reaching the general public. In America,
however, politics is generally played out "in the fishbowl
context of American mass communications." 39 Consequently,
"(t)he white House is a glass house, shot through with
floodlights of scrutiny from a skeptical press and a hostile
political opposition, watched by a changeable public. It is
expected to be a model for public service and it cannot help
but be a target for attack on even the least of
peccadilioes." 4 0 All this contributes to exacerbating the
image of American staffs as unpopular trouble-makers.
38. Wang Qiangong et al., Shivona mishu a nazuo shouce
(A Practical Handbook for Mishu work), Beijing: Guangming
ribao chubanshe, 1987, p. 85.
39. Fred I. Greenstein, "Change and Continuity in the
Modern Presidency," in Anthony King, ed., The New American
rolitical system, Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, p. 50.
40. Patterson, The Ringa of Power, p. 347.
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Furthermore, the American mass media will "make sure
that anyone next to the center of power will become an
instant celebrity,"41 and news reporters and gossip writers
enjoy making sport of political leaders' staff members for
the sake of journalist sensationalism. For example, "Shortly
after Jordan arrived in Washington, a local gossip columnist
scooped the world with the earth-shattering revelation that
the President's top aide 'never wears -- in fact, has never
owned -- a pair of underwear in his whole life.'" 4 2 And
Playgirl magazine published an interview with President
Carter's Press Secretary Jody Powell "alongside full color
photographs of male genitalia," making him answer
"insinuating questions about his extramarital affairs and the
sexual temptations of his office." 43
A Chinese mishu operates in a much more concealed and
protected environment, in that "every aspect of his work and
everything he is doing is confidential to a greater or lesser
extent." 44 Freed from constant harassment of fault-finding
and dirt-digging by the mass media and political opponents,
Chinese misjbs are in a better position to make themselves
popular than their American counterparts.
41. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 356.
42. Iid.
43. Ibid. pp. 356-357.
44. Zheng Xinghan et al., An Outline of the Mishu Work,
pp. 102-103.
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Different Cultural Attitudes Toward Politicians
Another -reason for a possibly exaggerated contrast
between the styles of Chinese mishus and American staff
members is cultural attitude. In China political leaders are
generally awed and held in extremely high esteem since social
and moral order relies heavily upon their personal authority.
It is a cultural norm for leaders to ignore most of the
requests for special favors from their subordinates and
ordinary people without entailing hard feelings. As a result,
any leader's individualized response, no matter how small,
tends to be a happy surprise and as such greatly appreciated.
Thus, leaders' mishus are in a good position to play the role
of delivering good news or favors to grateful recipients, who
are often in tears. Indded, even a leader's granting of
audiences is considered as a great favor. For instance, Deng
Xiaoping, like Mao before him, is not easily accessible even
to the members of the Politburo Standing Committee.
In America, political leaders do not enjoy esteem as
high as their Chinese counterparts. Rather, there tends to be
widespread skepticism and even antagonism toward politicians
among the general public. This is particularly the case with
the politically alert, as is best exemplified by journalists.
For example:
The working hypothesis almost universally shared among
correspondents is that politicians are suspect; their public
images probably false, their public statements disingenuous,
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their moral pronouncements hypocritical, their motives self-
serving, and their promises ephemeral.45
In short, until proven otherwise, political figures are
generally presumed to be deceptive. In the newsrooms,
politicians are habitually called "frauds," "phonies," and
"liars."4 6 News reporters and analysts see it as their
professional duty "to expose politicians by unmasking their
disguises, debunking their claims and piercing their
rhetoric. 47
For lack of popular veneration and thus job security,
American politicians tend to develop such a psychological
make-up as to "want to be nice and want to be liked." 4 8
Therefore:
Faced with a living, breathing fellow human being who wants
something very much...the natural reaction is to be obliging.
That's why if you are a lobbyist, just getting through to a
high official and presenting your case, using facts, figures,
and persuasion -- no favors involved -- gives you a good
chance for success. In fact, this is the way most lobbying
victories are won.4 9
Furthermore, the highly individualistic American
political culture inclines people to believe that they
deserve more than however much their political leaders can
45. Austin Ranney, Channels of Power: The Impact of
Television on American Politics, New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
Publishers, 1983, pp. 58-59.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid. 58-59.
48. Charles Peters, How Washinaton Really Works,
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1980, p. 7.
49. Ikid. pp. 7-8.
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deliver. At least they each deserve the fullest attention of
a politician when it comes to their personal problems. As a
result, a twelve-year-old Indian boy did not hesitate to
write to the President to complain "that his father, a
veteran, was out of work," and a street-cleaner felt it only
natural to call the White House to report that "someone had
stolen his broom," demanding a replacement.50 And the White
House constantly witnesses "the milling of a hungry mob of
job hunters working overtime."51 Americans' general faith in
their natural right to full service of their politicians is
most vividly illustrated by the following somewhat extreme
and yet telling case involving President Adams &nd a
persistent visitor Dr. George P. Todson. The incident was
recorded in the President's personal diary.
Todson, recently court-martialed from his post as an
assistant surgeon in the Army, first appeared at the White
House on December 16, 1826, to ask for a reinstatement. Adams
had already reviewed the proceedings twice, declined to
reverse the verdict, and learned from the good doctor's
attorney "that Todson had come to the most cool and
inflexible determination to murder me.".....After a lengthy
interview Todson left the White House, only to return five
days later. This time he announced that his former intention
to kill the President had been "absurd" since he now
understood that Adams entertained kindly feelings toward him.
As proof of those feelings, he wanted the chief executive to
give him money for passage to New Orleans....On March 15,
Todson made another appearance with the new demand that the
government return his court-martial fee of $47....0n the 27th
he returned to the President with a joyous announcement: he
was close to "forming a matrimonial connection with a young
girl." The girl's parents, however, would not approve the
match unless Adams agreed to reverse the court-martial
50. Patterson, The Rina of Power, p. 317.
51. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 65.
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conviction....Todson disappeared for two months, only to
shatter the President's hopes in May by showing up once
again. This time he demanded appointment to a vacant
clerkship in the War Department.... .52
This culturally imbedded belief in individuals' natural
right to politicians' service and time places, however, staff
members in a difficult position, easily turning them into
unpopular figures perceived as blocking the exercise of this
inalienable right. When President Lincoln's aide John G.
Nicolay attempted to bring some order to the frenzy to get
access to the President, he immediately incurred widespread
antagonism. He was "soon written down by official Washington
as 'snobby and unpopular.'" 53 That was because he "cast his
cold, disapproving eye not only on crank and common citizens,
but on haughty Congressmen as well." Those "(s)elf-important
Senators, who in all previous administrations had been
accustomed to striding unchallenged through crowded anterooms
and going directly to the President, developed a strong
resentment for 'this mere boy from the West' who forced them
to await his permission."54 Indeed, it is "an immutable rule
of Washington politics" that "(n)o one likes to believe that
he has been denied an audience with the chief executive
because his opinion is insignificant or irrelevant; it is
52. ZIbid. pp. 12-13.
53. Zig. p. 19.
54. ibid.
285
much easier to blame a conspiratorial aide for cutting off
advice 'the President needs. '55
Structural vs. Moral Constraints
Being close to power centers, staff personnel in both
China and America are subject to various intoxicating
temptations and character-distorting pulls, which are
particularly irresistible and potent for them, given their
usual young age and juniority. For example, a position on the
White House staff is said to be able to "transform the most
sensible person into a power tripper."56 Jack Valenti, who
was a special assistant to President Johnson for three years,
provided the following insight to illustrate this point.
You sit next to the Sun King and you bask in his rays, and
you have those three magic words, *the President wants." And
all of a sudden you have power unimagined by you before you
got in that job. And if you don't watch out, you begin to
believe that it is your splendid intellect, your charm and
your insights into the human condition that give you all this
power....The arrogance sinks deeper into their veins than
they think possible. What it does after a while is breed a
kind of insularity that keeps you from being subject to the
same fits of insecurity that most human beings have. Because
you very seldom are ever turned down. You are seen in
Washington. There are stories in Hawswemk and Tim about how
important you are. I'm telling you this is like mainlining
heroin. And while you are experiencing it, it is so blinding
and dazzling that you forget, literally forget, that it is
borrowed and transitory power.57
55. Ibid. p. 318.
56. Larry Berman, The New American Presidency, Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1987, p. 114.
57. Z=0
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The character-disturbing power of the position of a
Chinese mishab is similar, as for example, "the unique
position of a mishu tends to cause a person to have two
opposite mental states simultaneously: an inferiority complex
and a superiority complex."58 Toward his boss, he tends to
be "submissive," "obedient," and "passive." On the other
hand, however, he forms a natural tendency "to be blindly
optimistic (manamu leauan), narcissistically arrogant, and
condescending, as well as to enjoy lecturing people and
ordering them around."59 Furthermore, the position of a
leader's mishu is said to be teeming with "temptations in
terms of fame, interests, money, and sex."60 A former
important mishu confesses that, "It is extremely easy to use
his leader's position to promote his private interests, if a
mishu is so minded."61
Therefore, in both countries it is recognized that there
must be some constraints to curb staffs' personality disorder
and prevent them from abusing their powers. The measures
taken are very different, however. In China the emphasis is
on inner or moral constraints while in America the primary
58. Qi Peiwen et al., zenvana danahao linadaoren mishu
(How to Be a Good Personal Mishu for a Leader), Beijing:
Dangan chubanshe, 1990, p. 191.
59. Ibid. p. 192. This anatural tendency" is something
to be curbed with various precautions, as will be discussed
in the following paragraphs.
60. Wu Shaozu, "Extensive Observations," p. 117.
61. Ibid. p. 118.
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precaution is an appropriate external structural arrangement
in which actors check and balance each other out.
In China, great importance is attached to moral
constraints on mishus to fight various temptations inherent
in their position. Mishus are encouraged to implant in
themselves the will "to sacrifice themselves, to be invisible
and hard-working, and to be unsung heroes for the sake of the
[Party's] Cause." 62  Personal morality is particularly
stressed in the recruitment process. For instance, Li
Ruihuan, currently a member of the Politburo standing
committee, recently emphasized: "In selecting a mishu, the
primary consideration should be morality: rather a [virtuous]
mediocrity than a [talented] crook." 63
what is more, in order to reinforce inner restraints,
various disciplinary codes have been laid down and repeatedly
rubbed in. Some samples are as follows.
When leaders are having a meeting or a conversation with each
other, a miahu is forbidden to "open his mouth or wag his
tongue," unless talked to.64
Don't comment on a document or issue written instructions in
the name of your leader without permission; don't advance
your private interests in the name of your leader; don't ask
for gifts in the name of your leader; don't answer questions
in the name of your leader without permission; and don't
62. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 113.
63. Li Ruihuan, Wei renmin ban shii sutan (aual
Remarks by Li Ruihuan While Doina Substantial Thinas for the
Peogle), Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe, 1990, p. 813.
64. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 132.
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establish and contact personal connections (a anxi) or
engage in illegal activities in the name of your leader. 65
The constant efforts at taming the inner drive can
produce the following effect on mishus:
...many comrades [mishus] have great internal anxiety, being
constantly fearful that they will make mistakes, be
criticized, have to make self-criticisms, leave a bad
impression on leaders and thus lose their trust and
opportunities for promotion. So much so that they are nervous
and fidgeting, as if they were walking on a tightrope or on a
thin layer of ice. Their hearts beat irregularly, guessing in
agony what has gone wrong, whenever a leader wants to have a
heart-to-heart talk with them. They lose their spirit and
become dull...and in some cases they suffer nervous
breakdown, hypochondria, or depression, ruining their
health.66
Hence, there is a very common saying among mishus that,
NAccompanying a leader is like accompanying a tiger" (ban•_un
ru ban hu).67 0
In America there is not as much faith in inner or moral
constraints alone. Rather, the primary concern is how to
place effective external restraints on staffs through checks
and balances or other structural devices. For example, the
White House staff is confronted with constant challenges and
scrutiny from the president's institutional opponents.
Congress and the White House are engaged in "a kind of
administrative arms race.68 in their efforts to recruit more
65. Qi Peiwen et al., How to Be a Good Personal Mishu,
pp. 198-199.
66. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 124.
67. Personal interviews.
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and better quality staff assistants, in order to have
sufficient manpower and professional talent to keep a close
eye and effective counterbalance on each other.
Mass media are another mechanism of external
constraining. The Presidential.staff members are continuously
"surrounded by the surveillance of an expert and
unremittingly skeptical press corps." which ensures that "the
White House is a glass house, with both light and heat
streaming in."6 9 As for the president's political opponents,
they all "wait for staff members to get into trouble and then
attack." 70 And when they attack, they will "go after them
[White House staff members] like a pack of wolves."71
Indeed, even within the White House internal rivalry is
a commonplace, and such rivalry is generally believed to be a
healthy -measure of constraint. As President Franklin
Roosevelt once explained, "A little rivalry is stimulating,
you know. It keeps everybody trying to prove he is a better
fellow than the next man. It keeps them honest too."72 This
belief was well reflected in the practice of President
Reagan's top staff aides, who formed the "Troika," the
68. Douglas Yates, Bureaucratic Democracy:_The Search
for Democracy and Efficiency in American Government,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 57.
69. Patterson, The Rina of Power, p. 5.
70. Pious, The American Presidency, p. 245.
71. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 323.
72. Ibid. pp. 210-211.
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"Triumvirate," or the 'Three-Headed Monster.' This three-way
competition between Baker, Meese, and Deaver gave rise to the
following situation:
None of the three had qualms about leaking to the press to
advance their interests. In effect, they balanced each
other's influence -- the American tenet of separation of
powers, perhaps, on a smaller scale. 73
Because the preponderant attention is focused on
external constraints, inner or moral constraints on American
staffs are relatively relaxed. Some escapades on the part of
staffs are generally accepted or taken for granted as long as
they can be got away with. A veteran Carter staff aide
conceded:
Sure, there's a certain amount of partying and a certain
amount of sexual adventure. That's not abnormal. The White
House is a very high-pressure place and people need a way to
let off steam. In the campaign, we used to have a saying:
"It's better to shack up than to crack up.' It's like a war
when you work in politics. You don't know if you're going to
die tomorrow and so you go ahead and have a good time
tonight. Everything is temporary and chancy....I don't know
if Jimmy [Carter] either knows or cares about what's going
on.74
The different emphasis on the inner or on the outer
constraining mechanisms, as described above, contributes to
the fact that Chinese mishns are inclined to be unobtrusive,
quiet, and modest figures while American staff members tend
to be aggressive, vociferous, and nasty players.
73. Stephen Hess, Oraanizina the Presidencv, Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1988, p. 149.
74. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, pp. 357-358.
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Different Career Paths
The behavior patterns of Chinese mishus and American
staff assistants are also influenced by different career
paths. In the American political arena, staff assistants
rarely become professional politicians in their own right.75
For that matter, if a person has the ambition to go into
politics for a career, the position as a politician's staff
member is perhaps the worst starting point. President Kennedy
was very frank when he told his top aide Sorensen: "Every man
that's ever held a job like yours -- Sherman Adams, Harry
Hopkins, House, all the rest -- had ended up in the
shithouse. Congress was down on them or the President was
hurt by them or somebody was mad at them."76 Consequently,
instead of preparing for their political aspirations,
American staff members are typically "in-and-outers," 77 who
treat their staff appointments as short-term jobs or
opportunities to build up fast their personal reputation and
credibility for the sake of their future careers in private
sectors, which are often financially more attractive, or just
to temporarily enjoy wielding delegated political authority,
which they can hardly obtain on their own. As a result, they
75. The only exception in the case of the White House
staff is perhaps Richard Cheney, former chief of staff of
President Ford's administration. Cheney later became a
Congress representative.
76. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 273.
77. Price, America's Unwritten Constitution, pp. 106-
107.
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do not feel it particularly necessary to build up long term
goodwill with politicians other than their own bosses. As
Nixon's Chief of Staff Haldeman explained: "I was tough
because I had to be tough. In the White House you don't have
the luxury of time. You're not building for the long haul,
the way you are in business."'7
The desire to build up one's own professional reputation
may lead a staff assistant to act in a way that gives rise to
tensions even with his boss. For example, the White House
staff is often perceived as "a cast of actors more committed
to stealing the show from him [the President] than to
allowing him to live up to the nation's expectations that his
performance be the extraordinary one."7 9
A staff member aggressively pursuing his own
professional reputation may even cause his master to treat
him as a potential competitor. For example: "Limelight on his
aides sometimes brings second thoughts to a president: might
there arise a question as to who will be getting the credit
for the administration's accomplishment?"80 Such staff-boss
competition occurred in the Nixon-Kissinger White House, as
for example .iae's "Man of the Year" cover for 1973 was split
in two between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger.8 1 Nixon
78. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 312.
79. Greenstein, "Change and Continuity in the Modern
Presidency," p. 79.
80. Patterson, The Rinoaof Power, p. 125.
81. =bid.
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was so worried about being overshadowed by his own top aide
that he felt compelled to install a secret taping system in
the white House to record every conversation he had with
Kissinger. In his memoirs, he gives reasons for doing so:
"Such an objective record might also be useful to the extent
that any President feels vulnerable to revisionist
histories...from within...his administration....,,82 His chief
of staff Haldeman gave a more direct explanation: "It was a
final attempt by a frustrated Nixon to pin down the opinions
of Henry Kissinger and other advisers who often seemed to
come up with their own versions of both their own and the
President's positions...."83 President Carter was faced with
a similar competition with his White House staff, and in his
efforts of "trying to increase loyalty, [he] had his White
House assistants fill out a questionnaire that became an
object of public ridicule." 84
The boss-staff rivalry also arises from the fact that
American political principals and their staff assistants tend
to have a short-term utilitarian view toward each other. It
is tacitly understood between the two sides that one should
take care of one's own long-term interests. For instance,
some Congressmen admitted frankly their self-interested
utilitarian view in hiring staff members: they just want to
82. Ibid.
83. bid.
84. Berman, The New American Presidency, p. 114.
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"hire them young, burn them out, and send them on." 8 5
Significantly, this utilitarian view is generally acceptable
in the American individualistic culture, and is approved of
even by scholars. For example, Medved offers his advice
regarding the proper relationship between the president and
his top assistants:
Hard-heartedness can be a positive trait for the President of
the United States -- he ought to be selfish in using the men
who serve him. Yes, there is room for friendship in the white
House...but only if the core of the relationship remains
essentially ruthless.86
When it comes to Chinese mishus, they have a different
career path from their American counterparts. Unlike American
"in-and-outers," Chinese GO members are groomed successors
for higher leadership positions within the Chinese
officialdom. Because of this arrangement, Chinese mishus do
not feel it in their best interest to aggressively push for
their separate professional reputation and interests from
those of their leaders. Rather, it is in their best interest
to cautiously cultivate long term good relationships with as
many leaders as possible, so as to improve their chances for
career advancement. Particularly, they need to forge a
reliable and enduring relationship with their own bosses.
Unlike their American counterparts, Chinese political leaders
are not supposed to have a short term, utilitarian view
85. Michael J. Malbin, Unelected ReDresentatives:
Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative
Government, New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1979, p.
20.
86. Ibid. p. 359.
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toward their mishus, but instead they are expected to look
after their mishus' long term career advancement. As an
important mishu-turned-leader explains: "Using a mishu on the
one hand and cultivating and preparing him for being a
[leading] cadre on the other should be combined. It is not
appropriate to be interested only in using a mishu to one's
own satisfaction without considering his future. His career
should be taken care of."8 7 Consequently, it is very common
for Chinese leaders and their former mishus to remain in
close touch, through frequently exchanging gifts and favors,
for decades after they left each other.
Moreover, while American "in-and-outers' have their own
professional reputation to look after and they like to
perceive themselves proudly as "educators" to their bosses in
matters within the realm of their specialty,8 8 Chinese mighus
generally regard themselves humbly as "pupils," "students" or
"apprentices" of their leaders.89
The career pattern inclines Chinese mishus to be
pleasing, dependent, and self-effacing toward their bosses
rather than be hasty and noisy self-aggrandizers, like their
American counterparts, who are ready to promote their
87. Wu Shaozu, "Extensive Observations," p. 112.
88. Fox and Hammond observe: "...staff also serve as
educators -- tutoring their boss on substantive issues.
Hearings, briefing books, conversations, interviews,
speeches, are all used by staff in educating members [of
Congress]." Conaressional staffs, p. 159.
89. Wu Shaozu, "Extensive Observations," pp. 116-117.
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separate career interests even at the expense of their
bosses'.
Technology vs. Human Relations
Another reason for American staffs to be a major source
of tension and conflict is the fact that American culture is
characterized by a profound obsession with new technology.
Staff personnel are recruited largely for the sake of
promoting new techniques to achieve more and better material
results and greater efficiency. This is particularly the case
with business organizations, but this tendency is also
reflected in the staff arrangements in political
organizations.
Staff personnel usually have a different career pattern
from that of line personnel: line personnel 'are far more
likely to have worked their way up through their present
organization and to have done so on the basis of experience
and knowledge of particular jobs or operations rather than on
the basis of formal training," whereas staff personnel 'are
appointed directly to their present job from outside" because
of their technical training.9 0 So, line personnel are
generally regarded as "locals" and staff personnel as
-cosmopolitans. -91
90. Robert T. Golembiewski, Oraanizing Men and Power:
Patterns of Behavior and Line-Staff Models, Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 1967, p. 71.
91. bid.
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As a result, the two types of personnel face very
different incentive structures. American staffs tend to have
"a greater propensity to innovate."92 That is because staff
members are "usually more technically oriented than line
personnel," since they are "more technically trained, better
educated in general,.... 93 That is also because "their
freedom from operating responsibility allows them to keep
technically better informed than line officials."9 4 As
specialists in certain new techniques, Americar staff members
are usually hired exclusively to implement those techniques
in order to change the existing behavior of the line
personnel and squeeze greater efficiency out of their
performance. In order to justify their existence and to
retain their "existing power, income, and prestige,"9 5
American staff personnel tend to advocate "the doctrine of
rapid obsolescence for techniques." 9 6 And they "see
themselves as innovators of one gadget after another."97 As a
result, "(n)ew fads...spring up overnight, while the
92. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1967, p. 155.
93. hia.
94. Ibid. pp. 155-156.
95. id.
96. Sampson, The Staff Role In Manaaement, p. 7.
97. Ibid.
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comparatively recent...programs are quickly forgotten."9 8
What is more, staff personnel "are strongly motivated to
criticize the line's behavior and press for changes." The
built-in role of "criticizer" makes it particularly easy for
staff members to create tensions within the organization,
because:
...staff experts work for improvements and we have a
situation potentially that of internecine warfare.
'Suggestions for improvements' sound good in theory, but what
does it mean in practice? Criticism. Criticism of things, it
is true. But what does this mean? Line men who see their
things criticized, cannot disassociate their own egos from
the things. Therefore, they feel that they are being
criticized.99
In contrast, "(l)ine officials are normally more inertia
prone because they naturally try to justify their existing
behavior, they are far more aware of the difficulties of
disrupting informal networks, and they must bear the costs of
carrying out changes suggested by staff advisors."1 0 0
Consequently, "(t)hese differences between staff and line
generate an inherent conflict (emphasis added] between
them.... 101
Staff specialists tend to clash not only with the line
officials within the same organization but also with staff
specialists in other organizations, as is exemplified by "the
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid. p. 28.
100. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 155.
101. bid.
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now-familiar pattern of policy debate characterized by a
clash of expert testimony" between different parts of the
American government.102 Different government organizations
"will seek to use their experts and their policy evaluations
as political weapons in bureaucratic conflict." 1 03 As a
result, "Policy debates" tend to take the form of "struggles
between opposing assumptions, projections, and analyses in
the new language of" the theory, model, and technique that
are currently in vogue.1 04
Nevertheless, the above technique-related line-staff/
staff-staff conflict seems to be much less acute in Chinese
organizational environments, where mishus are more
preoccupied with skills at properly handling complex human
relations than with aggressively promoting new efficiency-
enhancing gadgets.1 05 In other words, Chinese mishus tend to
102. Yates, Bureaucratic Democracy, p. 76-77.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. It is noteworthy that for the first two decades or
so, *...Communist China also has staff-line conflicts, and
for reasons similar to those of the West." As Franz Schurmann
explains, "The staff-line conflict in Chinese factories has
taken the form of conflict between 'intellectual' staff men
and the proletarian line men," that is, between "expert
professionals and red cadres." This conflict stemmed from the
fact that, "The former hold to values of expertise; the
latter hold to values of 'red.'" (Ideoloav and Oraanization
in Communist China, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1966, pp. 70, 72.) Nevertheless, the Chinese line-staff
conflict had a significant difference. In the American ^ase,
staff personnel and top executive officers are typically
allies and they join hands in pushing line managers for
better performance, whereas in the Chinese case, superior
leaders and line personnel were both "red" and tended to
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be sensitive to various subtle power relationships and
personal needs of all the key actors in their immediate
milieu while American staff assistants tend to advocate new
techniques with single-minded determination paying little
regard to their disruptive effect on human relations.
Summary
American staff members and Chinese mishus demonstrate
very different behavior patterns: the former tend to be
aggressive, pushy, and assertive, while the latter tend to be
modest, reconciliatory, and accommodating. The contrast
arises because the pressures of elective politics incline
American politicians to reserve for themselves the role of
being nice and popular while letting their staff assistants
do the unpopular "dirty work", in the absence of such
pressures, Chinese political leaders prefer to make
themselves be awed, feared, and promptly and submissively
obeyed while leaving to their mishus the task of smoothing
out any disruptions or disturbances left behind by their
actions. The tendency for Chinese and American staff
personnel to play the contrasting roles is also reinforced by
the fact that the emphasis on external checks and balances
tends to reinforce the personality trait of aggressiveness in
American staff people whereas the stress on inner constraints
tends to tame and emasculate such instincts in Chinese
mishus. Another reinforcing factor for the above tendency is
share the same attitude of discrimination against "expert"
staff people.
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general cultural ethos. The cultural preoccupation with new
technology inclines American staff members, who are usually
specialists of one new technique or another, to aggressively
push for changes and technological improvements, which tends
to bring them into confrontation with status quo-oriented
line personnel. In contrast, cultural preoccupation with
human relations turns Chinese mishus into experts at properly
handling various subtle and complicated power relationships,
a fact which tends to add to their likeability or
acceptability to all sides. Moreover, Chinese miahus are in a
better position to be popular figures than their American
counterparts. The intimidating quality around political
leaders causes ordinary people to be grateful for whatever
small personal favors that. leaders hand down. Any help on the
mishus' part in the process will be greatly appreciated. In
America, the low esteem toward politicians and the
individualistic spirit inclines people to believe that they
deserve more than however much politicians can deliver.
Whatever staffs can offer tends to be appreciated even less.
Another advantage that Chinese mishus enjoy over their
American counterparts is the fact that their activities are
largely sheltered in secrecy or semi-secrecy, while the
political openness subjects American staffs to meticulous
public scrutiny and makes them fall easy prey to ruthless
attacks of political opponents and sensationalistic ridicules
of the mass media. From another perspective, however, the
"tougho and "soft" roles suit the self interests of American
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staff members and Chinese mishus respectively with regard to
their career paths. Playing it tough can attract attention
and build up personal reputation quickly, such being
beneficial to a more profitable career elsewhere for an
American staff member, who is typically an "in-and-outer.*
Playing it soft helps cultivate long term goodwill. with as
many key leaders as possible, thus being conducive to career
advancement of Chinese mishus, who are in most cases groomed
for fast upward mobility within the officialdom.
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Chapter Eight
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has unveiled a crucial but hitherto
neglected hidden structure of the Chinese political system --
the mishu institution. There are about one million mishu
personnel in the Chinese political arena, who provide
comprehensive staff support and services for political
leaders at all levels, individually or collectively. With
regard to the functioning of the Chinese political system,
mishus perform two roles: 1) amplifying political
leadership's control over bureaucracies; and 2) cushioning
and moderating disagreements, conflicts, clashes, and
arbitrary changes or disruptions.
As is the case with staffs everywhere in the world, a
primary function that Chinese mishus perform is to amplify
political leaders' control over bureaucracies. Our findings
reveal that in this regard, mishus constitute a form of
counter-bureaucracy so as to provide political leaders with a
permanent countervailing base of expertise and knowledge and
an extra channel of information and authority flow vis-a-vis
the regular bureaucracies. In China every formal organization
is run by a leadership squad composed of only a very small
number of leaders, but every leadership squad is assisted and
served by a sizable mishu squad, also called 'general
office." The general office is one of the largest departments
under a leadership squad, consisting of counterpart subunits
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to virtually all the bureaucratic departments. So structured,
the general office provides necessary organizational capacity
for leaders to attempt to closely and constantly supervise
and monitor all the subordinate departments and units, thus
helping strengthen the leadership squad's control over them.
An important part of mijghs' controlling role lies in
information processing. Mishus are responsible for handling
all incoming information, summarizing, condensing,
clarifying, and synthesizing it, so as to reduce the
informational torrents from the bureaucracies to manageable
proportions for the leaders. Furthermore, mishus have the
duty and authority to collect and verify information
independently. They can either go out to investigate the true
conditions and find out facts or receive visitors and letters
from below to keep an eye on any misbehavior of bureaucrats.
Importantly, the mishu institution is organized as a
separate, unified subsystem with each general office having
the obligation to report to higher-level GOs and coordinate
with other GOs at the same or lower levels. Thus, mishus
operate in fact a somewhat independent information network,
which apparently connects all bureaucracies vertically and
horizontally across the country. Our findings suggest that
this mishu-operated information system seems to be generally
efficient and capable of providing timely and accurate
information to the Chinese political leaders at various
levels, particularly with regard to emergencies or crises. Or
at least it seems to constitute a sufficiently strong
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deterrent preventing subordinate bureaucrats from straying
too far away from superior leaders' intentions and
instructions. Furthermore, mishaus conduct research and
investigations and provide extensive advice for leaders in a
policy process so that the leaders can make informed
decisions to exercise effective leadership over the
bureaucracies.
Our research also shows that the mishu institution has
some highly unique features in comparison with its
counterparts in other countries and even in ancient Chinese
history. It is a principal cushioning/integrating mechanism
for the Chinese political system, working to facilitate a
workable degree of harmony, coherence, coordination,
consistency and continuity.of it.
So far as interpersonal relationships are concerned,
mishus' cushioning role is primarily reflected in these two
aspects: 1) performing tension-releasing and conflict-
deflecting rituals, and 2) mediating intra-elite
communications.
Mishus play a major role in coordinating interpersonal
relationships in the Chinese political process by taking care
of all rituals, ceremonies, and punctilios, which are
indispensable to deflect or diminish tension-provoking
uncertainties when leaders come together. Mishus help
establish a clear pecking order among the leaders. They
*guard the gate" for the leaders so that everything one says
and does is strictly in line with his relative status and
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importance vis-a-via the others leaders. when leaders of
different units gather together, it is the mishus' job to
carefully weigh various factors and establish a proper
hierarchical order, so as to minimize anxiety-arousing
ambiguities and uncertainties. Mishus' skills and care are
particularly indispensable for the organizing and servicing
of conferences and meetings, which are occasions for leaders
to meet with each other and/or with their bureaucratic
subordinates for discussions, negotiations, and bargaining.
In China, mishus are made exclusively responsible for
organizing and servicing all conferences and meetings.
Our research demonstrates that Chinese mishus are in a
position to cushion and moderate conflicts and clashes
between leaders also by mediating intra-elite communications.
It is generally expected and even taken for granted that
there exist personality conflicts, policy disagreements, or
power struggles among political leaders. Yet it is an
official taboo for some leaders to band together to promote a
separate interest, regional, institutional, or factional. As
a result, Chinese political leaders are not supposed to meet
in private too frequently except at formal meetings held at
certain intervals. Any two leaders directly contacting each
other with any conspicuous frequency in private will arouse
suspicion of factional foul play and thus draw fire from
their colleagues. Consequently, for all the fact that
factionalism does exist and even often goes rampant at
different times and different places in the Chinese political
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arena, leaders are very cautious in their open interactions
with one another, in order to avoid arousing accusation of
committing this cardinal sin -- under normal circumstances.
As a result, Chinese leaders have to rely heavily upon their
mishus, personal and organizational, to communicate with each
other in their work and even in their personal
communications.
In conducting and mediating communications between
leaders, mishu personnel tend, out of self-interest, to
remain neutral, nonpartisan, and supportive toward all of the
leaders. They usually sift out backbiting comments, dilute
personal malice, and gloss over divergent opinions, so as to
facilitate a workable rapport among the leaders. In this
sense, Chinese mishus perform a function comparable to the
institution of civil service in the Western countries, which
is supposed to be above partisan politics so as to provide
stability and continuity to the political system as a whole.
Heads of the general offices are particularly important in
reconciling clashes among the leaders.
Moreover, mishus are able to play a significant role in
lubricating interpersonal interactions between leaders and
bureaucrats, since they work as the go-betweens, passing
upward nearly all information and requests and passing down
virtually all instructions and commands. This way, chances
for friction and direct confrontation between leaders and
bureaucrats are reduced.
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In addition to lubricating and smoothening interpersonal
relationships and interactions, misshu '
cushioning/integrating role is also reflected in coordination
over policy issues. The mishu system is the principal carrier
of institutional memory in the Chinese political process.
Virtually all of leaders' past decisions, instructions, and
opinions are either memorized and/or recorded and stored by
mishus. In this capacity, they are made responsible for
researching, drafting, and editing practically all new
documents. During the process of composing an official
document, mishus enjoy an extraordinary amount of discretion,
so that they are entitled and required to consult each other
and all the interested leaders and bureaucrats, under usual
circumstances. Thanks to the institutional memory mishus
preserve and to extensive consultations they are required to
conduct, the Chinese decision-making process is able to
maintain some measure of consistency and continuity, for all
the arbitrary authority that powerful individual leaders
possess and apply sporadically.
Our comparative analyses, historical and contemporary,
suggest that mishus' cushioning/integrating role is a highly
unique phenomenon, compared with the primary functions of
staff personnel in other systems or even in ancient China. In
the United States and imperial China, staff personnel
function typically as major sources of tensions, frictions
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and conflicts, whereas the mishu institution of China today
serves as a primary cushioning/integrating mechanism.
Our findings suggest that the contrasting behavior
patterns are caused or influenced by a combination of
structural constraints and cultural attitudes, though any
single factor is not sufficient for explaining the difference
and its relative weight varies from case to case. when it
comes to comparing the American and Chinese cases, the most
important structural determinant is probably competitive
politics versus power monopoly. Under the pressures of
elective politics, political leaders tend to save for
themselves the role of being nice, popular, and consistent,
while leaving to their staffs the role of being tough, pushy,
demanding, and changeable. In the absence of popular
elections, Chinese Communist leaders tend to prefer
themselves to be awed, feared, and promptly obeyed, while
letting their staffs worry about bringing a measure of
smoothness, consistency, coherence, and continuity to their
often abrupt and arbitrary decisions and actions.
Furthermore, the Chinese mishu system itself is
structured differently from its counterparts in other
countries or in ancient China. The mishu institution is a
unified system organizationally connecting all its units
across the country. This arrangement inclines or encourages
mishus everywhere to reconcile regional and institutional
differences and conflicts and to coordinate with each other.
In contrast, the staff systems in imperial China and the US
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are privately hired assistance; as such, staff members tend
to single-mindedly promote the interests of their bosses at
the expense of other individuals or institutions.
Relatedly, mishus typically serve many masters. Even
those personal mishus who serve individual leaders belong to
the mishu squad, and thus have some obligation to take the
interests and opinions of the whole leadership squad into
account. In contrast, staff people elsewhere typically serve
only one single master, and all they have to be concerned
with is to push and fight for his interests.
Another structural constraint is career path of staff
personnel. The mishu institution is arguably the most
important fast track for upward mobility in the Chinese
political arena of today. .Mishus are young and junior people
but are groomed successors for becoming political leaders.
Hence, mishus generally feel it in their best interest to
cautiously cultivate long-term friendships and goodwill with
as many leaders as possible instead of jumping onto the
bandwagon of one single leader -- under normal circumstances.
By contrast, staff people elsewhere typically follow a career
path different from that of their masters'. They treat their
staff positions either as temporary jobs on their way to more
profitable employment in other societal sectors, as in the
case of American politics, or as a permanent career rather
than a mere springboard into officialdom, as in the case of
the mufu and the palace eunuch systems in ancient China.
Following these career paths distinctive from that of
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mishus', staff people tend to care more about gaining their
personal reputation and accumulating de facto, not de jure,
power and respect onto themselves than cautiously and humbly
cultivating long-term goodwill with other political leaders.
One exception to this pattern is the Grand Council
institution in the Qing Dynasty, in that the Grand Councilors
were indeed permanent members of the officialdom.
Nevertheless, they found themselves already comfortably at
the apex of the bureaucratic rank system for all their staff
status vis-a-vis the emperor. This arrangement prevented them
from caring greatly about playing the cushioning/lubricating
role toward other officials or institutions. In all the cases
above, staff members often feel it necessary to deliberately
act aggressively, insensitively, and rudely toward other
leaders or bureaucrats in order to prove their loyalty and
reliability to their own bosses. Thus, the different career
paths work to limit the cushioning/coordinating role of staff
personnel in other systems and in imperial China.
In terms of cultural determinants, our findings suggest
that popular attitudes and expectations toward political
leaders have significant impact on the division of personae
roles between leaders and their staff members.1 Readers
should be cautioned that the cultural explanation to be
offered below may sound tautological without pinning down the
1. The following observation is based on the insights of
Lucian W. Pye's book, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural
Dimensions of Authoritv, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1985..
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exact cause-effect sequence in a scientifically rigorous
manner, but it is hoped that it can offer some heuristic
insight into the dynamics of the respective leadership-staff-
bureaucracy interactions under discussion.
In a society where politicians are "expendable" (or
replaceable), are expected to fulfill limited utilitarian
purposes, promote specific policies, and serve separate
interests, and are held in low esteem, the leaders tend to
jealously hold on to whatever shreds of respect and support
they can amass or retain in order to get elected, stay in
office, and advance their specific polices and interests,
while leaving their staff members take care of the unpopular
jobs and take heat on their behalf. This has been illustrated
by the American case.- In a society where rulers are
"unexpendable" (or irreplaceable), are expected to maintain a
static overarching social, political, and moral order instead
of pushing for changes in one direction or another or in
favor of one interest group over another, and are held in
great awe and high esteem and counted upon to possess moral
impeccability, the rulers tend to empower their personal
staffs to play it tough and take charge of conflict-arousing,
mistake-prone government affairs, while they themselves
remained detached and aloof, thus minimizing chances for
betraying any personal failings. This has been illustrated by
the case of imperial Chinese politics.
Put in another way, in traditional China, the most
important responsibility for rulers was to maintain social
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and political order. Confucianism, or the official ideology,
dictated that this order should be based primarily upon
morality; rulers should stand at the highest echelon of this
moral hierarchy and be perfect moral exemplars for their
subordinates and the general populace. If in American
political culture people's esteem for politicians is too low,
then in imperial China, people's expectations toward the
moral conduct of their rulers were unrealistically too high.
The result seems to be the same, however. Both American
politicians today and Chinese rulers of ancient times need
badly the assistance of tough, rough-mannered staff people.
"Hanging there" precariously, American politicians cannot
afford to lose any more of the little public respect;
claiming to be morally impeccable, ancient Chinese rulers
could not afford to expose any personal failings and defects.
Therefore, both rely heavily on their staffs to take care of
the unpopular "dirty work" inevitably associated with
politics.
Chinese political culture has, however, undergone
significant change in one important respect: traditional
rulers were primarily responsible for maintaining social,
political, and moral order; whereas political leaders of
today take it upon themselves to not only maintain order but
also transform and modernize society. Consequently, cultural
expectations about political leadership's role have changed
significantly. In the past, an ideal ruler was expected to be
a benevolent, 'do nothing" (wu wei) figure; a leader today is
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expected to be an activist, pusher, and taskmaster. Thus, to
put it in a generalized statement, in a society where
political leaders are "unexpendable" (or irreplaceable), are
expected not only to maintain comprehensive order but also to
carry out drastic social transformations, and are held in
great awe but at the same time expected to possess personal
imperfections (e.g. ignorance and ineptitude) and make
blunders from time to time,2 the leaders and their staffs tend
to divide the personae roles between them in such a way that
the leaders are supposed to be bold, pushing, demanding,
experimenting, while their staffs are supposed to be
discreet, soft, reconciliatory, and accommodating, thus being
ever-ready to remedy any damages and smooth out any
disruptions left behind by the leaders. This has been
exemplified by the case of temporary Chinese politics.
Significantly, this research demonstrates that as an
institution, the mishu is not only beneficial to the
functioning of the Chinese political system as a whole but it
also brings enormous personal benefits and advantages to
individual actors -- leaders, bureaucratic subordinates, and
mishu personnel themselves. Leaders enjoy extensive
meticulous services and assistance from their state-provided
miahus, which virtually cover every aspect of their work and
2. The official excuse for this expected practice of
incompetent cadres making foolish blund~ers is "paying the
tuition fees" (iao xaueeii) or "learning from mistakes."
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even their private livelihood. In terms of personal life
support, mishus take care of their leaders' salaries, food,
transport, clothing, housing, medical care, recreation,
family affairs, down to funeral services. Mishus are also
great beneficiaries of the institution. Young as they are,
mishus are allowed into the innermost core of the Chinese
authority structure, thus enjoying opportunities to learn all
the political tricks, secrets, and skills necessary for
success or even mere survival in the Chinese political arena.
Being physically closest to leaders, miahus are in the best
position to please them and win their personal trust and
liking. As a result, they are rewarded with frequent
promotions. Subordinate bureaucrats profit from the mishu
institution in that mis.hus' oral communications are a
critical source of clues as to the leaders' true intentions,
preferences, and feelings behind the usually vague written
documents. Besides, mishus' cooperation is indispensable when
bureaucrats try to manipulate leaders' perceptions,
decisions, and activities in favor of their separate or
private interests.
Since every party can gain a great deal from it, the
mishu institution has proved highly stable and consistently
powerful over time, and has in .turn provided to all political
actors a personal sense of continuity, coherence, and
anchorage or security, for all the political upheavals,
drastic policy zigzags, and structural disruptions both in
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the Mao times of "uninterrupted revolution" and in the Deng
era of sweeping reforms.
When it comes to China's reform movement, the mishu
institution provides the Chinese system two advantages:
flexibility to cope with uncertainties and ambiguities and a
reasonably good concentration of authority to initiate bold
measures and still maintain order and stability. These two,
as Susan Shirk puts it, are preconditions for success in
reforming a soviet-type system: '...the political
preconditions for dynamic transformation from plan to market
are institutional flexibility and authority."3
Heavy dependence upon mishu support and services
apparently hinders institutionalization or proceduralization
of the Chinese system, causing Chinese political system to be
"surprisingly flexible."4 For instance, the Chinese decision-
making procedure is highly fluid: who are let in and who are
left out in a particular decision process is often decided on
an ad hoc basis, varying from case to case. If a leader is
unhappy with the decision reached by a set of participants,
another process can be called upon with a different group of
participants, so that a different decision can be made.
Nevertheless, this flexibility has saved the Chinese top
3. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic
Reform in China, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1993, p. 22.
4. •Iid,. p. 333.
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leaders from confronting two highly risky tasks. First, they
did not have to drastically reorganize or dismantle a highly
institutionalized and rigidified existing bureaucracy, as
Gorbachev felt compelled to in the Soviet Union,s in order to
implement their reform plans. "As a consequence, the Chinese
processed economic reforms through the old decision-making
channels."6 Second, the Chinese top leaders did not feel it
necessary to follow a "big bang" strategy to carry out the
economic reform, but were able to adopt a gradualist approach
of "crossing the river by feeling for one stone after
another." The mishu institution has probably played a crucial
role in making the desired flexibility possible by conducting
constant oral communication, continuous adjustments, and
comprehensive coordination, thus giving the Chinese system a
remarkable degree of stability amidst an overabundance of
ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions, and reversals.
In addition to flexibility, a reasonably good
concentration of authority in the political leadership is
indispensable for setting in motion bold reform plans,
overcoming bureaucratic inertia and resistance, and
maintaining political order. Susan Shirk explains:
5. Ibid. pp. 11, 348. Although the staff role in the
Soviet Union awaits further study, the findings of
preliminary research suggests that it played a relatively
minor role, particularly with regard to the function of
cushioning, smoothening, integrating, and coordinating on a
nation-wide scale, as in comparison with the Chinese mishu
institution.
6. Shirk, The Political Logic, p. 12.
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A second institutional desideratum for achieving economic
reform is authority. Reforming an economic system cannot be
done without inflicting some pain on the groups who are
favored and prbtected by the status quo. A political system
that cannot exert authority over its agents will find
economic transformation an impossible task.7
In this regard, the mishu role is also highly significant. By
constantly monitoring and supervising activities in
bureaucracies, mishus make sure that leaders stay well
informed and that bureaucrats stay within the boundaries set
by the leaders. What the Chinese top leadership aims at in
terms of an appropriate concentration of authority was once
explained in 1989 by Li Ruihuan, a member of the Politburo
standing committee:
What we are trying to do is fly a kite, not set it free. When
we are flying a kite, it is still controlled by our hand. we
can have many ways to control it. Our controlling ability is
expressed by how far and how flexibly we can fly it. s3
with the assistance of the mishu institution, the Chinese top
leadership has, generally, proved capable of alternately
decentralizing and recentralizing various powers, as it deems
appropriate.
This research has focused on the benefits that the mishu
institution brings both to the Chinese political system as a
whole and to individual actors. Nonetheless, it would be
misleading to regard the mishu institution as a panacea for
7. Ibid. p. 348.
8. Quoted from Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres
to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1991, p. 423.
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all the control problems and the centrifugal forces inherent
in the Chinese political process. It should be pointed out
that there exists, for example, some intrinsic tension
between the controlling and the cushioning roles,
particularly when it comes to the relationship between
leadership and bureaucracy. If mishus perform the controlling
role too enthusiastically, they will certainly arouse
resistance and hostility from the bureaucrats. An effective
cushioning and smoothening role requires that mishus overlook
or gloss over many minor deviations from leadership's
preferences, which means loosening up leaders' control.
Although ~ishus are trained to be highly skilled in striking
a delicate balance between the two roles, this inherent
contradiction can cause problems from time to time.
Moreover, it is a classical political dilemma everywhere
in the world: "How to control the controller?" The same
problem exists in Chinese politics with regard to the mishu
institution. There is no question that mi•hus play a crucial
part in amplifying political leadership' control over
bureaucrats, but Chinese political principals sometimes
experience difficulty of varying degrees controlling their
mishus. There are occasional complaints about abuses of power
by miahus, who are said "to lord it over common people," "to
deliver falsified or distorted 'imperial decrees'," "to play
leaders off against each other," "to advance their private
320
interests," and even "to violate the law."9 Exercise of great
de facto power appears to have, in some case, fanned desires
for more power, as for example, in the recent years some
mishus have advocated openly the principle of "more
autonomous mishu power."1 0 Therefore, a chronic issue in
Chinese politics has been the call to curb the power of
mishus.
For instance, Mao warned on many occasions: "Don't let
mishus take part in politics. Don't tolerate the dictatorship
by mishus (mishu zhuanzhena)." 11 For all his warning to
others, however, Mao himself sometimes had some control
problem with his own mishus. For instance, his chief
personal mishu Tian Jiaying detected three major weaknesses
in him. The very first one was that Mao "coul.d manage the
universe but could not manage the people around him," namely,
his mishus. 12 The problem of controlling mishis is
particularly serious when the political leadership itself is
divided.
9. Xu Ruixin et al., Zhon auo xiandai mishu aonazuo
icghu (The .Essentials of Contemporary Chinese Mishu
Profession), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989, p. 138.
10. =hid. p. 138.
11. Mei Bai, "*u yao mishu can zhana" ("Don't Let Mishus
Take Part in Politics'), in Guo Simin, ed., Wo van zhona de
Mao Zedona (The Mao Zedona I saw), Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin
chubanshe, 1990, p. 85.
12. Li Rui, Lushan Huivi Shilu (The True Record of the
Lushan Conference), Changsha, 1989, p. 46.
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Moreover, for all its major role in cushioning conflicts
and clashes under normal circumstances, its moderating and
reconciling effect is limited when infighting between
hardened factional rivals heats up,13 as during the Cultural
Revolution. Then, some mis hus may abandon their usual
position of neutrality and jump onto the bandwagon of some
political leaders and become partisan players against other
leaders, turning the mishn institution itself into a source
of tensions and frictions. The Cultural Revolution during
which the entire factional Pandemonium broke loose was, in a
sense, engineered in its actual details and directed on a
day-to-day basis by the mishus of Mao and the mishus of his
staunchest supporters. Some Chinese authors on mishu work
regard the Cultural Revolution Small Group as the worst case
of misha power going awry in PRC history.14
Normally a major peace-maker and reconciliator, a
general office head may at time turn into ferocious partisan
figure. For instance, Wang Zhaoguo, then Central General
Office director, complained: "During the Cultural Revolution
and up to the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress,
someone [almost certainly Wang Dongxingis] caused great
13. This is even admitted by the Chinese author himself.
See Hou Rui, Zenvang dana banaotnashi zhuren (How to Work as
Director of a General Office), Beijing: Dangan chubanshe,
1990, p. 68.
14. Xu Ruixin et al., The Essentials, p. 179.
15. Wang Dongxing was Central GO director throughout the
Cultural Revolution.
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strains in the relationship between the Central General
Office and the various provinces and Central departments and
ministries."16 Moreover, a leader may deliberately place his
partisan follower or henchman in charge of a general office,
and then use it as his factional power base. It was no
accident that in arranging for his son Lin Liguo to take over
de facto command of the Chinese air force, Li Biao had the
younger Lin first appointed to be a mishu of its Party
Committee general office and then had him promoted to be
concurrently deputy director of the same GO and deputy head
of the Operations Department.17 Based partly on his special
status as Lin Biao's son and partly on his own control of the
mighu squad, Lin Liguo was then able to dominate and bully
all the leaders of the air force. The Party Committee of the
air force decided that revery matter in the air force should
be reported to Lin Liguo, and everything should be under his
control and command." In addition, the political department
of the air force adopted five injunctions: "Think of Lin
Liguo all the time, ask him about everything, protect him
16. Wang Zhaoguo, "Chonafen fahui banaonLtina de canmou.
zhushou zuovona" ("Give Full Play to the Role of General
Offices in Providing Advice and Assistance"), in in
tonazhi tan mishu gonazuo (The Remarks by Leadina Comrades on
Mishu Work), Beijing: Xiandai chubanshe, 1989, p. 70.
17. Shao Yihuai, Lin Biao wanachao heimu (The Sinister
Plot of Lin Biao's Imperial Court), Sichuan: Sichuan wenyi
chubanshe, 1988, p. 23.
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everywhere, take him as our leader, sincerely comply with his
demands and his every command. "18
Moreover, a chief leader may deliberately create
divisions among the mishus so as to pit them against each
other and thus keep checks and balances. This was the case
with Mao, who seems to have always divided his personal
mishus into two opposing sides. During the Great Leap
Forward, Chen Boda, one of his major mishus, was a well-known
zealot for the policy of people's communes, regarding the
communes as "a new utopia, "a miracle," and "China's
Sputnik." Tian Jiaying, another of Mao's major miahus, was
known to be critical of the same policy. His investigation
report was "as black as Chen Boda's was white," portraying
the communes as "an endless list of troubles.'19 During the
Cultural Revolution, Mao's two chief milhus were also known
to be on the opposite sides of the factional line. Mao
Yuanxin, his niece and political liaison mishu, was a
supporter of the radical Gang of Four, while Zhang Yufeng,
his confidential mishu and probably his mistress, was a
sympathizer of Zhou Enlai's moderate faction.
The policy of "divide and rule* may result in ruthless
competition among miass for leaders' attention and favors.
18. Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, Wenhua Da Gemina Shinian Shi
(The Ten-Year History of the Cultural Revolution), Tianjin:
Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1986, pp. 341-342.
19. Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emreror! China in
the Era of Mao and Deno, Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1992, pp. 170-171.
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Then, mishus may report on each other to their masters. A
former confidential mishu of Mao has confessed: "There were
complications in the relationship among those of us [mishus]
who worked for Mao Zedong. Sometimes the conflicts could be
quite fierce.'20 When a rectification campaign came, they
apparently criticized each other relentlessly.21 In an extreme
case, Tian Jiaying, Mao's chief mishu, died from the
persecution by Mao's other miahus.22 One of his persecutors,
Qi Benyu, had been reproached and demoted by Tian on an
earlier occasion.23
Even under normal conditions without cutthroat factional
struggles, head of a ~iAhu squad may mean well and try to be
faithful to his expected role as a major reconciliator, and
yet the conflicting demands on him resulting from the
convoluted interpersonal relationships may be just too
difficult even for his superb human relations skills. Thus,
he may make unpopular decisions that arouse tensions and
20. Kao Zhi, "Jiang Qing wo zhineng guan bange" ("I Can
Control Only Half of Jiang Qing"), in Quan Yanchi, ed.,
Linaxiu lei (The Leader s Tears), Beijing: Qiushi chubanshe,
1989, pp. 92-93.
21. Zbid. pp. 98-99.
22. Pang Xianzhi, "Mao Zedong he tade mishu Tian
Jiaying" ('Mao Zedong and His M•abm Tian Jiaying'), in Dong
Bian et al., eds., Mao Zedong he tade mishu Tian Jiavina (M=
Zedona and His Mishu Tian Jiavina), Beijing: Zhongyang
wenxian chubanshe, 1989, pp. 81-82.
23. Peng Yaxin, "Tian Jiaying xiaozhuan" ("A Short
Biography of Tian Jiaying"), in Dong Bian et al., eds., Mao
Zedong and His Mishu Tian Jiavina, p. 329.
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conflicts. For instance, considerations about economizing on
the administrative budget led Wang Zhaoguo, then Central
General Office director, to decide to "confine all the
expenses within fifty thousand yuan" when arranging the
funeral services for Marshal Liu Bocheng, who had been
politically dormant for decades. Wang's decision enraged the
military, who expected a much more extravagant "state
funeral." As a result, "dozens of ranking army officers filed
angry protests to the Center, and Deng Xiaoping had to
personally intervene to smooth out the ruffled feathers."24
Nonetheless, the above extreme cases of mishus'
misconduct should not obscure the basic fact that under
normal circumstances, mjihus serve, on the whole, as the
primary cushioning/integrating mechanism in the Chinese
political process. Even during the Cultural Revolution, a
period of the worst factionalism in PRC history, most
organizational mighus still managed to maintain a degree of
neutrality among the clashing leaders, if only for the sake
of self-protection against highly unpredictable outcomes of
the political drama. Indeed, even some personal mijhus tried
to preserve some safety for themselves against their masters'
possible fall, by secretly cooperating with their bosses'
enemies. Jiang Qing's confidential mishu Yan Changgui, for
example, tipped off Marshals Ye Jianying and Xu Xiangqian
24. He Pin, NZhonggong dui Tai gongzuo diyixian
zhujiang" ("The Front-line Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese
Communist Party's Taiwan Affairs*), Zhonaauo shibao zhoukan
(China Times Weekly), No. 68 (1993), p. 71.
326
about Jiang's plan to search their residences and detain
them, thus giving them time to make preparations and escape.25
Finally, our findings allow us to make some speculations
about the prospects for the political development of China.
There are three possible scenarios, which are as follows.
First, Chinese politics is moving away from charismatic
authority toward legal-rational institutionalization, away
from vertical authority relationship toward horizontal
exchange relationship, away from the command model toward the
bargaining model, away from centralization toward
decentralization, away from the Center' omnipotence toward
autonomy of provinces, and away from state hegemony toward
freedom of society.26 In the process of this development, the
power allocation in the Chinese political arena is
increasingly shifting in favor of the bureaucracy at the cost
of the political leadership. In other words, the political
leadership becomes weaker and weaker while the bureaucracy
gets stronger and stronger. As a result, fragmentation and
political decay set in. The political process degenerates
into something like "the bargaining treadmill," "the rural
25. Luo Ning, AChumo yu hongse gongqiang lide renwu°
('The Shadowy Figures behind the Blood-Red Wall"), Minzhu
hon (Demcratie China), No. 11 (1992), p. 41.
26. A typical example of this general perception is
perhaps provided by David Shambaugh, "Losing Control: The
Erosion of State Authority in China," Current Hitoryv, Vol.
92, No. 575 (September 1993), pp. 253-259.
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country fair or market," 27  or "protracted guerrilla
warfare," 2 8  with self-serving bureaucrats getting
increasingly self-assertive and uncontrollable. And the whole
country 'is becoming an increasingly anarchic society," as
'the economy continues to careen out of control," social
unrest and political protests intensify, 'social order is
breaking down," crime rate keeps rising to 'unprecedented
levels," and Nofficial, institutional, and individual
corruption have all reached epidemic proportions.'29 The worst
imaginable outcome is a total disintegration of the whole
political system (as has befallen the Communist countries in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union), which may even lead to
a civil war.
with the 89-year-old Deng rapidly approaching his death
and an inevitable succession struggle already afoot or in the
offing, this scenario is particularly inviting. For that
matter, this is the dominant view at the present. In this
scenario, the cushioning/integrating role of the mishu
institution is greatly weakened, and miabra are divided among
themselves and become fierce partisan players, fighting with
27. David M. Lampton, "Chinese Politics: The Bargaining
Treadmill, Taisues and Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1987), p. 12.
28. David M. Lampton, "A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining,
Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China," in Kenneth G.
Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracv. Politics.
and Decinion Makina in Post-Mao China, California: University
of California Press, 1992, p. 37.
29. David Shambaugh, 'Losing Control,' pp. 253-259.
328
each other and supporting different factions of political
leaders.
A second scenario is that there emerges a new
charismatic strongman, while mi±hus jump overwhelmingly onto
his bandwagon and rally around him. With the firm support of
the mishus and some colleagues, he removes his political
rivals and smashes the resistance of the bureaucracy, thus
establishing another totalitarian regime. This is obviously
the least plausible scenario. Unlikely as it may appear,
however, this scenario was indeed realized in imperial China,
when some emperors came to the throne or acquired domination
over the state bureaucracy depending almost entirely upon the
assistance and support of palace eunuchs. Even today, given
its formidable Central Security Bureau (also known as Unit
8341) and its extensive information, intelligence, and
communication networks, the Central General Office is
certainly a crucial factor in determining the outcome of the
succession struggle, and after that, consolidating the power
of the new paramount leader.
Our third scenario is that thanks to the controlling and
cushioning/integrating roles of the miahu institution, the
Chinese political leadership retains sufficient authority but
allows ample flexibility for bureaucracies at all levels to
vigorously pursue their separate interests, hence the model
of "authority without immobilism.e30
30. The term was first used probably by Susan Shirk, The
Political Logic, p. 349.
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This scenario is supported by the findings of this
dissertation, which suggest that the political development in
China's leadership-bureaucracy relationship is not
necessarily unidirectional -- one way or the other. It is
true that the Chinese political leadership has lost much of
its arbitrary power over the bureaucracy and the Chinese
authority structure is more diversified, diffused, and
fragmented today than under Mao. Nonetheless, with adequate
and competent staff assistance, leaders can retain, and even
enlarge in some aspects, their power to exercise effective
control and leadership over their bureaucratic subordinates.
And with adequate and competent maigh, assistance, Chinese
leaders are capable of maintaining a reasonably good degree
of coherence, integration, and coordination of the political
system as a whole, in spite of apparent fragmentation,
contradictions, conflicts, fluctuations, confusion, and
reversals.
Harry Harding once wrote: "Thus a veneer of unity, which
masks a cauldron of conflict underneath, often characterizes
Chinese politics. In short, Chinese politics is usually less
stable than it appears. "' But this study of the jis u role
suggests that with the help of the controlling and
cushioning/integrating roles of the miahu institution,
Chinese politics may turn out to be more stable than it
appears.
31. Harry Harding, China's Second Revolutione Refoxm
After Mao, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987,
p. 289.
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